THE FORTNIGHTLY

VOL. CXLIII NEW SERIES
JANUARY TO JUNE, 1938
(VOL. CXLIX OLD SERIES)

EDITORIAL OFFICE:
13 BUCKINGHAM STREET, STRAND, W.C.2

PUBLISHING AGENTS:
LONDON:
HORACE MARSHALL & SON, LTD.
TEMPLE HOUSE, TALLIS STREET, E.C.4

CORNELL COLLEGE
LIBRARY
WITHDRAWN
69083
MOUNT VERNON, IOWA

UNITED STATES:
FORTNIGHTLY REVIEW OFFICES
13 BUCKINGHAM STREET, LONDON, W.C.2

The Right of Translation is Reserved

CORNELL COLLEGE
LIBRARY
MT. VERNON, IOWA

THE FORTNIGHTLY

JANUARY, 1938

THE DECAY OF OPPOSITION.

BY LORD ELTON.

AT any moment between 1905 and 1914 any moderately intelligent person who was mildly interested in politics could probably have reeled off, on request, half a dozen clear-cut and burning issues between the Government and the Opposition. Could even an expert political partisan to-day? Before the War, too, beneath the immediate conflicts of the moment lay a fundamental conflict of political philosophies which was apparent and intelligible to the man in the street. The soundest Party man would find it difficult to maintain that that is so to-day. To discover to-day the genuine dissension of warring political creeds it is necessary to penetrate to the Annual Conferences of the Labour Party and to observe Mr. Bevin or Dr. Dalton defending the theses of the National Government against Professor Laski or Sir Stafford Cripps. Indeed it was impossible to read the reports from Bournemouth without realizing that the Trade Unions and their political henchmen, which is to say a vast majority of the voting strength of the Opposition, were far closer to the Government than to their own left wing. And many of the curious phenomena recorded in Hansard nowadays are to be accounted for only by the erratic functioning, in an era in which fundamental political cleavages have disappeared, of a procedure which traditionally assumes them.

Thus for a generation or more, devoted Labour evangelists lashed themselves, and often their audiences, into a frenzy with the demand for the nationalization of coal royalties. Thousands of enthusiasts must have enlisted under the Labour standard for no other reason than that Labour was prepared to press that demand against the two historic Parties. What would Keir Hardie have thought or said, could he have lived to see the nationalization of coal royalties being proposed by a National

Government amid the half-resentful apathy of the Labour Opposition? For years it used to be the boast of Socialists that they were determined to found legislation on science, while it was the habit of their opponents to taunt them with the charge that Socialism would mean constant and irritating intrusions on the privacy and independence of the individual. What would the pre-war Socialists have made of the spectacle of a National Government introducing a Population Bill with the express object of founding legislation on science, while a nominally Socialist Opposition clamoured against such irritating intrusion on the privacy and independence of the individual? If there were any genuine political cleavage to-day these would indeed be the politics of the other side of the Looking-Glass. The truth is, of course, that there are no clear-cut political cleavages; but an Opposition, or so the present Opposition believes, must needs oppose.

What is the explanation of this state of affairs, what will be the result of it and how long is it likely to last? August 4th, 1914, rang down the curtain on a number of envenomed controversies—Ireland, the Lords, the new social services, the taxation of the rich—and these the return of peace happily did not revive. Yet the post-war era opened in a political atmosphere which soon became so heated that there were plenty of pundits prepared to prophesy violence, and even revolution. Two fundamental issues appeared to divide the nation. In the first place Collectivism, the doctrine of co-operative planning and control, seemed to many to be the indispensable key to the new era and seemed also still to be the exclusive property of the idealistic and still untried Labour Party. In those days it was Labour which preached the nationalization of royalties, and its opponents who scouted the very suggestion as robbery. And, secondly, the conflicts of Labour and Capital in the world of industry were already acute and seemed likely to become acuter still. Closely linked to the Labour evangelists of Collectivism, the trade unions thus added to the rising temper of the nation the fuel of their own less theoretic but highly controversial objectives. In the worlds of theory and practice alike the issue was fairly joined, and the conflict seemed likely to be truceless. To-day neither controversy

is alive. Collectivism—Evolutionary Socialism, if you prefer it—is the common property of all the political parties. In a sense, indeed, to judge from such extraordinary spectacles as the Opposition's treatment of the Coal Bill and the Population Bill, the creed may be said to be more genuinely believed in by the nominal anti-Socialists than by the nominal Socialists. After all, the B.B.C., the Central Electricity Board, the Port of London Authority, the Area Traffic Commissioners, the Agricultural Marketing Boards and a number of other Socialist institutions were all inaugurated by supposed anti-Socialists. And, characteristically enough, the London Passenger Transport Board Bill was introduced by a Labour Minister, taken over by his Liberal successor and finally piloted to the Statute Book by a Conservative. In 1931, 320 Members of Parliament suggested to the Prime Minister that the Post Office should be re-organized on similar lines; and of these 320 no less than 295 were Conservatives. In fact one highly significant aspect of Mr. MacDonald's career was that, having first played a leading part in the diffusion of Collectivist ideas, he was eventually dubbed a traitor by sound Party men for combining with his converts to save the nation by translating those ideas into practice!

And if the old war of ideas is no more now than a mock battle, in which, to suit the exigencies of the Party game, many of the combatants change sides at will, the conflict of interests has dwindled to little more than an occasional sullen murmur. Labour and Capital are no longer locked in an internecine struggle. For one thing, now that vast sections of the people are assured of work or maintenance free from the taint of the Poor Law, a long step has been taken towards that economic security which was a prime objective of the old agitation. Mr. Bevin moreover has recently reminded the world of Labour that the attitude of the employer has been completely transformed of late. The tradition that advances can only be won through conflict is for the time being defunct. From time to time in the critical weeklies some academic theorist of the Left excitedly explains that now during the Armaments boom, now on a rising market, is the time for large-scale industrial conflict. The unions, however, do not respond. They are doubtless even less familiar nowadays with the outpourings of the academic

Socialists than was Lord Snowden, as he explained on a famous occasion, with the text of *Labour and the Nation*. Thus the principal origin of the blurring of Party frontiers is simple. Neither of the fundamental issues which divided the nation in the 'twenties is alive. To this we may perhaps add the increasingly obvious need of national co-operation—co-operation in face of the threat to democracy from abroad, co-operation in view of the vast complexity, the specialization and sub-specialization, of the modern way of life at home. The forces, both at home and abroad, making for unity are infinitely more powerful than the forces of disruption.

To all these generalizations the insignificant minority of intellectuals are naturally an exception. But then to be an exception is the very essence of their being. In art, politics and morals they have long now been sundered by an unbridged chasm from the mass of a nation which they never understood. In the coteries of Bloomsbury, in undergraduate clubs and in the spinsterly journals of the Left, the old incantations are chanted with scarcely diminished fervour, but in the country there is scarcely an echo to be heard. The man in the street, dimly aware that since the war he has been living through a second and vastly swifter industrial revolution, is simply not interested in the Victorian formulas of Marx or even in the network of sub-committees profferred to him by the various Utopias of Mr. G. D. H. Cole. If he votes Labour, these, at any rate, are not his reasons for doing so.

What are likely to be the results of this startling transformation of the political scene? The consequences, to begin with, to the Labour Party must obviously be momentous. From its foundation in 1900 it has always combined three distinct and easily distinguishable elements. An infinitesimal minority of enthusiasts of the Class War; a larger minority of genuine converts to evolutionary Socialism; and an overwhelming majority of honest-to-God trade unionists, converts to no theory, anxious merely for better working conditions and a squarer deal from society. It was evolutionary Socialism, the second of these elements, which once gave Labour its distinctive battle-cries, that sense of being *different* which is indispensable to a Party: the third provided the voting strength: the first

was usually little more than an occasional nuisance at meetings. To-day, with evolutionary Socialism all-pervasive in the intellectual atmosphere of the new age, Labour has lost its political *differentia*. It has been caught bathing, and its opponents have walked off with its clothes. To-day, consequently, it is faced with the dilemma, if it can be called a dilemma, of choosing between the two survivors of its original component elements. Is it to become a mere Party of the Class War *à la* Stafford Cripps or a mere trade union Party *à la* Bevin. That is the issue which so conspicuously divided the Bournemouth Conference. There can be no doubt how, sooner or later, it will be decided, for the Unions have the votes, the cash and, it may be added, the commonsense. But, let it be observed, the answer, when it is finally and unequivocally given, will not be the end of the Party's troubles. For, barring some unpredictable mischance, it is inconceivable that the nation will ever entrust its destinies to a mere Party of class war or even to a mere Party of trade unionism. As far as it is possible to foresee the future, the Labour Party will never be in power again. Hence the endemic clamour for a "Popular Front," an alliance between professed individualists under Sir Archibald Sinclair and professed Collectivists under Major Attlee, to achieve the one objective which genuinely unites them—office.

There is, however, another possibility which cannot be overlooked. It is not only that the leaders of the trade unions are sick to death of Left Book Clubs, of class-warriors in suede shoes and of the political indiscretions of Sir Stafford Cripps; they are also perfectly well aware that in the political alliance of 1900 they sacrificed the valuable power they formerly possessed of bargaining with all Parties in the State in return for what then appeared the even more valuable prospect of an eventual indefinite tenure of power by the new alliance. With that prospect relegated now to the Greek Kalends they naturally ask themselves what in fact the alliance is worth to them. They see the executive of the Labour Party composed to-day of 12 members elected by the trade unions but 13 chosen by other bodies. With the Trade Union Congress practically unanimous for rearmament they see every prospect that the Party will oppose it. They have even begun to wonder whether in wage

negotiations they are not hampered by their political alliance. Small wonder that to-day there are trade union leaders who are openly opposed to an alliance with any political Party at all. It is possible that the rupture will come sooner than is expected.

The consequence to the nation at large of the disappearance of fundamental political cleavage, of the shifting of interest from argument about principles to argument about how principles should be applied, is likely to be even more far-reaching. With a succession of National Governments (whose centre of gravity will shift from Right to Left and back again) Parliamentary procedure will presumably adapt itself. The necessary stimulus of the Front Bench will come increasingly, not from a formal Opposition whose duty is monotonously to oppose, but from the guerilla tactics of small groups on extreme Left and Right and, above all, from the criticism of its own supporters. The influence of the private member will increase. The Government has already of late had to beat a retreat before its own back-benchers in the matter of the Hoare-Laval agreement, the National Defence Contribution, the partition of Palestine and the Population Bill. Such incidents are novel, and Governments of the future are likely to take steps to see that they do not become too frequent. National politics in fact may well pursue something like the course of municipal politics, where elections, amid the growing apathy of the electorate, are still usually contested on orthodox Party lines, but in the business of the elected bodies Party is constantly treated as an irrelevance. Moreover, with the decay of Opposition the economic landscape of the future is beginning to take recognizable shape. Even ten years ago it looked as if we were faced with a clear-cut choice between a "capitalist" and a "socialist" State. Even then it was difficult for an impartial student of economic organization to assent to such a simplified view, but the form which the Party conflict still assumed made it at least a natural popular illusion. To-day no one but a few doctrinaires of the Left genuinely supposes that in fact either Scylla or Charybdis lies ahead of us. To-day vast and increasing areas of our economic life are controlled by public boards and commissions whose underlying principle is no longer a subject of dispute.

Here we have the characteristic British compromise, an attempt to limit profits and impart collective direction while retaining the flexibility and initiative of private enterprise. The B.B.C., the Marketing Boards, the Coal Re-organization Commission and the rest are neither Socialism on the international model nor Capitalism on the international model. They are a characteristic British substitute for both, a courageous attempt, and who shall say that it will fail, to enjoy the best of both worlds. They are the democratic answer to the rigid formulæ of the Totalitarian States. Already they are being copied by other democracies abroad. In time to come they may well be as widely acclaimed and imitated as was British Parliamentarism a century ago.

EMPIRE FINANCE AND AGRICULTURE.

By Philip Mairet.

THE struggle between the Banks and the Government in the Province of Alberta in Canada is a consequence, as everyone knows, of a searching criticism of our money system which originated just after the Great War in England. Not so many people know why such a cause should have led to a colonial struggle as its most conspicuous effect, and few of the general public realize that this monetary criticism has revealed the most dangerous weakness in the social and economic structure of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

The after-war problems led innumerable laymen to enquire for the first time into the working of our money and credit systems, and Major Douglas' Social Credit propaganda focussed critical argument upon their most vulnerable points. In the ferment of thought that followed beliefs about money have changed considerably. Even academic economists have come to treat the present functions of money much less as the operation of eternal principles and more as historic growths which falsify real economic values and distort the normal relations between men as producers and as consumers. But the only direct political effect so far of Major Douglas' propaganda has been to organize discontents in several regions in the Empire.

The zeal of the Dominions to turn a financial doctrine into a political agitation can be simply accounted for. These peoples are in debt not merely internally, and some of them to others, but each as a nation is heavily in debt to the Mother Country. Each is trading with Britain whilst paying to Britain a very large annual interest upon its past imports of capital. Millions of pounds' worth of their goods must be sent abroad before these peoples can begin to exchange goods for goods upon equal terms : and this, in the Great Slump following upon the

War, when world-trade diminished to less than half its previous volume—reduced them to extreme poverty and unemployment. The interest payments, which had to be kept up throughout, took almost all of their produce that the world-market would absorb, and sometimes more than all.

Being amongst the worst sufferers from the Slump, these populations were predisposed to question the economic system that had let them down; moreover, in the colonial character there is a propensity ingrained by practice to seek the causes of a breakdown with alacrity; to consider remedies with openness of mind and to apply energetically any that seem feasible. Besides, one element in the Douglas criticism touched, in some colonies at least, the rawest nerves of recent experience. In Australia, for instance, the banker was taking it upon himself to ration the expenditure of the colonist by intervening between him and the only available stores in his locality—and checking his domestic accounts. Free men, subjected to surveillance of this kind, almost impossible to be exercised without pettiness of spirit, only needed to hear of Douglas's exposure of the financial system and his warnings of the growing powers of bankers to feel his reasoning reinforced by their own resentment. In other Dominions, too, the banker's interference in controlling expenditure, if less offensive than it was in Australia, was more officious and conspicuous than it appears to be in the older countries.

All those irritations that have rendered the Dominions specially susceptible to Social Credit agitation are symptoms of one and the same *malaise*—their state of irredeemable indebtedness; these peoples have awakened to another and more sinister aspect of the bonds that bind them less in love to the Mother Country than in percentage to the City of London. It had not been the intention of Social Credit teachings, apparently, to focus attention specially upon this issue—though there was no wish to avoid it—but the appearance of a Social Credit Government in the province of Alberta compelled attention to the question of the debts before any Social Credit legislation could be introduced under Dominion conditions. Premier Aberhart's victory led to some embarrassment in Social Credit circles, mainly because this problem of the Dominion

debts, which had figured somewhat distantly in the prospect, came suddenly to occupy the whole of the foreground.

Yet it is a natural working-out of Social Credit teaching that it should lead to an attack upon the very structure of financial imperialism. That these teachings took effect as a minor crisis in Imperial relations is, however unexpected, a fact of history. And if we look into the nature and history of the inter-Imperial debts, we shall quickly see that questions of incalculable menace or promise depend upon their continuance or liquidation.

These debts are records of material assistance rendered in the past by Great Britain to her colonial lands. They were loans of money, subscribed by individuals and financial institutions in this country, to enable the Dominions to establish themselves as ordered States, with full facilities for economic development. Development has been mainly undertaken, of course, by private enterprise, financed also in the main by private loans. Both kinds of loan create, by the interest due upon them, a first charge on Dominion production, but in the case of loans to the Governments concerned the interest is collected by taxation, which means that it must be paid in any case, even if the currency of a Dominion has to be depreciated in consequence.

What was actually transferred from Britain to these countries when the loans were made was partly money and mainly capital goods. Very heavy expenditure of this kind is needed to bring the undeveloped countries up to their full productive power, but vast as the amount of the debts has become, payment of the interest might not have been too burdensome to be borne, in view of the richness of the new lands, the energy of the colonists and the exhilarating atmosphere of unlimited enterprise. Repayment depends, however, upon the willingness of the world-market—and particularly of the British market—to accept payment in produce : and this has always been limited. It is not so much because the colonists cannot pay, as because their payment cannot be accepted, that the interest is felt as ruinous, and repayment as an impossibility, and the situation is usually met by contracting further loans.

The circumstances that create an artificial incentive to this

export of capital are now being fairly widely understood, and may be briefly summarized. The progress of technique called the industrial revolution rapidly concentrated wealth, especially industrial and financial profits, in the hands of the few, while immensely increasing the power of the banks and other financial houses. Relatively very little of the huge increase in values was distributed to raise the general standard of livelihood, and this excess of financial wealth therefore pressed for employment, not as purchasing power for end-products, but as capital for financing further industrial plant. Left to itself, the effect of this over-capitalization would have been, under prevailing competitive conditions, to replace productive machinery at a pace too hot to bear, and this is what did happen on several occasions, bringing about serious reactions and depressions. But there were whole continents abroad to develop; there were natural demands from other countries, including the Dominions, for capital to develop their economic life; and to stimulate and increase these demands soon became a leading motive of high financial policy in the City of London. To use the excessive potentiality of production at home by export abroad was the simplest means of relieving the pressure.

It may not be useful to make moral reflections upon a historic movement so vast as this, and conditioned by so many different influences. But it may be worth recalling, by the way, the horror of many of the great nineteenth-century moralists—even if their cultural sympathies were as remote as those of Marx from Ruskin's—at the social ruthlessness and moral indifference that were characteristics of this hey-day of usury. The craze to exploit the new technique of industry in order to make money, and to spend it to make more money, may actually have been, as it appeared to the more sensitive spirits of the time, a wave of moral perversion such as sometimes comes over a whole people led into new temptations. In this case it was aggravated by one of its symptoms—the rise of a school of economic philosophers of immense learning and industry, and with a complaisant tendency to justify all ambition to make money as somehow conducive to public profit and progress; indeed as morally valuable, provided only the money gained were "saved" or turned into financial capital. They believed

there might easily be too little capital and could hardly be too much, since the law of supply and demand operated in capital as in commodities, so that all must work out right in the end. This notion was really about as plausible and useful as would be the idea that inequity does not really signify, since we are all made equal at last in death ; but it is a notion still cherished in certain high financial quarters.

Morals apart, however, the passion to turn the new potencies of the industrial age into capital values, instead of applying them to the enrichment of the population—whose social inheritance they were—was highly questionable economics. What return was to be made for all this exported wealth ? That question was answered by vague optimism rather than calculation. Not much reflection would have been needed to show that, if the people of Britain could not, under existing financial conditions, buy the product of their labours, and there was so large a surplus to export, they would be even less likely to buy still more goods, imported as interest-payments from abroad. Not only Britain, but the other industrially advanced countries following her lead as creditor to more backward states, soon discovered insuperable objections to accepting more than a portion of the new wealth they equipped the latter to produce. It is true that great benefits accrued to the industrialized states from their access to colonial resources : but these could have been amply absorbed by the current exchange of balanced trade. The artificial excess created by the loans was in effect an ever-growing invasion of the home markets by alien goods, which invasion was naturally resisted. It is true also that the purchasing power of the home population was slowly raised under these conditions, but only to a small extent, not nearly enough to transfer the interest from the debtor to the creditor countries. The lender abroad was supposed, like other capitalists, to be practising abstinence in the present for the sake of the future. Actually, this purblind foresight, this most profligate economy, led to terrific losses in monetary values, balanced by little if any material benefits to posterity. The loss of British capital abroad in the sixty years previous to the Great War is variously estimated at from two to four thousand million pounds. And this was before there had developed, to any great extent, an

aggravation of the process now only too familiar—as, for example the export to countries such as China, Japan, India and Egypt of mass-production machinery which accelerates their competition in markets not only for raw materials but for finished manufactures.

In the United Kingdom, where finance was all this time growing more all-powerful in politics, it became a main political concern of financial interests to force the population to absorb the produce of the foreign debtors. Imports from the new countries overseas consisted, necessarily, almost wholly of raw materials and agricultural produce, of which the former could be largely utilized by industry, much of it for re-export, and the latter could be introduced in the home market at prices that would undersell the British farmers. This opening of the domestic market to the free competition of overseas agriculture was the issue of the bitterest political struggle of the Victorian period, and it was won by the interests of capital-export.

Very few people, even at the height of that long and impassioned political conflict, could grasp its full significance ; because the issues were apparently so mixed. Nearly all of the humanitarians were impelled to advocate the open market, because it meant cheaper bread, and the underpaid workers were literally starving. In their perhaps excusable zeal for the quickest, if by no means the surest, way of relieving distress, few, if any, of these philanthropists considered that the issue of this struggle was committing Great Britain to the destiny of financial imperialism, with all that this must entail.

People of that period, whose understanding of Roman history was still moulded by Gibbon, were unlikely to realize that the actual technique of that " decline and fall " which destroyed a whole culture and civilization, was a system of financial loans to the colonies by the home-country, most ominously similar to the policy they were then establishing in the British Empire and which we are still pursuing. As a distinguished Conservative M.P. pointed out recently :

> " This is not a new policy. The Roman Bankers of the late Roman Republic and early Empire organized joint stock companies to develop the colonies, as you may read in Mommsen and in Lord Tweedsmuir's 'Julius Cæsar,' and imported their profits in the form of corn, to the utter ruin of the small Italian yeoman farmer."*

*From a letter by P. C. Loftus, M.P., to the Suffolk County Branch of the National Farmers' Union, May, 1937.

Rome's problem, as creditor to her colonies, was the same as Britain's is, as banker to the Dominions—the problem of selling sufficient colonial produce in the home market to pay the investors their interest. This is the observance of a purely financial condition. Commercially, metropolis and provinces have reciprocal interests in the exchange of commodities; but the existence of a vast financial superstructure reaching overseas overrules the operations of genuine trade. The results in Rome are well enough known. The population of the metropolis and its surrounding country became dependent as servants and general providers upon the official and financial classes; the city itself, more and more densely populated by people without economic security, disintegrated in family morale and was only kept from revolt by doles and public amusements. But we seldom think how perilously we are progressing towards a similar state of economic instability and social weakness.

The effect of exported capital upon Britain can be most briefly indicated by looking at the gross figures. According to the latest and most reliable estimates, the total money-value of farm-products consumed in this country is about £625,000,000 per annum. This includes all the materials of food and, of course, a great part of the material required for clothing. Just about two-fifths of this is produced in the home country: the rest is imported, partly from the Dominions and partly from foreign countries such as the Argentine and Denmark. The figure quoted is estimated at wholesale prices: at retail prices it would be rather more than double.

Now if we estimate at £100,000,000 the portion of these commodities which could not be satisfactorily produced in Britain—and this is an outside figure—we may still say that this country is producing considerably less than half of the food and clothing which it both needs, and is capable of providing for itself.

If there are many people capable of contemplating these figures without alarm—and it appears there are—it is because they lack the knowledge or imagination to realize what such an unnatural restriction of wealth implies; or because they have been misled by shallow arguments which have long been popularized to justify the sacrifice of agriculture to industry.

They say, for example, " Why not buy our food abroad, if it is cheaper ? " but, if they considered closely the grounds of that question, it might occur to them that food produced thousands of miles away in countries much less modernly developed, was unlikely to be cheaper in the only real sense of the word—*i.e.*, in consumption of material and human labour. They forget that things can be made artificially cheap or dear according to financial policy, and largely irrespective of the material costs of their production.

Or, more subtly, these people may say, ' It is the privilege of Britain to draw upon a wider world for her food. It is more profitable, more interesting, and gives people a more civilized life to live in towns and supply the world with scientific implements, than to go on living the brutish life of the fields, amongst animals and their excreta. We ought to be pleased and proud that we can now work in electrically-run and government-inspected factories, with a radio in the tenement room at home, two cinemas within as many minutes walk and a thronged swimming-pool in the park hard by.'

Not to argue about matters of taste, let us admit the grain of truth in this argument. A national exodus from agriculture and migration into towns of factories and offices could not have come about unless the people had been, to a large extent, fascinated by the newer possibilities. So much we must allow. But that is not to say we are only doing what we are doing because we like it. Our financial policy, so long dictated by a very small proportion of the population, has compelled the rest, by the unrelenting pressure of the money inducements it has held out and the ambitions it has inspired in money-makers, to use the discoveries of a scientific age in certain ways and not others, but with results that were neither desired nor foreseen.

There are the strongest reasons for believing that, whether we like it or not, this sacrifice of agricultural to industrial life is *not* good for us. Two of the most serious effects of excessive urbanization upon the population are the decrease in fertility and the increase of nervous instability. These evils are overtaking us at an increasing rate, and are rendered no less ominous by the fact that scientific progress—chiefly of sanitation and medicine—has considerably increased the average length of

life. Rural population, which is the source of human life from which we recruit not only our armies and navies but the workers of our cities, is beginning to dry up. A rise in the average age of citizens is no compensation for that calamity.

Many reasons could be adduced for regarding the present repression of rural life as a tendency towards national suicide, but their discussion would involve too lengthy a digression. The two effects mentioned are surely sufficient in themselves to condemn the policy that causes them. It is, moreover, important to realize that we are not lessening but increasing the cause of these evils. The most recent statistics show that the area of land under the plough is still diminishing. Disquietude over the position of agriculture having increased in recent years, strenuous efforts to improve it have been made by the Government, notably under Mr. Walter Elliot as Minister for Agriculture, the effect of which has been, on the whole, to make the prospects of the individual farmer a little more calculable and comfortable. But these measures have done nothing to enable more people to live upon the land; they have only confirmed and co-operated with the existing trend towards rural depopulation. Nor is anything better to be expected of Mr. W. S. Morrison's programme, which Parliament has now approved. That programme aims at the conservation of our agricultural resources in such a manner that they can be readily stimulated and expanded at need to meet the emergency of war. It proposes nothing to redress the perilous overbalance between the industrial and rural halves of the national economy.

Rural reconstruction, it is clear, is impossible without financial reconstruction. And the latter presents a problem so formidable that no party will yet commit itself to any thorough-going policy; for the interest upon the foreign and Dominion debts has become tightly bound up with the whole monetary class-structure of our society, ramifying through banks, insurance societies and other channels throughout the country. Nevertheless, it is fantastic to suppose that these debts will always be accepted as permanent features of the landscape: and the sooner we get down to removing them by whatever processes of conversion or amortization can be devised, the less embittered will be the circumstances of their ultimate, inevitable liquidation.

The re-colonization of Britain need not wait for this. Without spoiling anyone else's market in this country, consumption of food products could be very largely expanded. We now know from recent researches into national nutrition, that a large proportion of the population is underfed, and have a fairly reliable idea of the amount of produce that would be required to supply the deficiency; its wholesale value would approach a hundred million pounds.

Leaving aside the vexed question whether the whole of Britain's food could possibly be produced at home, few would dispute that this present deficiency could be supplied by British farms, and the two millions weekly which it represents would be enough to make the agricultural fortunes of several counties. Moreover, we know from the researches mentioned above that the population can be trusted to nourish itself to the optimum if it has the means; its instinct for right choice of foods is not defective. If the home demand were expanded by £100,000,000 annually, and imports merely not increased, the required expansion of home production would in fact occur. There are thus two main aspects of this question of restoring balance to our economy. One is the provision of the increased purchasing power for the public, and this without reliance upon the artificial (and now rapidly vanishing) means of capital export to augment wages. The other is liberation from the dead hand of past debt. Both present formidable problems in finance, and neither can be thought of as soluble except in easy stages: but already these things ought to have become the fixed objectives of national policy.

Apathetic acquiescence in the present drift towards racial impotence—for such it is—is unfortunately still countenanced by some, upon mistaken grounds of international idealism; as though the absolute dependence of Britain upon other countries for her daily bread were a beneficent example of international co-operation and tended towards the ultimate unity of all mankind! Such ignorant confusion of racial downfall with moral uplift is probably less prevalent than it was; and any serious examination of conditions in those countries that are laid under contribution for our sustenance would dispel it altogether. As Mr. Montague Fordham has said:

> "I always recommend these people who think we should have an open market for food to study its effect on the workers of the countries that export food to us: it is here that you find disaster."

The revolt of the countries most concerned—the Dominions—has already begun and is taking a directly financial form. Britain's top-heavy development is disastrous to them, moreover, in other ways than those they most sharply realize. It deprives them of the source of the immigration which they could most readily accept, and which would be most beneficial to their development. They do not want the human waste products of our industrial cities, but the more adventurous surplus of a bountiful countryside—which we no longer have to send them. If there are still Britons who have some faith in the cultural mission of the British Commonwealth, this is an aspect of our home policy which might well appeal to them.

For naturally, emigration from Britain has dwindled to very little. In the last year and a half there has been more immigration from Australia than emigration from Britain to that continent, although new settlers, nearly four thousand in number, came from Southern and Central Europe. Of last year's immigrants into South Africa, ten thousand in all, less than four thousand came from any other British country: whilst less than one-third of the new settlers in Canada in the last half year were of British origin.

No one supposes that the British Dominions ought to be, or could be, only populated by British immigrants; but from the figures quoted it is evident that the genuinely pioneering type of emigrant is no longer being supplied from Britain to the Dominions in any considerable numbers: and, apart from Imperial sentiment, this is almost certainly an evil omen for these new countries, whilst they are laying the political and social foundations of their future States. Such immigration as they do obtain from the home country is increasingly of town-bred origin, and already, in these undeveloped lands, there is a marked tendency for the population to crowd into the few urban centres. On the whole, it is true to say that the unbalanced economy of the mother-country tends also to unbalance the economy of the Dominions, to their special disadvantage in dealing with their special problems.

Enough has been said, perhaps, to show that the main discontent of the Dominions is closely related to the old grievance of home agriculture, and that both are due to the pressure of a cumulative financial evil. The forces entrenched against any genuine movement of reform may seem invincible. But two things must now be recognized. The pre-War basis of world economy is changed; it no longer consists in foreign lending and opening up new countries as granaries and ranches: every country is aiming at a balanced economy and will spare no pains to cultivate it. In these changed circumstances a new line of alliance may become possible between the statesmen of the Dominions, and those in Britain who realize that it is neither in the destiny nor the deepest interests of this country to become still more the "workshop of the world," but rather to become more agricultural, with industries giving up quantity for quality. We may be very thankful that the Empire is declining to borrow further. Otherwise we could only continue to approach the financial nemesis of Rome, where at last the title-deeds of nearly all the productive estates in the Empire were deposited in two or three streets of the metropolis, and the whole civilization was ready for its irretrievable ruin.

THE DEFENCE OF THE EMPIRE.

By Liddell Hart.

THE recent infusion of new blood into the Army Council has, naturally, attracted much public attention. What may seem more surprising to those who remember the last war is the way it has been accomplished without any public protest. Mr. Hore-Belisha has been able to achieve swiftly and smoothly much greater changes than Mr. Lloyd George at the height of his power could venture to attempt. The extent not merely of agreement but of nation-wide approval would seem to be the measure of the awakening, within the army as well as outside, to the necessity of new ideas to meet new conditions. The Prime Minister of the War may well have contributed to the comparatively trouble-free course of the present War Minister by his witness to the military obscurantism which prevailed a generation ago ; the phrasing of his charges has been resented, but their substance has been as much realized by the younger generals of to-day, who were the junior staff and regimental officers of 1914-1918, as by the five million civilians of to-day who were then soldiers " for the duration."

It is necessary to eliminate the habit of thinking in terms of 1914-1918, and to develop a new outlook—one that will take due account of new weapons, of the influence of air-power, of the lessons of recent wars abroad—and remodel the structure, strategy and tactics of the army to fit the changed conditions. A grave hindrance has been the age of the heads of the army since the war, much higher on an average than in pre-war days. They were matured, and their ideas moulded, at a time when many of the important instruments of to-day were unknown or immature. This experience of the old, and inexperience of the new, has hindered their mental adaptation to new ideas and conditions. To gain a new outlook at the top it is essential to hasten the advancement of men who have grown up with the

new instruments. It is universally recognized now that the opposition offered to the development of the tank in the war was one of the worst cases of official obstruction on record. Yet even more scandalous was the fact that, when the tank won acceptance, those who had brought it to fruition were shelved to make room for men who had contributed nothing to its development and even had been among its opponents. Their ignorance of the new machines which were put in their charge caused a further delay, and wasteful mishandling, before the new weapon fulfilled its promise. That process of blindly conservative obstruction has continued during the post-War era. It delayed the mechanization of the army nearly twenty years, and has led to the present hustle and trouble in trying to catch up time.

The difficulty has been aggravated because of the instinctive nervous reaction which has accompanied every manifestation of new ideas. This has hampered not only their advocacy but the opportunity of any soldiers who were bold enough to voice them. Since the Royal Tank Corps was the first mechanized, and thus the first truly modern, branch of the Service, it was natural that men of ideas should gravitate thither. That tendency has been to their own detriment. In the seven years between 1929 and 1936, two of its officers reached the rank of major-general. Both had been outstanding pioneers. Yet after promotion the first was retired without receiving employment, while the other was tucked away "on the shelf," in a second-class district in India. Two more have gained such promotion in the past year, compelled it indeed, only to be met with a similar ring-fence of apprehension of what they might do if they were placed where they might have any important influence on the general progress of the Army. There was all the less excuse for such an attitude since the mechanization of the Army had now been tardily accepted as a general policy.

Too often the charge of newly mechanized formations, and the task of carrying out experiments with them, has been handed over to officers with no previous experience. Apart from the effect of that kind of treatment on the public attitude to the army, it was the most certain way to convince the keen young men who are needed that it was still an unpromising

career for men of ideas. Further, it was likely to convince the younger men already serving that it was still " unhealthy " for them to take up any of the newer lines of service, or to become known as progressive-minded soldiers.

It is only just to recognize the progress in modernizing and re-equipping the Army that has been made during the last year or two. And the Chief of the Imperial General Staff who has just given up his office will be gratefully remembered, also, for the refreshing change of atmosphere which came with his advent, for a receptivity to ideas which was marked in comparison with the past, and for his sense of the importance of bringing on younger men. It was unfortunate that earlier neglect should have piled up such an accumulation of difficulties. The country is indebted to him for what he did to prepare the way for the far-reaching measures that are necessary to meet the present situation. For the first time since the War responsibility is given to men in the prime of life, who are young enough to be part of the generation which bore the brunt of the World War. The new problems of Imperial Defence will thus be tackled not only by fresh minds but with the resilience, as much physical as mental, that is needed to cope with the pressure of our present rapid rearming, and with the still more intense strain that would ensue if war should come.

While obscurantism and hidebound conservatism have notably diminished in recent years, diffuseness of ideas and uncertainty of purpose have remained to hinder the remodelling of our military structure. The greatest need to-day is to clarify our picture of the kind of need for which we are preparing. What is the purpose of our army in the event of another major war ?

* * * * *

Some light on the ideas, or at least on the instinctive direction, which has hitherto governed our military preparation is to be gained from the composition of what was formerly called the Expeditionary Force, and is now known as the Field Force. In 1914 the Expeditionary Force which went to France consisted of 4 infantry divisions and 1 cavalry division. In 1937 the Field Force consists of 4 infantry divisions and 1 mobile division —which comprises two mechanized cavalry brigades and one

tank brigade, our only one, attached. The similarity of pattern suggests that hitherto there has not been much difference in the ruling idea as to how it would be used.

The design of exercises and war games tends to confirm this deduction. The bulk of them are concerned with war of the familiar kind that we last experienced in France. Where they have any identifiable location it is usually akin to that of 1914, when we met the Germans advancing through Belgium. Yet, somewhat contradictorily, they seem to be governed by the strategic idea of joining in an allied offensive—as we had proposed to do in 1914, until the dream was rudely dispelled. Again, the training of the army is predominantly devoted to studying and practising the attack.

While some attention, if not enough, is given to the need of protecting the actual advancing force against air attack, I have been unable to find signs that adequate account has been taken of the difficulties, and dangers, of transporting a large army to the continent and maintaining it there under the menace of air attack. The most that is suggested, by certain administrative exercises, is the use of more westerly ports than in 1914. These involve lengthened communications, and consequently extend risks of breakdown under hostile air-pressure. Broken communications are bad enough when an army is on its own territory, or where it has complete control. It would be worse for an army to be stranded in the depths of someone else's territory. And the larger the army the worse it would be.

Again, I have been unable to find due consideration of the problem that would arise if Belgium remained neutral and the Germans abstained from violating her territory. This stretches some 250 miles inland. In these circumstances our field force could not operate save by being sent right across to the eastern frontier of France. This would mean a still greater extension of communications, and complication of supply.

Beyond this is the question what our Field Force would do if the Germans abstained from land attack in the West, and left the French to attempt it. Here we are brought face to face with the biggest problem of all, and one that is habitually burked —the problem of the offensive. Is there any adequate justifica-

tion for the army's continued belief in, and preparation for, it? The question is fundamental to any consideration of our military policy.

In peace, we prepare our forces primarily with a view to the conditions that may be expected at the start of a war. It would therefore be fallacious to base our assumptions, as to what may be expected, on the conditions which prevailed at the end of the last war, when the opposing forces were rotted by starvation, and shortage of munitions—both produced by our blockade, depression at the failure of their own offensive to achieve any decision, the moral collapse of the home front due to the combined effect of the preceding conditions. Even so, it is worth noting that in this final stage the Allies on the Western Front possessed a general superiority of more than 3 to 1 in the offensives of August, September and October, 1918, which repeatedly broke into the German positions and forced the enemy to withdraw his line as a whole. Nevertheless, at the end of October, Haig himself admitted—" Germany is not broken in a military sense. During the last weeks her armies have withdrawn, fighting and in excellent order."

Thus, when analysed, the conditions at the end provide little encouragement for belief in the power of the offensive, strategically and tactically, even under the most favourable conditions. And they have no relation to the conditions at the outset of another war.

The initial success of the German offensive in 1914—up to its breakdown on the Marne—is not a sound guide to what may be expected at the start of another war. For the main blocking weapon of 1914-1918, the machine-gun, was only present in meagre quantity, while most of the other principal weapons of to-day were not even in existence. The nearest approach to any sound evidence from experience lies in the " later middle age " of that war, when weapon development was more mature, and came closest, in kind if not in degree, to the state of present-day armaments. During this period the most successful offensive—in its immediate as distinct from its ultimate effect (which was ruinous to the attacking side)—was that of the Germans in March, 1918. This owed much to the fortuitous help of fog. It is significant that there was a fog on the occasion of almost

every offensive on the Western Front which had any success. (It is a strange reflection that such an elementary fact has never been noticed in official military studies). The supreme value of fog was that it blinded hostile machine-guns. But no military policy can count on such accidents.

A possible substitute is the development of artificial fog on a great scale. But we should be unwise to rely on it too much—lest this advance be overtaken by new means of dispersing or penetrating fog and smoke. Another possible substitute is the use of night as a cloak to the attack: but here again the defender may find it easier to solve the problem of turning darkness into daylight.

Even with the aid of fog and of a new technique of attack, the Germans still required a great superiority of strength to make their offensive effective—up to a point. They had a quantitative superiority of nearly 3 to 1 on the sixty-mile front on which their resources allowed them to deliver the offensive. One may add, incidentally, that it is the verdict of our own Official History that "in a conflict between foes of the same standard of skill, determination, and valour, numbers approaching three to one are required to turn the scale decisively."

Our own experience suggests that we needed greater odds still in our favour. Until the enemy's morale rotted, our attacks failed with odds of more than 6 to 1—sometimes, as at Neuve Chapelle, with as much as 16 to 1. How is this difference to be explained? If we believe, as I think we are justified in believing, that we had the same standard of "determination and valour," the discrepancy must lie in skill. And this deduction is borne out not only by the verdict of our opponents but by the sum of our experience in the offensive. Even if it be thought that we might do as well as others, and succeed with the minimum odds—3 to 1—we ought to face the fact that there is no ground for expecting such odds in our favour, in any European theatre of war where we and possible allies might be engaged. On the Western Front, the most probable, a state of something more or less than equality between the rival forces is to be expected. This suggests a probable stalemate.

We ought also to take account of technical developments since the last war. It was the machine-gun above all which

held up the attack in 1914-1918. There is now a much higher proportion of machine-guns, light and heavy, in all armies. Tanks have been improved and increased, but anti-tank weapons have made still more rapid progress—and, being cheaper, can be multiplied faster. Mechanization and motorization quicken the advance, but help the defence even more—by enabling it to rush machine-guns and anti-tank guns to any threatened spot. Air action may hinder the arrival of the enemy's reserves—and this has been the chief military argument for clinging to hope in the offensive, and for believing that a " break-in " can be developed into that long-sought " break-through " which was never achieved in the last war. But so long as the defender is at least equal in air strength, it is still easier for him to hinder the attacker—who needs larger reserves and thus offers larger targets—from following up his initial success. The collapse of the " General Franco-Italian " offensive at Guadalajara is a recent illustration. The balance of these developments seems to strengthen still more the probability of a stalemate.

When we consider the problem of our own field force, we have also to take account of the time factor. In 1914 the main operations did not begin until the German and French armies had completed their concentration. This took nearly three weeks. By that time our expeditionary force was on the scene. Incidentally, though it had come prepared to join in an offensive, it found itself thrown on the defensive. To-day, no such interval is likely. The Continental General Staffs have recognized the power of the defensive sufficiently to realize that the best chance, and perhaps the only chance, for the offensive lies in launching it coincidently with the decision for war—without waiting till the mass has mobilized. With that mental picture they have developed striking forces of a mechanized kind which shall be available for immediate use. The Germans have 3 armoured divisions, and probably 2 more being completed. The French have already mechanized 2 of their cavalry divisions, and are forming a heavy armoured division. These " spear-head " forces are supported by a shaft composed of a growing number of motorized divisions.

Unless both sides decide to abstain from attack, judging that the profit does not justify the risk, these spearhead forces

are likely to become engaged in the first days, even in the first hours, of war. During that opening phase, before the armies are mobilized and the frontier defences are fully manned, there may be some chance of gaining ground. And the result of the clash between the spearheads may determine, not the issue of the war, but the line on which a deadlock will be established.

If one side uses its spearhead forces with sufficient skill, and attains a sufficient measure of surprise, that deadlock line may be some distance within the opponent's territory. The further it can be carried, the more it will help the air operations by shortening their range. But even this partial degree of success in the strategic offensive is far from sure. If the leading mechanized elements are temporarily blocked, even a few hours' delay may suffice for the defender to bring up sufficient reserves to seal the sector—so greatly has motor-movement quickened the power of reinforcement from a distance. In that case deadlock may form along the frontier itself.

Now, to return to our own aspect of the problem, there would seem to be no chance of the time of arrival of our own field force, as it now stands, being reduced to much less than a fortnight after the outbreak of war. If that be so, it can have no influence on the crucial opening phase. What can it do if it arrives when a deadlock has been established? According to present ideas, it can only be used for an offensive—for attacking a line that the enemy has consolidated. So far as one can see, such a course can only lead to sacrifice without profit. To send our present field force on such a mission is the surest way to involve the despatch of larger and larger forces—as in the last war. And the more forces we lend for such a futile policy, the more we encourage our allies towards self-destruction.

Further, the more troops we send oversea the more aircraft and seacraft we shall have to divert to cover them and their communications—thus diminishing the pressure that we can exert by air and sea. Also, the more shipping we shall have to divert from the essential task of maintaining the supplies of this country, and the more targets we shall offer in the narrow sea passages.

The rôle of the Army, like that of the other services, ought to be closely related to our national object in war. That object

is essentially a " conservative " one, and thus much easier of fulfilment, under present military conditions, than the purpose of a country which is trying to enlarge its possessions. The acquisitive state has to aim at conquest. For this it has to overthrow the opponent's army and occupy his territory. By contrast, the " conservative " state has only to consider the enemy that it cannot conquer. For this, it has only to frustrate the attacker, demonstrating to him that continued efforts will merely increase his loss and lead to his own exhaustion.

In achieving this negative purpose, if positive lesson, our navy can be used to sweep the enemy's commerce off the seas, to isolate his colonies, and towards depriving him of the supplies necessary for carrying on war. If it has no great troop-shipments to protect, it will have all the more strength to spare for protecting our own supplies and cutting off the enemy's.

Our air force, apart from covering our own territory against air attack, can be used for paralysing the advance and supply of any hostile army which tries to invade our allies' territory or our own overseas possessions. It may also dry up his aggressive efforts at their sources by harassing his centres of warlike industry. The smaller the land forces that we send abroad, the larger the air strength we can concentrate on these purposes—by saving on the comparatively " unproductive " duties of reconnaissance, artillery spotting, and fighter protection for our troops.

There will still be plenty for the army to do. It has a heavy enough burden of Imperial Defence to carry, even if it is spared the task of attempting an offensive campaign on the Continent—one which would probably lead to vain sacrifice, consequent expansion with a view to a bigger attempt, and vaster sacrifice still in vain. The more one takes the measure of the army's responsibilities for the *defence* of the Empire in war, the more essential it seems to avoid assuming such a Continental commitment as that into which we were drawn, by degrees, in 1914-1918.

If we arrange to send across the Channel a complete force like that of 1914, there is all too much risk of being dragged along the same course. Its arrival might encourage the French to take the offensive—with the fanciful idea of winning the war in a land campaign. If that offensive should fail, as is most

probable, and a British army be thus palpably repulsed, it is to be feared that popular emotion might swamp sober calculation: and thus lead to the despatch of more and more for a policy of try, try again.

Is there any less dangerous alternative—if it be thought that we must, on grounds of policy, be ready to give the French some support on land? I am inclined to think that the commitment might be limited, yet with improvement of effect, if we were to send, instead of a complete force, the technical means and specialist personnel needed to strengthen the quality of our allies' defence. To restore a possible breach in the defensive front, the best and quickest emergency aid on land is that which can be given by powerful mechanized forces used for a rapid counterstroke. The French themselves recognize this. We could double their present resources if we could provide two or three small armoured divisions. By comparison our present infantry divisions would be but a drop in the bucket, an inconsiderable addition to the large number of such divisions which the French can mobilize, long before ours could arrive, from their own large reserves of trained man-power. Mechanized divisions would provide the French with more comfort against the fear of any penetration—and could be kept in reserve for such a contingency. We should be wise to make it a condition that they should not be employed in an offensive campaign.

Even this possibility must depend on our capacity to meet the minimum demands of Imperial defence. The garrisons which we normally maintain in our overseas territories will need reinforcement if these are threatened. India may be over-insured, since the garrison there is almost as large as after the Indian Mutiny, despite the immense change of conditions and growth of mobility. But the rest of our territories are under-insured. There has been no proportionate increase to compensate the numerous additions to our territory, by mandate and otherwise. And now new risks have arisen. Apart from the threat to our naval bases at Gibraltar and Malta, we have to reckon with the possibility of attack on Egypt from Italian Libya; on the Sudan, Somaliland, and Kenya from Italian East Africa; of trouble, or worse, that may be created in Palestine, Iraq, and the Yemen. Looking further east, we see

new risks to our garrisons in Hongkong and Singapore. The British Empire is on the rack, suffering a two-way stretch. To safeguard all these territories adequately we might need far larger forces than the Army can provide, or could attempt to create without endangering our essential superiority at sea and in the air. Our first problem is to reduce our needs by remodelling our forces on a new design, and seeking to develop new types of unit which have more force in proportion to their size. In the Middle East, which contains the largest number of danger-spots, defence against external threat might be more effective if mobile mechanized divisions of a handy size were employed in substitution for the present cumbrous infantry divisions. But even if we re-organized our possible expeditionary units at home on a new ratio of mechanized troops to infantry, we should be lucky if events allowed us to spare a fraction of them for France.

To sum up—our military policy hitherto has been dominated by the 1914 picture. As a result it has instinctively concentrated on preparing the bulk of our forces in an unsuitable way for a dubious contingency across the Channel, which could only mean being too weak anywhere else for the defence of the Empire. There has been a reluctance to face the urgent need of re-organization and re-distribution, and a feeling that these involved changes of organization too big to contemplate. Now, however, with a change of personnel in the War Office, and fresh minds in control, we may hope that the need will be faced, and fulfilled.

THE ARTS TO-DAY.

By Lord Derwent.

ONE of the last (presumably) and one of the most obstinately popular of the European playgrounds (I call it this because the only people out of fancy-dress to be seen there look like being, from now onwards, the inhabitants themselves who will surely weary of being caricatured) distinguished itself last summer, apart from its admirable music-festival, by a passage of words between two personalities of international fame. I, for one, am still exasperated, though I know it is by this time naïve to be so, that when Signore Toscanini reproached Herr Furtwängler with managing to stretch political tolerance to the point of finding it indifferent to him whether he conducts in Munich or in Salzburg and when Herr Furtwängler gave the reply that one long imagined any civilized person would give—namely, that in his opinion, Art should care for none of these political inhibitions—Toscanini and quite a number of other people seem to have been surprised and pained.

The currents flowing through Europe to-day not only lap our shores, but insinuate themselves, with much perfidy, into minds that consider themselves well-protected against them. I know it from experience. Last winter I was asked by the French Institute in London to give a lecture on Baudelaire. In the peroration, I found myself exhorting the poets of to-day to abjure politics and the politicization of their verse. I was mentally comparing the sublime disregard of the Frenchman for the political life of his time with the pamphleteering bias of the Spenders and Audens & Day-Lewises of our present world. I did not in the least recommend the Ivory Tower, but I wanted to convey that, in my opinion, an intense spiritual experience or the kind of mental photograph which everyday emotions,

removed from all political stress, could imprint, were amply sufficient to start off the right train of inspired thought. Trying my own hand at the art in question within a few weeks from the lecture's date, I found myself hammering together stanzas whose fire and sincerity even now I can admit and approve of, but whose political flavour is not in doubt. What can be the depth and extent of such a vein exploited by artists of real force and talent? To what extent is it profitable for artists to "face up" to the events that affect the life of their time?

The problem is, of course, not the same for all the arts. It seems difficult to deny the advantage enjoyed by the novelist, who so far from feeling it his duty to turn his back on life, must, on the contrary, come to grips with it as much and as often as possible, without, of course, degenerating into journalism. Architecture is even better off; its details move with the times, with new inventions; its manifestations are necessities, and have all the "beauty of commodity" about which the late-lamented Geoffrey Scott wrote with such noble conviction; public demand has replaced private (for no one can call "private" the demand for one more brick villa just like the last, empty of individuality as of invention). Music, free as a wind, is a law unto itself; a Schönberg and a Molotov can both find room to move about unconstrained. Sculpture can always fall safely back on the rhythmic mysteries of the human frame, and no one will yawn; in addition, it has possibilities of dynamism that can fit it even into politics, and of course, easily into industry. I suggest that painting and poetry, on the other hand, are twin Cinderellas, in a sense, for even if they sally forth in up-to-date finery, they have, in my opinion, to return to the discretion and humility of the fireside, a world of brooding.

Consciously or unconsciously, Mr. William Gaunt, in his recent book "Bandits in a Landscape," has shed a broad light on the question as far as it concerns painting. The book is a concise, yet intensely poetic essay composed round certain side-streets of painting that range from Caravaggio to Géricault and Van Gogh and occasionally widen out into an imposing avenue like Claude and Delacroix. "The work of some modern painters," he writes

"is sympathetic with the architecture, the machinery, the *utilitarian* design that are the original productions of the age. This machine art is the classical art of our time, a part of its *positive* and optimistic character, an affirmation of its order and *power*, *propaganda* for its greatness, and for the perfection of human *achievement* evidenced by its tall buildings, its huge ships, its aeroplanes, its magnificent complexity."*

And he goes on to add :

"This is the exact opposite of romantic art . . . . yet branching from the same stem there are signs of the reappearance of the romantic spirit, manifesting itself in a mood of melancholy, of criticism, of imagination. To the element of horror which lurks in the modern age, these hold up a glass. To the irrationality and weakness of man they point instead of the imposing nature of his creations. The ruin left in the wake of progress, the decay which inevitably accompanies growth, are themes for their strange pictures. They are the bandits in the modern landscape."

I cannot help feeling not only that he is right, but that it is right he should be right. On the other hand, it is equally possible to argue that for a painter to reproduce or a poet to celebrate, indefinitely and exclusively, the fierce beauty of the aeroplane or the streamlined train or the sky-scraper, will, if it is feasible, lead to an almost Goethean sanity in art, even if it equally leads into the municipal, the communistic, the essentially *public* in art that may turn out to be nothing but a *cul-de-sac*. In other words, it is fine while it lasts. But can it last ? and if it does last, is it or is it not a *cul-de-sac* ?

Surely our difficulty, in this dilemma (as much ours as the artist's, since we are his appreciators, or depreciators) is that the gaff has been blown. Gazing at the superb proportions of the "Normandie," at the triumph of the Chrysler building, we have reached the point that for us a high-explosive shell has the same sort of functional elegance of line ; or, to put it even more simply, a bomber is as beautiful as an Imperial Airways liner. Could the illusoriness of progress be more pointedly underlined ? And has this not crept into our sub-consciousness ? If this is the case, then, however much art seeks "to fight its way back to a place within the social order, to become its ally and share its triumphs," nevertheless escape will remain "the order of the day."

Science has made life cleaner, longer, more exciting ; but its toys are of two kinds, leading by the mildest of bifurcations as well to a chemical manure as to an explosive. It makes Broad-

*The italics are mine and are intended to stress the connection between the manifestations of the time and its political aspect.

casting House possible with one hand, and employs the other in running up brick cubes that will eventually create a new slum problem as acute as the old. It promised a whole fruit, and promised it to everyone; but it gives only the rind. Encouraged by the light, Marx has been only one among many to offer all this world's goods in exchange for an adoration of himself. So we let Science have full fling, since it was to remould the world nearer to our heart's desire; and now we have played the rôle of sorcerer's prentice all too long, so long that we cannot remember the word that will call the halt. If "belching chimneys and sprawling slums" (many of which are still with us) were the hall-mark of Victorian England, neo-Georgian England can boast that it is faced by a monstrosity that has not even the pretence of seeming constructive; gaily Mr. H. G. Wells prophesies, when interviewed in Paris, that "we live in a most exciting time," and that in his "*Shape of Things to Come*," he already foresaw the world a prey to "bands of gangsters, who would need only aeroplanes and bombs to exercise their tyranny" (the sea-gangster is already at work, indeed, in the Mediterranean). The sinister activities of the sorcerer's broom are well pictured by Mr. Stanley Casson in his book, "*Progress and Catastrophe*." In the chapter, entitled "The Perversion of Science," he stresses the "innate tendency" of mankind "to prostitute all of his inventions"; thus, the invention of wireless has given rise to the cruel imbecility of Propaganda.

The future, then, is blacker than usual (I am making allowance for the eternal past-ness of the "Good Old Days"). And it is only when a stable society has created conditions where optimism may be a perceptible quality of the air that the artist can bloom and prosper. To-day, he is the first to turn his back on the machine (yes, I presume even the Audens and Spenders would agree to this by now); what other obvious beauty remains to those who search for it and do not find it at their elbow, as a Phidias, a Rubens, or a Watteau did, as even a Reynolds or a Lawrence still could? The unobvious, of course, is what the bandits will continue to snatch brutally from the dark byways. Once the machine itself is abandoned, there are still its by-products. How far will it lead an artist-poet, all that official fresco-painting of

workmen in overalls, of doctors in white, of farmers super-muscled, of girl-guides? Will it not end by being the prerogative of the slightly "advanced" academician, however daring it seems now? I have, I may add, insisted on the word "obvious" also because there is that other storehouse discovered by Picasso and the Cubists, the decorative abstraction; but that seems to me unrecommendable, requiring as it does an impeccable sense of decoration and a talent for mathematics as well—a rare combination. The proper solution is, I take it, in the end, that found by Degas, by Manet (in his less purely poetic moments), and in particular, by Bonnard and Vuillard, those two great transformers of the ghastly ordinary—the frankly monstrous—into the very music of colour. All the great painters are poets—even Ingress, painting the opulent *bourgeoises*, poet in spite of himself; only a Bonnat remains simply interesting as a recorder of costumes. Must one, then, come to the conclusion that, however much the artist "faces-up" to reality, it is not the contact with reality that enriches him, but only his divine distortion, his poetization of reality that enriches it? Even so, and even now, the strange flowers of the wilderness seem to me less inviting than the occasional rich bloom a man of genius can grow with the manure of public life. But he should doubtless now and then, *fuir les hommes pour mieux les connaître*, considering this maxim as applicable to their exterior as much as to what lies behind it—if he can afford to! A course of banditry, of voluntary exile, may well alternate, for the fortunate and sensible, with periods of returning the steady glare of everyday things.

Is the case the same for the poets? I can remember as if it were yesterday the dawn of Sir Edward Marsh's "Georgian" movement about 1917, which was designed to introduce a greater naturalness into a poetry that seemed to have got stuck in the exquisite lanes into which Swinburne and Tennyson and their successors had led it. But by now, the spades (partly rustic, partly sexual) that the Georgians so resolutely set out to call spades have palled on us—only Rupert Brooke and Grantchester seem to keep the sweet bloom of eternal youth conferred by untimely death. T. S. Eliot led us into the "Waste Land" (not that we should not have got there in any

case); how do we get out? Is the only visible ancestor of new poets to be Siegfried Sassoon? There certainly seem to be no more "Sonnets to Aurelia," or anything of the sort at all. Is passion to be only political (and certainly mere word-painting *à la* Flecker, could no longer hold us)?

"To-morrow for the young the poets exploding like bombs,
The walks by the lake, the weeks of perfect communion;
To-morrow the bicycle races
Through the suburbs on summer evenings. But to-day the struggle.

To-day the deliberate increase in the chances of death,
The conscious acceptance of guilt in the necessary murder;
To-day the expending of powers
On the flat ephemeral pamphlet and the boring meeting."*

From the talent of an Auden or a Spender, sparks will always fly; but I have the gravest doubts concerning the capacity of any poet to explode like the right sort of bomb after a long period of this fuse-damping, neo-Puritanical, entirely politicized sort of life, as exemplified and preached in this admittedly fine poem. Fine, because technically successful, and spiritually touching. Do I then (since I have adopted this pedagogic stance) recommend to the poet a shrinking away from the ethical implications of what surrounds him? Yes, if it is a direct contact he is foolish enough to seek. No, if he will only remember the old tag about "beauty remembered in tranquillity," and put the emotion aroused by Guernica or Shanghai or the G.P.U. into a crucible, and only pour out the residue after many heatings. For there is nothing superficially poetic about the idiocies of to-day such as gas-war and hysterical credos in politics; there *is* a general emotion that rises like a steam, and permanently, from their moral aspect. In the end, such a writer as Auden will always risk the judgment of the man who has "seen four-and-twenty leaders of revolutions"; and that is not the proper tribunal for poetry. No; sooner than that, give me a modern Goya in paint or in verse, as much, if not more, fascinated by the gold and red of generals' uniforms as by the mutilated corpses in the Retiro; the grimacing witches and goblins lay in wait for him, but he had stared the Medusa of reality in the face and not been turned to stone.

*W. H. Auden—"Spain" (1937).

SHANGHAI AND THE JAPANESE.

By O. M. Green.

"SHANGHAI is a world-problem," said the Consul-General. The remark made in after-dinner conversation eight years ago, when the young Nationalist Government at Nanking was becoming clamorous for the abolition of all foreign rights in China, is doubly true to-day. For some time past the Japanese community of Shanghai have been increasingly demanding special privileges, on the ground that they outnumber any other foreign community by three to one; and now they have in support an army of at least 200,000 men, intoxicated with the knowledge of victory—while the fiasco of the Brussels Conference is, for the time being at any rate, a plain invitation to them to do whatever they please.

The position of Shanghai is so peculiar, and the interests of the Foreign Powers centred in it are so enormous—those of Great Britain alone being estimated at around £150,000,000—that the grave crisis with which the city is faced calls for a clear understanding of how Shanghai has come to be what it is—a romantic story indeed: for upon what was but a swampy tract of barren land less than a century ago has arisen the wealthiest city in Asia, adorned with huge buildings and parks, the sixth biggest port in the world, the financial, industrial and commercial nerve-centre of China.

When in 1843 Shanghai was declared open to trade, the first British merchants who went there lived in such houses as they could rent in the old Chinese city. Fortune, the great traveller and botanist, who visited them, has left a record of their discomforts. "Often in the mornings (he wrote) we would find ourselves drenched with rain; and if snow fell, it was blown through our windows and formed wreaths on the floor." In the sweltering heat of a Shanghai summer, the pioneers must have been even more uncomfortable. The situation suited neither

them nor the Chinese officials, who made no difficulty about granting the request of Captain Balfour, the first British Consul, for a piece of ground northwards of the Chinese city on the banks of the Whangpoo, on which the foreigners might buy land (or rather acquire it on perpetual leasehold, paying a small tax to the Chinese Government, as is still done, the sale of land to foreigners being illegal) build themselves houses, and manage their own affairs under their consuls. Incidentally, Captain Balfour bought ground for a British Consulate, and had considerable difficulty in getting his Government to repay him the 17,000 dollars he had given for it. That land is probably worth at least half a million sterling to-day.

There is little doubt that the Chinese officials of the 1840's hoped to immure the foreigners in the allotted tract, in the same manner as they had been cooped in the old factories at Canton. Nor was there anything unusual in allowing them to manage their own affairs under their consuls. The same system had been adopted with other alien communities not deemed worthy to be ruled by the divine laws of China. Yet it was from this little germ of a bit of land reserved for the foreigners' self-government, buttressed by their newly-acquired right of extra-territoriality, that all the wealth and importance of Shanghai have since grown.

If Hongkew and Yangtszepoo were still part of an American Concession as, geographically, they once were, the Japanese would not have been able to use these districts as a base of military operations against the Chinese, as they have done both in 1932 and again to-day. The legality of their doing so in any case is very much open to question, since Hongkew and Yangtszepoo are not an exclusive Japanese possession, but part of an International Settlement over which twelve other Powers have as much right as the Japanese. The point is that they would no more have tried to land troops there, if the district had been an American Concession, than they have tried to land in the French Concession.

Similarly if Shanghai, south of the Soochow Creek, were still a British Concession, the Japanese could not have made that disastrous " victory parade " through its streets on December 3 ; nor have claimed the right to march through it whenever they

please; nor have swooped upon hotels in it and carried off persons whom they dislike. All such attempts the French have successfully resisted on the plea that their Concession is French territory. It is hardly even arguable that the International Settlement owes its wealth and importance to its mixed constitution. Its position at the mouth of the Yangtze Valley must have given it that, once the energy and independence of the foreigner were applied to its development. Diplomatically, legally and socially, its international status had given rise to countless problems and was the direct cause of untold friction with the Chinese, not experienced in the British Concessions at Tientsin and Hankow*, long before the present issue with Japan.

The first administrative regulations were drawn up between Captain Balfour, first British consul, and the Taotai (the chief local mandarin) in 1845. The chief interest of these, again as with the Concession question in the light of later events, was that no Chinese were allowed to live in the foreign area. This provision, however, "went west" in the Taiping Rebellion, when hordes of Chinese fled into the Concessions, and the foreign residents found that there was so much money to be made by renting them houses that they have remained ever since. In the civil wars of the present century, the Chinese population of Shanghai increased so enormously, to a total of nearly a million, that the anomaly was not far from being realized of an area reserved for foreigners in which only Chinese lived, the foreigners having gradually been squeezed out into extra-Settlement roads. Only the great Sir Rutherford Alcock warned his compatriots that they were storing up many troubles for posterity. Their reply was that they were in China to make money as quickly as possible and go home; and that posterity could look after itself.

By 1854, Shanghai had grown so greatly that new regulations for its government were urgently needed. Another revision was demanded in 1866, and thus came into existence the famous Land Regulations, the charter by which Shanghai† has since

*The British Concession at Hankow was given back to China by the Chen—O'Malley agreement in 1927, but this does not affect the force of the argument.

†Henceforward, unless otherwise stated, "Shanghai" means the International Settlement. The French Concession, as stated, is a separate entity which does not enter into this article.

lived and governed itself. It took three years, by the way, to get the Diplomatic Body to approve these regulations, and except for a few additions and by-laws, no new charter has since been written. When it is remembered that in 1866 Shanghai was less than a third of its present size, with a foreign population of 2,200 and a Chinese of 90,000, it is rather wonderful that the Land Regulations are still adaptable to a foreign population of some 50,000, embracing 42 distinct nationalities, and nearly a million Chinese, not to mention all the immense responsibilities devolving on the Council from the development of factories, mills, hospitals, public works of many kinds and public education. In fact, the Land Regulations have been stretched to the utmost limit of interpretation, and the possibility, nay, even the necessity, of their revision has frequently been discussed. But revision would have to be approved by both the Diplomatic Body and the Chinese Government; and the well-known uncertainty of the behaviour of both these august bodies always decided the authorities of the Settlement to let well enough alone.

The present government of Shanghai first took shape under the regulations of 1854, when administration by the Consuls, assisted by a Roads and Jetties Committee elected by the land-renters, as they were called, gave place, to a Municipal Council annually elected by the foreign residents, which was empowered to collect rates for the discharge of public duties, and maintain a police force—the distinctive attributes of an autonomous government.

And here may be emphasized the most peculiar, and in many respects baffling characteristic of Shanghai. Although under the protection of thirteen Powers who have extraterritorial treaties with China, Shanghai does not belong to any of them individually or collectively—since the first eighteen years of separate British, American and French concessions. It belongs to the persons who own the land on which it stands, and to them alone is its Government, the Municipal Council, responsible. None of the Powers can give an order to the Council; only the ratepayers of the Settlement can do that, at the annual general meeting. Naturally, the Council works at all times in close co-operation with the local Consular Body, through whom,

moreover its negotiations with the Chinese officials are conducted. Also, its by-laws must gain the approval of the Diplomatic Body. But neither consuls nor diplomats can interfere with the administration of the Settlement, and any warrant that they wish to execute in it must be carried out by the Council's police.

An effective check against arbitrary action by the Council is that it can be sued by any person who considers himself aggrieved, a Court of Consuls (three in number) being appointed to try the case. One other check is provided by the extra-territorial rights of certain of the nationalities in Shanghai, against whom the Council's police can take no action, nor enter their houses, without warrant from the Consul of the nation considered. Proceedings are then taken against the accused man in his own court. The great nations, Great Britain, France, America and Japan, maintain their own law courts and judges. In the case of other nations, consuls have judicial powers to try cases themselves.

Thus is the rule of law preserved in Shanghai, together with the autonomy of the Council; and this is the key-note of the whole development and position of the Settlement. In an orderly, well-governed country such an anomaly as Shanghai presents could never have come about—the need for a separate reservation for foreigners would not have been felt. No just view of what the Settlement is can be formed, unless we bear clearly in mind the rapid decay and inefficiency of the Manchu dynasty in the nineteenth century; the appalling upheaval of the Taiping Rebellion through fourteen years, in which it is estimated that 70,000,000 people perished; the disintegration of organized authority for many years after the Revolution of 1911; and the Communist rising of 1925-27. The various steps taken by the Council to consolidate its authority were not the outcome of so-called "imperialist aggression," but a necessary process of self-defence against emergencies which were none of its contriving. Even if there had been none of the political storms which have racked China in the past eighty years, the necessity of constant self-defence would have been as acute, owing to the totally different conceptions of government within and without the Settlement. Throughout China government was, and still for the most part is, purely arbitrary;

the people had no hand in the appointment of officials, no say in the amount of taxes levied, nor as to how those taxes were spent; worst of all, it was the fixed idea of Government that judges existed primarily to do its bidding. Inside Shanghai, whatever imperfections might be found in its administration, the fundamental principle is that rule of law and individual rights must prevail. As has been shown, it is always open to the humblest citizen of Shanghai, of any nationality, to sue the Council in a court specially provided. It is obvious that such a system must continually be on the watch to protect itself against encroachments by the arbitrary power outside, or it will go under.

Three notable examples may be quoted, briefly, to illustrate the development of the Council's rights in direct response to the needs of its position. In 1864 a Mixed Court was established in the Settlement, presided over by a Chinese magistrate and a foreign assessor, in which thenceforward all cases against Chinese have been tried. Previously all such cases had been sent for trial to the Chinese city but with the rapid growth of the Chinese population in Shanghai, the Council had to take a new view of its responsibilities. Not infrequently criminals sent to the city immediately gained their freedom, by methods better imagined than stated. A natural extension of the institution of the Mixed Court was that the arrest of Chinese in the Settlement could only be effected by the municipal police. No Chinese yamên-runners (yamên was the mandarin's official residence) were allowed to function in the Settlement, a very necessary ruling in view of the notoriously extortionate character of these gentry.

In later years, after a prolonged struggle, the Council gained the right to prohibit the posting of Chinese official proclamations and the collection of Chinese taxes in the Settlement. Actually, to-day, various taxes to which Chinese are amenable elsewhere in China are collected in the Settlement, but this is done either by or in collaboration with the Council's officers.

A moment's reflection will show the necessity of these enactments. It would have been impossible for the Council to maintain peace and order among its huge Chinese population, if its authority were being continually undermined by Chinese

official interference. Since the Nationalist Government was established in 1928, the foreign assessors have been removed from the Mixed, now called the Special District, Court, and Chinese judges sit there alone. But the warrants of the Court are carried out by Municipal police, and no Chinese can be handed over to his Government without a *primâ facie* case established against him in open court. The vital necessity of both these regulations, it may be said, has been amply shown in the past ten years.

Concurrently with its independence, another aspect of Shanghai's position has always been insisted upon most strongly: that is, its absolute neutrality towards all the convulsions of China. Arms have been taken up in defence of this principle. Thus in 1854, when the pressure around the Settlement of the Imperial armies acting against the Taipings became a distinct menace, the whole male population of Shanghai who could bear arms, aided by British and American bluejackets, sallied forth and drove the Imperialists off at the famous Battle of Muddy Flats. That was the beginning of the Shanghai Volunteer Corps, which now numbers some 2,000 men of all nationalities, admirably trained and equipped. These, and the Council's 5,000 police, have repeatedly done splendid service in guarding the boundaries of the Settlement and maintaining order.

Another extraordinary incident occurred in the civil wars of 1924, when the Council actually arrested a famous Chinese General, known as "Little Hsu," then sheltering from his political enemies in the Settlement, in order to prevent his getting control of a derelict army deserted by its commander just outside Shanghai's boundary.

It is also to be observed that the British defence force of 20,000 men sent to Shanghai in the Communist upheaval of 1927, was as much charged to preserve Shanghai's neutrality as to defend it. The Powers generally, and Great Britain in particular, have always shown the greatest promptitude in maintaining the integrity and neutrality of this curious city.

Not the least serious aspect of the Japanese invasion is that it has shattered this important neutrality and in a manner never expected. It had always been taken for granted that the neutrality was to be as against China. That she would be at

war with one of the Treaty Powers, which would use a part of the Settlement as a military base against her, thus really incriminating the other Treaty Powers and the Municipal Council in its actions, was never contemplated. Yet see how thin the distinction might be between defence and offence, and how difficult it was owing to Shanghai's international status, to prevent the Japanese from landing. They had a perfect right to land troops in order to protect their nationals from possible violence by the Chinese. Every other Great Power has done the like at some time or other. They had a perfect right to march troops through the Settlement, as other Powers have done, in that " victory parade." Whether they could or could not have taken up positions around Hongkew (where most Japanese live) and remained purely on guard, as the British Defence Force had done in 1927, it is now idle to discuss. The fact remains that a great wrong has been done, much property destroyed, a vital principle shattered. The only point at which the catastrophe could have been prevented was before the Japanese landed, and that neither the Council nor the Powers had the right to do even if they had had the might. It was purely a matter for Japanese forbearance.

So, too, it is to be feared is the question of Shanghai's future, now the subject of much anxious speculation. Until the Great War the Japanese community of Shanghai was comparatively unimportant. Since that date, concurrently with Japan's amazing growth as an industrial Power, it has swelled to about 30,000 people, three times as big as the next largest community the British, while Japanese holdings in Shanghai, in cotton mills, filatures, wharves and warehouses must begin to run the British close. But as voting for members of the Municipal Council is on a property qualification, not reached by the majority of the Japanese, their voting power is still inferior to the British.

Since the British opened Shanghai to trade and have always held the most important part of its interests, it was inevitable that the administration should have developed largely on British lines and its staff have been recruited from British subjects. Many hard things about Shanghai have been said by people who, having enjoyed its hospitality, have gone away to hold up

virtuous hands of horror at its dissipation. But the hardest censors have not denied that its administration is good and above all things honest, and other nationalities have accepted the situation without complaint, finding that their rights were well preserved and their duties comfortably shouldered by others.

The Council is by no means slow to change as circumstances require. Of its nine members five are British (they used to be seven), two American and two Japanese. At the present time the Chairman is an American, as is the head of the whole permanent staff. In recent years five Chinese Councillors have been added to represent the Chinese community, and increasing numbers of Chinese have been recruited into the staff, some of them already having attained to highly responsible posts.

The Japanese challenge to the British ascendancy in Shanghai's administration dates from the fighting in 1932, when, it will be recalled, the 19th Chinese Army held up the Japanese attack for six weeks. It is based on the simple proposition that, as they are the largest foreign community, they ought to have most say in Shanghai's affairs. They have extracted various concessions from the Council, for example, the creation of a special Japanese branch of the police force to police their particular quarter, Hongkew ; while the promotion of a Chinese to any position of authority in the Council's service is immediately countered by a demand for a similar appointment of a Japanese. Since 1932 the Japanese have built large barracks capable of holding 3,000 men on the northern border of the Settlement, which has certainly not made the Council's position *vis-à-vis* of the Japanese any the pleasanter.

The present situation is largely the fault of the other Treaty Powers. The armistice which ended the fighting in 1932 envisaged, if it did not actually provide for, a conference which would have regularized the whole situation of Shanghai. But Great Britain and America were unwilling to appear to be taking advantage of China's extremities, and the conference was never held. It would have been far kinder to China, quite apart from the Powers' own interests, if it had been. For the result was to leave everything in the loose inflammatory condition which had provoked the explosion of 1932, and has now

provoked another, infinitely more calamitous for the unhappy Chinese.

It is idle to speculate on what Japan will demand at Shanghai, although it seems inconceivable that she will be content to allow the old *régime* to continue as before. Some think that she will insist on a large extension of the Settlement, with the old administration maintained, herself being the chief partner in it, others, that she will create a new Concession for herself between the eastern end of Shanghai and the mouth of the Whangpoo; others, again, believe that she does not yet know what she wants and that the question of Shanghai will form but an item in the enormous list of things that will have to be settled between Japan, China and the Powers after the war; in which event Shanghai and the Customs (both of which are undoubtedly in the hollow of the Japanese hand) would be very useful levers to induce the Powers to acquiesce in Japanese plans for China.

One prophecy may be risked. The origin of Shanghai was a gamble: its growth has been a prodigy; it has survived many fearsome extremities; one cannot believe that its proud existence and indisputable services to the Far East are to be snuffed out ingloriously under a Japanese military boot.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE FAR EASTERN CRISIS.

By Felix Morley.

IN the arts of peaceful intercourse the accomplishment of mankind, like that of the coral-building animal, springs from continuous rather than spectacular activity. There must be tiers of brick and layers of mortar before the keystone can be fitted into place. It is different when man devotes his energies to work of destruction. Then six years is long enough to throw the whole machinery of civilization into reverse and to pile up a devastation which is even more appalling in its moral than in its physical aspects. This generation has good cause to realize how swiftly the slow upward spiral can be reversed. On every hand there is evidence of the scope of the retrograde movement since Mukden was seized by Japanese troops on the night of September 18-19, 1931.

Any virulent disease tends to spread until it either destroys the organism on which it feeds, or is defeated by the development of combative anti-bodies. There is no more reason to suppose that the present onslaught of dictatorships will stop with a Japanese conquest of China than there is to expect an attack of scarlet fever to recede when it has pushed a victim's temperature to exactly 100 degrees. There is, on the contrary, every reason to anticipate that from now on policies of aggression will become progressively less restrained and more destructive to any economic system which, like capitalism, depends on the stability of peace.

The American public, perhaps more rapidly than is realized in Great Britain, is beginning to appreciate the overwhelming menace of the lawless militaristic nation, and to draw the appropriate conclusions. Isolationist tendencies are still strong in my country. Post-war cynicism continues to be a potent force. There remains plenty of that emotional pacifism which explains war as a creation of international bankers and munition

makers and would exorcise it, much as the prohibitionists sought to stamp out drinking, by Act of Congress. But within the past few months the opponents of collective action have lost much ground in the United States. There have, for instance, been only feeble criticisms of the Administration's refusal to invoke the misnamed Neutrality Act in the Sino-Japanese hostilities. Many of those who worked hardest for the passage of this legislation have lost confidence in its efficacy to keep us out of war.

The extent of the change in public sentiment was mirrored both by President Roosevelt's famous Chicago speech of October 5, and the Government's declaration, the following day, "that the action of Japan in China is inconsistent with the principles which should govern the relationships between nations and is contrary to the provisions of the Nine Power Treaty of February 6, 1922." Public approval of these two actions was pronounced, and has remained so even after the implications of this policy for the development of international co-operation became generally understood.

Hostile critics have suggested that one purpose of the President's speech of October 5, warning his fellow-countrymen of the threat of aggression to the New World, was to divert attention from the issue aroused by Justice Black's confession of membership in the moronic and obscurantist Ku Klux Klan. This it certainly did, but the argument is of the *post hoc propter hoc* variety. As a matter of fact, Mr. Roosevelt was voicing warnings against the influence of Italy, Germany and Japan in South America as far back as his trip to Rio de Janeiro and Montevideo, a year ago. Readers of Ernest Hambloch's article on "Fascist Trends in Brazil," in the October FORTNIGHTLY, will have realized why. It is as unfair to say that domestic politics inspired the Chicago speech as it would be to argue that Wall Street instigated the recent slump to distract public attention from the Far East. Incidentally American antagonism to Japan's course has not been diverted by business recession or any other factor.

At Chicago, it is well to realize, the President was applying to a current problem a theory of international conduct which for nearly a generation has had strong non-partisan backing in

the United States. As far back as 1910, Theodore Roosevelt, in accepting the Nobel Peace Prize Award, observed that: 'It would be a master-stroke if those Great Powers honestly bent on peace would form a league of peace, not only to keep the peace among themselves but to prevent, by force if necessary, its being broken by others." Franklin Roosevelt, in October of this year, only paraphrased the words of his cousin when he said that: " the peace-loving nations must make a concerted effort to uphold laws and principles on which alone peace can rest secure."

Theodore Roosevelt was not the only Republican President of recent years to urge collective action against an aggressor. William H. Taft, though then out of office, gave the principle clear-cut endorsement in launching the " League To Enforce Peace" in 1915. A fundamental provision of this programme, which gained many prominent adherents in the United States prior to our entry into the World War, was that members of the League should pledge themselves to refrain from hostilities without prior invocation of arbitration or mediation machinery. Failing that procedure, " then the remaining members of the League agree to join the forcible defence of the member thus prematurely attacked."

The significance of this early advocacy of collective action, though it did much to provide the philosophic basis for American participation in the war against Germany, has been obscured by the Senate's failure to give a two-thirds majority for ratification of the Treaty of Versailles. Although this successful opposition was the work of a minority in the Senate, it kept the United States out of the League of Nations. In consequence the Geneva policy of co-operative resistance to aggression was doomed long before it was first attempted against a Great Power. But there is no reason to suppose that the Harding-Coolidge interlude, which in so many ways paved the way for the present pusillanimity of the Republican Party, represented a permanent setback to enlightened American thought on international problems.

69083

On the contrary, the swing back towards co-operation had become obvious by the time of Mr. Hoover's election, and was apparent to everybody at the time of the Manchurian crisis

of 1931-32. President Hoover's Secretary of State, Mr. Henry L. Stimson, has shown in his book on "The Far Eastern Crisis" how far the Government of the United States was at that time prepared to go in combining with other countries to oppose Japanese aggression. The full record of this period indicates that Secretary Stimson, as well as Sir John Simon, failed at critical moments to give the full co-operation which would have been necessary for success. But retrospective Anglo-American recriminations on this score are now worse than futile. The important matter is that no cause for further criticism of this character, on either side of the Atlantic, should arise again.

"During the progress of the Manchurian controversy," says Mr. Stimson in the closing pages of his book, "proof of a growing interest and support for our policy of frank co-operation with the League was evident within the United States." There follows an even more significant observation: "We (i.e. the Department of State, with President Hoover's approval) had embarked upon that policy with apprehension but we found behind us a constantly growing interest and support."

Attention, should be concentrated on Mr. Stimson's remark that while he anticipated public hostility to a forward policy it failed to materialize. There is abundant evidence, in which the nation-wide approval accorded President Roosevelt's endorsement of "concerted effort" against aggressors is only one item, that the American people are willing to follow a strong lead in making war unprofitable for those nations which utilize it as an instrument of national policy. One may assert with confidence that if an oil embargo had been applied to Italy at the time of the invasion of Ethiopia it would not have been broken by American shipments. And if Great Britain and France had seen fit to lay down a more positive policy at the outbreak of the civil war in Spain, American opinion, and consequently governmental action, would have responded helpfully.

Of course assurances of a sympathetic attitude are not enough. It is easy to understand that the British Government needs something more than a generally benevolent approval from the United States if anything in the nature of sanctions is to be attempted in future. A nation as deeply committed as is

Japan to her present policy of militaristic expansion is certain to resist, probably by force, any attempt to block her course by economic pressure. If material obstacles to the programme of aggression are to be interposed there must be some advance understanding as to what concerted action shall be taken, should the Japanese, for instance, attack Honkgong or seize the Dutch oil islands.

Here in Washington there is ample understanding of these contingent factors. It is realized that there is full justification for the British argument that the United States must take the lead, and be willing to follow through, if there is to be anything in the nature of collective action in the Far East. But there is no such realization in the country as a whole. For a generation, barring the immediate post-war setback, American statesmanship has been moving towards the theory of collective action. It is still frightened, however, lest concrete steps to that end should arouse domestic resentment as "entanglements" or "involvements" leading to war. And this fear on the part of the Department of State is not merely imaginary. The partially successful effort to fetter the Administration by mandatory neutrality legislation indicates the obstacles which those who conduct American foreign policy have to overcome on the home front.

The outcome of these conflicting forces—a push forward counteracted by a pull back—is the forcible-feeble foreign policy which is now so pronounced a characteristic of American diplomacy. It is easy to explain this situation on historical, geographical and psychological lines. The problem is natural to any Democracy. It is particularly pronounced in a federal system where the central government, though steadily expanding its powers, is as yet by no means absolute. And the difficulties are emphasized in the case of a nation which is at one and the same time both powerful and insular, both eager to seize commercial advantage and loath to assume political responsibility. To understand the nature of the problem, however, is to take the first step towards its solution.

The old teaser about the frog in the well, who slipped back an inch for every two inches which he laboriously climbed, is an apt description of current American foreign policy. If its

inevitably staccato course is understood abroad, both by the dictatorships and the democracies, there will be less misconception of the American position, and therefore less risk of the disastrous consequences which are certain to arise from any assumption on either side that the United States can safely be regarded as a nonentity in international councils.

Just as the frog in the well made obvious progress, even though he periodically moved backwards, so the United States progresses erratically towards some regularized form of co-operation with other nations possessing kindred institutions and ideals. If an adequate span of American history is taken as the basis for examination the evidence of advance is incontestable. An opposite opinion is possible only if attention is concentrated on the recurrent retrograde periods. And these should properly be regarded in the light of the French proverb : *reculer pour mieux sauter.*

The importance of analyzing the trend of American public opinion accurately is well illustrated by the diametrically opposite misinterpretations of many European observers in assessing the relations of the United States with the League of Nations. Some felt that President Wilson's great effort signified the complete abandonment of isolationist policies, and therefore the inauguration of a Utopian period of orderly international advance. They were disillusioned, baffled and embittered when the Senate failed to support Mr. Wilson's stand and when the promise of ardent co-operation was succeeded by a period of chill indifference towards the Geneva experiment. Those who felt this way had counted too heavily on the frog's advance. They were not prepared to see him slip backwards on an essentially slippery footing.

On the other hand there were many Europeans who, during the Harding Administration, wrote off the United States as a bad asset from the viewpoint of the world community. Noting only the withdrawal from its councils they assumed a lack of sincerity and dependability in the American attitude. The influence of the iniquities of the Versailles Treaty, always seen more clearly in this country, were not taken into account. And the gradual climb back towards co-operation was viewed with suspicion in Europe, and with a belief that this country aimed

to secure the advantages of the new international machinery without assuming any responsibility for its operation. There was often a superficial justification for this attitude, but it was fundamentally the attitude of those who, having seen the frog slide back, doubted his ability to climb again.

American foreign policy will probably continue to proceed along the lines which have been outlined, but with equal probability it will proceed by fits and starts. In other words, it is very unsafe to assume that a dramatic speech by the President, a forthright announcement by the Secretary of State, a positive action by Congress, will be immediately followed up. The converse is more likely to be true. A definite forward movement will be succeeded by a pause, even a seeming recession. That is due to the necessary deference for public opinion in a democracy of continental distances, with a population of heterogeneous origins, highly diversified in its intellectual equipment and educational background. Whenever there is a forward step there will be a time-lag to permit public opinion to catch up. But by the same token any definite backward movement, from the viewpoint of international co-operation, will be followed before long by an almost surprisingly pronounced advance. The trend being forward, an action against it inevitably produces a strong reaction.

If this is kept in mind, together with an understanding of the division of powers and the checks and balances which are ordained by the Constitution, much that may seem mysterious about American foreign policy will become clear. It will be understood that our rejection of membership in the League of Nations was followed logically by an approach to Geneva which now makes us one of the most active collaborators in all the technical work initiated there. It will be realized that the passage of "neutrality" legislation, refusing to discriminate between an aggressor and his victim, led naturally to the stimulating denunciation of aggression voiced by the President at Chicago. And it will be further appreciated that, having made this long advance, and having flatly declared Japan a violator of the Nine Power Treaty, the Government was unlikely to assume a position of pronounced leadership at the Brussels

Conference. A pause, to let public opinion consolidate the ground gained, was to be expected.

To every thoughtful person who believes in the Anglo-Saxon heritage it is now axiomatic that the United States and the British Commonwealth of Nations must work together on behalf of world peace. From a rational viewpoint it is revolting, nothing less, that nations as diverse in their backgrounds and ambitions as Germany, Italy and Japan should be able to form effective working agreements while the superior civilizations of Great Britain, France and the United States stand divided and helpless before them. And the major responsibility for this invertebrate attitude rests in London and Washington. For if those two governments decide to work together, whatever *régime* may be in power at Paris will automatically follow the lead. The French position is now too desperate to permit an independent course. But the democracies will not be able to co-operate, and to provide a core around which the world-wide will for peace can crystallize effectively, until they understand each other. And to-day the motivation of British policy is probably better appreciated in this country than is that of the United States in Great Britain.

There will be, in ensuing months, a very considerable effort to make British motives seem discreditable in the United States. There is a small Irish minority, steadily dwindling, which makes that its chief object in life. There is a larger Italian and German element which will work to the same end on orders from Rome and Berlin if it seems advantageous to those capitals to stir up sentiment against Great Britain. There is, finally, that egregious pacifist sentiment which, since it cannot with any shred of logic be pro-Japanese, will instinctively try to rationalize its position by becoming anti-British. But these endeavours, individually and collectively, can be ignored, if it is remembered that the unmistakable trend in American policy is towards international co-operation to stabilize peace. In effect this now means Anglo-American co-operation.

Every student of the origin of the League of Nations knows that the Covenant was in all essentials a product of Anglo-Saxon jurisprudence, based on political and philosophical concepts which the English-speaking peoples share, and which

are menaced today by the rise of the medieval and internationally anarchic totalitarian doctrine. For reasons which need not be scrutinized here the League effort has failed, at least as an effective force for the visible future. It must be emphasized, however, that the League, based as it was on the assumption of a triumphant democracy, can only be effective if it opposes itself resolutely to the Fascist principle. And this, without American membership, it is not strong enough to do.

Much the same effect, however, can be achieved by any form of practical co-operation, whether *ad hoc* or regularized, between the British Commonwealth of Nations and the United States. And such a working arrangement would inevitably serve as the nucleus of an association of democratic nations to which all the peace-loving and self-governing peoples would automatically gravitate. In time Geneva would undoubtedly emerge again as the logical clearing-house for such an association.

This is the way the tide is running, perhaps almost imperceptibly but, nevertheless, in response to a pull which is gravitational in its power. Those who are realistically inclined will recognize the natural trend and work with it. For it is impossible to see promise in any other course. Those who are realistic will also recognize that a trend of this character may take a long time to show positive results, and may be greatly hampered by bungling diplomacy, by inbred prejudices, and by the obstacles and delays inevitable to policies which must be hammered out in concurrence with a slow-moving public opinion. It is thus that the Far Eastern crisis appears as a stage in an evolutionary process, and not necessarily as a stage which will of itself be conclusive in bringing the co-operation which is so desirable.

That crisis, however, has actually brought to flower a definite alliance of the most powerful and aggressive of the anti-democratic nations. That alliance, behind the smoke-screen of an anti-Communist front, is actually designed to undermine the institutions and authority of those democratic nations which seek a politically stable world. And a challenge of such magnitude, once understood, is unlikely to go unanswered in terms of a practical response.

NEW DIVORCE PROBLEMS

By Alfred Fellows.

THE Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937, passed last July, but coming into force on 1st January, 1938, marks the end of a very long halt between two opinions, one, that Christian marriage is absolutely indissoluble, save by death, and the other that, for grave causes which practically wreck a marriage, divorce is the lesser evil. The first view, as held by the Roman Church, admits of no modifying dispensation, though Protestants have on occasion been mildly surprised at certain decrees of nullity pronounced by the Rota Court at Rome in favour of certain wealthy or distinguished persons. Between the two views as above stated there is, of course, no logical compromise. That which our Legislature attempted, divorce for adultery only, was not only illogical but unjust. Certain texts in the Gospel of S. Matthew might possibly have been quoted for it, but they are of very doubtful authenticity, and the Roman church and many Protestant scholars have entirely rejected them. They certainly have not sufficient weight to force their authority on millions who attach no importance to them. In practice divorce for adultery only had come to mean easy divorce by mutual consent for the well-to-do, by means of the hotel-bill evidence (husbands often boasting that they took no notice of their companions on an all-night vigil, though at pains to make a divorce judge decide otherwise) and no divorce at all for poor persons deserted for five, ten, or twenty years, by spouses they could not trace. The stark injustice of this has resulted in an agitation culminating in the passage of the above statute. This admits of divorce for desertion for three years, for cruelty, and on the grounds of incurable lunacy for at least five years preceding the petition. There are also four new grounds for decrees of nullity of marriage.

Following some well-deserved strictures on our divorce law

delivered from the Bench in 1906 by Lord Gorell, then President of the Divorce Court, a Royal Commission with Lord Gorell himself as Chairman was appointed in 1909, and reported in 1912 in favour of enlarging the causes for divorce, with three dissentients of pronounced Anglo-Catholic views, whose disapproval of any such proposition could have been taken for granted from the first. To attain this result, nearly two hundred and fifty witnesses testifying from all points of view had been examined, and over seventy sittings held. The majority report recommended divorce for all the above causes, and in addition, for drunkenness and drug-taking, and in favour of the spouse, almost invariably the wife, of a murderer reprieved from hanging to a life sentence.

The advocates of divorce reform have not therefore obtained all they wish, but, so far as causes for divorce are concerned, the new Act has conceded by far the more important of their claims. Broadly speaking, if worked in the spirit in which Parliament caused it to be passed, it will bring our divorce laws into line with almost all the rest of the Christian and civilized world. The law of the Roman church now prevails only in Italy, Southern Ireland, South Carolina, and some of the South American republics. There appears to be no divorce law in Northern Ireland, but divorce by private Act might be possible, as it may be in some of the provinces of Canada.

Those opposed to divorce have obtained a concession in the new Act which perhaps is not unreasonable. Divorce for the first three years of marriage is forbidden, unless a judge finds a case to be " one of exceptional hardship suffered by the petitioner, or of exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent."

The first problem on the Act, already the subject of brisk discussion in the legal journals, is whether it is retrospective, *i.e.*, whether cruelty committed before 1st January, 1938, or periods of desertion or insanity prior to that date, can be pleaded for divorce. Originally the Bill expressly provided for this, but, on the advice of the Solicitor-General, the provision was dropped as being superfluous. The Act itself is definite enough, but Judges are very reluctant to decide that a new statute destroys vested interests unless it does so in a manner which

admits of no possible doubt. The Act is hardly strong enough for that, hence the controversy. On the whole, the view that it should be construed as Parliament assuredly meant it to be construed appears the better one, though there will certainly have to be a definite ruling, and, to preclude doubt, a test case should be taken to the House of Lords or at least to the Court of Appeal at the earliest opportunity. It may be hoped that judges will not consider that the right of a wife to walk out on her husband, or of a husband to be cruel to his wife, in each case without fear of divorce, is sacrosanct. On the other hand they may probably hold that the right to divorce for adultery committed just before 1938 is not divested for a marriage of less than three years' duration. A test case on either issue ought to be decided before the first decrees nisi under the new Act have time to ripen to the absolute stage, to prevent any hardship of delay. An adverse decision would of course mean that no divorce for desertion was possible before 1941, for permanent insanity before 1943, or for pre-1938 cruelty at all.

Some difficult considerations may arise as to desertion. Both divorce judges and magistrates are quite accustomed to dealing with the issue of desertion, and therefore many of the problems have been solved. A certain member of Parliament, however, contrived to have the operation of the Act postponed from July to January for the express purpose of giving those who had deserted their spouses the chance of reconsidering their positions (incidentally on the assumption, made without question by all the legal M.P.s concerned, that the Act was retrospective). The Court may then have to consider the effect of an offer by a deserting spouse to return to cohabitation. Broadly speaking, the effect of such an offer, if genuine, determines the desertion, and presumably destroys it as a cause for divorce—certainly if it was for less than three years, and perhaps for any period. The Court may thus have to judge how far such offers are genuine, and what validity shall be given to them if obviously made for the mere purpose of preventing divorce. On occasion Courts have held that a wife is not bound to return to a cruel husband merely because he requests her to do so, and perhaps it will scan such offers closely. It may be hoped at least that it will not repeat such a farce as was too often enacted before 1923, when

a wife had to prove desertion or cruelty as well as adultery for divorce. She was then allowed to prove desertion if her husband left her and, in answer to her stereotyped letter requesting him to return, said he would not do so. Everybody in Court knew that the letter of the wife was a mere pretence, written as a preliminary to divorce, and that her husband left her and kept away with her full approval. Nevertheless the judge held, under a very hasty and ill-considered statute, that the interchange of the two letters constituted desertion on the part of the husband. Thus it may be quite possible that an offer to return may be mere trickery.

Possibly the most important problem of the Act will arise when Divorce Court judges have to decide how they will deal with a certain provision in Section 6, allowing them to treat an order for separation made by a magistrate, or a bench of magistrates, as sufficient proof of the adultery, desertion, or other ground on which it was granted.

Incidentally, adultery is made by the Act a new ground for a separation order. It was not so previously, perhaps because the more complete remedy of divorce was theoretically possible. The word "theoretically" must here be used because, our Divorce Court being one of the most expensive tribunals in the world, divorce has hitherto been inaccessible to tens of thousands of people with just cause for it. For various reasons, the "poor persons" procedure has been a very slight mitigation of this injustice. The hearing of divorce cases at Assizes gives relief in certain cases, but, if a defence is put in, the rules made by the Divorce Court provide that the hearing must be London. Incidentally, divorce cases could have been heard at Assizes at any time after the passing of the first Divorce Act in 1857 on a reference of fact from the Divorce Court, but the section which contained this provision, was simply ignored by that Court until it had virtually to be re-enacted about fifteen years ago.

Now judges will have the power to adopt the findings of magistrates on separation decrees, and it remains to be seen how they will exercise that power. If they start on the assumption that the lower court has come to a proper decision, not to be reconsidered unless there is substantial evidence

otherwise, the serious expense of witnesses testifying in the High Court will be saved, and divorce may at last become reasonably accessible to all classes. If on the contrary they act on the theory, possibly derived from Doctors' Commons, that in matters of such grave import as divorce, only a High Court judge can properly weigh the evidence, and therefore require the witnesses to appear before them in nearly every case, the utility of the Act will be destroyed for those classes, probably the great majority, who, not coming within the narrow range of "poor persons" as defined by the rules, cannot afford the expenses of a High Court action.

In fact the reproach "one law for the rich and another for the poor" has hitherto been more applicable to the English divorce law than to any other in our realm. In consequence, decent men and women, denied divorce because of the expenses of witnesses and lawyers, have been faced, sometimes in early adolescence, with the choice of living like monks or nuns all the rest of their lives or contracting irregular unions, and thus "living in sin," though the "sin" in England would be lawful matrimony in almost every other country. Probably the vast majority of men who desert their wives, and a large percentage of women who desert their husbands, also commit adultery by forming new unions. In the classes which can pay for High Court actions, the deserter can be traced by detectives, etc., not to mention that any one who receives dividends must either give an address for their despatch, or forego them. Those of narrow means, however, cannot afford private detectives, and disappearance is easy. The law provides no means of tracing a disappearing spouse, save in the case of a husband who leaves a wife dependent on poor law assistance. This outrage to ratepayers sets the police in motion, but the outrage to a self-respecting woman who, by half starving herself, contrives to keep herself and her children off the rates is not considered of any consequence. Such a woman has in the past often had to choose between abject poverty, with the knowledge that her children are half starved, and an irregular union. Three years is a long time to wait, but, if the High Court makes proper rules, her poverty should not preclude her from obtaining divorce for desertion after that period. The fact of desertion

may be easy to prove in innumerable cases where proof of adultery is practically impossible. Indeed, unless the cost of divorce is materially lightened by this provision in the new Act, it is not too much to say that its benefits will prove almost illusory for the majority of our population. Divorce reformers must therefore still watch the workings of the Act very narrowly, for the Divorce Court has not hitherto shewn itself particularly anxious to render its procedure less disastrously expensive, and the forces that have in the past worked underground to render divorce inaccessible to the poor are still both strong and subtle.

Judges will also have to decide as to the class of cases in which "exceptional hardship suffered by the petitioner or exceptional depravity on the part of the respondent" justify a divorce in the first three years of marriage. This, however, is not nearly so important as the reasonable adoption of magistrates' findings, since justice delayed for two or three years, a possibility if the discretion is narrowly and harshly exercised, is better than its flat denial. There is of course a large question as to whether, if Parliament gives a judge power to use his own discretion in particular circumstances, other judges should fetter that power by making rules concerning its exercise. As to a certain discretion given to Chancery judges by statute one of them may be quoted:

> "I say emphatically that this discretion ought not to be crystallized as it would become in course of time by one judge attempting to prescribe definite rules with a view to bind other judges in the exercise of a discretion which the Legislature has committed to them. This discretion, like all other judicial discretions, ought as far as practicable to be left untrammelled and free."

This ruling was adopted by Chancery judges, but Divorce judges have always held that their discretion should be fettered and regulated by a developed practice. As a consequence, until the Great War, when the existing harsh practice was shattered by the King's Bench judges called in aid, a petitioner guilty of adultery was for all practical purposes denied divorce, though Parliament had enacted that judges had the power to grant it in such cases.

Another discretion newly given to the Court is that of making a decree nisi absolute at the instance of the respondent. It has often happened that a petitioner, almost invariably the wife in

such cases, has obtained a decree nisi for divorce and then, not desiring herself to re-marry has, either from religious scruples or out of spite, refrained from having the decree nisi made absolute. The discretion in favour of petitioners guilty of adultery has since the War been exercised fairly, and it may be hoped that the new discretion, also in favour of guilty parties, as respondents with decrees nisi against them necessarily must be, will be exercised in the right spirit. The object of it is manifestly to enable them to regularize their irregular unions, and, if a man pledges himself to take this course (and, incidentally, to give his woman companion ground for a breach of promise action default, as recently held by the House of Lords) his freedom should not be denied to him.

There is one question with which the Act does not explicitly deal, but which should assuredly be considered in its working, and that is the attitude of the Court towards separation deeds. The doctrine of the Ecclesiastical Courts before the original Divorce Act was that married couples should live together, save only when separated by the Court itself for such grave reason as adultery or desertion. In fact with such zeal was this principle enforced that one spouse who deserted another could be compelled to return on pain of imprisonment, nominally for contumacy or disobedience to a decree for restitution of conjugal rights. On such principles these judges refused to look at separation deeds between the parties, and held that they were entirely void, and against public policy. Lord Eldon in Chancery made a similar answer to a peeress who came to him with such a deed in her hand. "After the sacred contract" he observed grimly, "people should feel it to their mutual interest to improve their tempers." Later, however, first Lord Cottenham and then Lord Westbury overthrew the old doctrine, and the House of Lords finally ruled that separation deeds should be enforceable in all the Courts. This of course means that a judge is as much bound by a separation deed as the parties to it, and cannot go behind it. In Victorian days the "washing of dirty linen publicly" in the Divorce Court was considered more undesirable than the compulsory celibacy required by the separation deeds, and judges actually encouraged them for this reason. In the twentieth century it is recognized that the

multiplication of legal celibates, inevitably leading to concubinage, is in the highest degree undesirable, and it may be hoped that judges will reconsider their attitude to these deeds. They form, of course, as usually drawn, an absolute bar to divorce for any cause arising before they are executed, and a bar to divorce for desertion, for separation under such a deed is not desertion. And sometimes they have been extorted by one spouse from the other by a process savouring of duress.

As the Bill was originally introduced, refusal of marital rights by a wife constituted desertion, for which a husband could obtain divorce. At the instance of the same member of Parliament who caused the operation of the Act to be postponed, this provision was struck out, with the consequence that a husband who is refused his rights has got no legal remedy and remains under the full obligation to maintain the woman who continues to break her vows to him. This is an injustice which, to the knowledge of the Divorce Law Reform Union's executive committee, has perhaps sent more men to prison for disobeying a maintenance order than any other single cause, for the husbands of such wives often prefer imprisonment to giving them money. It may thus be hoped that a solution of this difficulty will be found, but the converse case must also be remembered, that the wife of a very poor or unemployed man with several children may reasonably object to bearing more.

Most of the questions propounded above will depend on High Court judges, but on the issue whether a particular person is incurably of unsound mind, no doubt judges will take the last word from medical evidence. Statistics shew that about three persons out of every two hundred who have been certified and kept confined as lunatics for five years and upwards recover their reason. The doctor who certifies incurability is therefore in an exceedingly safe position, though the impossibility of mistake is not absolute. Perhaps sooner or later a divorced lunatic will recover, and no doubt the opponents of divorce will make the most of such an occasion. It is on record of course that the law has occasionally hanged an innocent man, and, our system of justice being a human institution, mistakes must now and then occur. Sometimes the spouses of persons who have disappeared for years have re-married in the genuine belief

that they were free to do so and then the absent ones have re-appeared, and claimed their matrimonial rights—or, in some cases, exacted blackmail to keep quiet and so avoid scandal. Incidentally, the Act provides the means for preventing the latter possibility, for it enables the spouses of those who have disappeared to petition the High Court to make the presumption that the absent one is dead. On proper evidence the Court will make this presumption (Chancery judges have long been accustomed to do so to order dealings with property) and, on the decree absolute for such a presumption, the marriage is dissolved.

The Act provides four new causes for annulment of marriage. The annulment of marriage is not against any religious tenet, and the Roman Court has granted, and apparently still grants, decrees with far greater facility than our own. The new grounds are wilful refusal to consummate, mental deficiency or recurrent fits of insanity or epilepsy, the existence of communicable venereal disease at the time of the ceremony, and, in favour of the man, the pregnancy of the woman by another man. In each of the last three cases the petitioner to be successful must have been ignorant at the time of marriage of the facts justifying annulment, and have refrained from marital intercourse after discovery. It does not seem likely that there will be many of these petitions, but each one granted will remove a case of hardship. It is provided that proceedings must be instituted within a year from the date of marriage. In a case known to the Divorce Law Reform Union, a man who eighteen years ago married a woman who unknown to him, was pregnant by another man instantly, on discovery of the fact, separated from her, and has since declined to live with her, though of course she remains his lawful wife. Unluckily the above provision in the Act denies redress in this hard case. The non-consummation provision will hardly change the law, for judges have usually inferred impotence on proof of wilful refusal, and granted decrees accordingly. In venereal cases infection of the petitioner is not required to be proved by the Act, though normally evidence that it has occurred is likely to be the basis of the petition. Medical evidence will be indispensable, and the sharp issue may sooner or later be raised as to the possible

violation of the secrecy promised by the Government to those who have recourse to the venereal clinics. The marriage of a lunatic is already made void by an Act passed over a hundred years ago, but annulment for mental deficiency, etc., is new. Medical evidence will again be indispensable. Mental deficiency is defined by statute, and proof of repeated periods of confinement in lunatic asylums will be the evidence of recurrent insanity.

Clergymen of the Church of England are excused by the Act from performing the ceremony of marriage over any person who has either obtained or suffered divorce, and whose former spouse is living, nor need they allow such a ceremony to be performed in any Church or Chapel of which they are Ministers. The former law absolved them from marrying a respondent guilty of adultery, but they were obliged to marry a successful petitioner not guilty of adultery, and to lend their Churches if some other parson was more accommodating to the guilty. The House of Lords has held that persons whose marriages are valid in law but uncanonical must be allowed communion, and this, of course, applies to all divorced persons re-marrying, but the decision appears to be entirely disregarded both by bishops and clergy.

The acid test of the Act's utility will be the accessibility of the Court, for all causes of divorce, to the class that constitutes no doubt the vast majority of married English people, namely those whose incomes exceed £100 a year but who cannot afford to pay anything in the neighbourhood of £100—and perhaps very much more in a contested case—in Court fees, fees to lawyers, expenses of witnesses, etc. To work the Act to its greatest efficiency the rules for divorce at Assizes should be expanded. The denial of justice to poor people by withholding the right of divorce from them has been perhaps the worst scandal of English law, and the new Act will be worse than useless if it merely enables a select few of the privileged classes who now can afford to approach this expensive Court to obtain relief which should be accessible to all.

PERHAPS WE SHALL MEET AGAIN. . . .

By H. E. Bates.

IT was no use, no use any longer, She must begin to eat less, much less; starve herself, cut out everything. It could not go on like this: public dinner after public dinner, company luncheons, lavish food, eating till she could not breathe, eating for the sake of eating. She must be firm, put a stop to it, now, at once, before the summer got too hot, before Victor got to be the director of any more companies. Two hundred and thirteen pounds. She saw the hands of the bathroom weight-clock revolve again, in imagination, and rest at that awful figure. She felt like weeping. It was something terrible. No woman could bear it. And so she had made up her mind. She was going to starve herself—and see what that would do.

She bounced and dumped along the edge of the lake, in the park, like a distended silk balloon, her feet still quite neat, her ankles incongruously bony still, so that it appeared as if she wore false legs. Her mind whispered and panted its little humiliations in small gas-escapes of misery.

On the edge of the lake, on the already hot grey concrete, small children were crumbling bread and saffron-yellow buns for the ducks. Mrs. Victor was revolted. Food, always food, eating, didn't the world do anything else? Gulls planed over and clawed the air, to swoop down and up and snatch the thrown bread before it reached the water. Their dismal crying greed set Mrs. Victor's nerves on edge like wire scratching on glass. She bumped and panted past, out of range of gulls and children and the revolting sight of bread thrown and snatched.

She sat down on one of the green public seats. There was another thing. Now it had got so that she couldn't sit on one of the twopenny chairs. They were made only, it seemed, for normal people, the slim and elegant. She remembered the days

when she had been slim and elegant : straight as a line-prop, hardly fat enough in fact, her body its own corset.

Like the young woman on the seat. Just like her. Scarcely enough flesh, if anything. Mrs. Victor looked at the young woman who, in turn, was staring across the water : blonde, young, with shadow-pointed cheeks and small scarlet buttonhole mouth, closed tight up. Mrs. Victor, looking to see if she had any stockings on at all, saw the points of stitched ladders where the legs crossed. Stockings meant she had some sort of belt on. Well, that was just for decency. She didn't need support. It was a figure that had stepped straight out of advertisements.

Mrs. Victor looked down at her own squabbed-out thighs, like two vast aerated sausages, and felt like weeping. She could not bear it, and looked back at the girl.

Ask her if she diets. Somehow she looks as if she diets. That sort of thinness can't be natural. There's thinness and thinness. Somehow she looks as if she must diet.

Mrs. Victor hesitated to speak. She had seen the scorn, before now, in the faces of the young. She didn't want to speak and then have it thrown back in her face. Then she looked again at the girl. You could have blown her away with a breath. She had the ethereal lightness you saw spoken of in advertisements. There was nothing of her.

More children had appeared on the lake-edge, with more bread, so that the air was filled with a shrieking storm of gull-wings. Mrs. Victor said :

" Excuse me. I've been looking at your figure, and wondering."

" Eh ? " The girl, startled, turned her extraordinarily thin face. " I'm sorry. I can't hear for the birds."

For a moment the birds quietened. Mrs. Victor said :

" I hope you'll excuse me speaking to you. I've been looking at your figure. Wondering if you did anything special for it. If you dieted. You see how I am."

" No," the girl said. " I don't do anything special."

" Oh ! "

Mrs. Victor, not knowing how to go on, smiled. The girl's profile looked as though it had been pared down by a knife.

" I've got so desperate now," Mrs. Victor said, " that I'm thinking

of seriously starving." It did not sound right. "Starving seriously," she said.

If she thinks I'm going to sit here, the girl thought, and listen, she's crazy. Not me. I'm going. I'll go straight away. She sat quite still. If I get up, she thought, I think I shall fall down.

"Really starving," Mrs. Victor went into an explanation of the word, moving slightly along the seat. "You know. Days without food."

"I know."

"I'm sick of food. Sick of it." Mrs. Victor began to explain who she was, how, being who she was, she had to attend dinners, functions, eating, always eating, eating until now, at last, she was utterly sick of eating. "Take last night. The dinner began at eight, and we were still eating at half-past nine. Still eating!"

The girl sat trying to think of something to say. She could think of nothing but her suspender belt. It felt loose on her body. It will fall off, she thought, if I move. I've altered the hooks once already. I shall have to alter them again.

"First there was some special sort of cheese, Norwegian or something, on rye-biscuit. As if we needed that. Then soup, *consommé* or *crême*, just the usual thing. Then fish. Fish I should have liked, but it was messed up with spaghetti and sauce and egg and I can't think what. All fattening things. And that's how it went on. Duck, pheasant, chicken—and I was so sick of them I tried venison. Have you ever eaten venison? My husband was having it and he said I should try it. I couldn't eat it. I can't explain what it tastes like—but queer, somehow. An acquired taste. You've never tried it."

"No," the girl said, "I can't say I have."

"Don't."

I could eat an elephant, the girl thought. I could eat bacon-rind. She sat thinking of bacon-rind. People didn't eat it. They cut it off, but if you did fry it it jumped in the frying-pan like snakes.

"If you multiply that by hundreds you'll see what I have to go through in a year," Mrs. Victor said.

Multiply it by hundreds. Like snakes. Snakes lay eggs, hundreds of eggs. The girl remembered going, long ago, to the Zoo, and there giving whole bananas to monkeys. It's not so bad, she thought. I had a banana yesterday. I made it last forty-three minutes. With luck I could make it last an hour.

" I've tried special baths. I've tried slimming creams and massage. I've tried everything," Mrs. Victor said. " It costs me a fortune." Children were beginning to come nearer, along the edge of the lake, drawing the gulls with them as though they were kites on invisible strings. Ducks scurried round in brown skirmishing flotillas, quarrelling, diving, tails up. " I've done everything, and this morning I went over fifteen. Its terrible. I used to be as thin as you."

It's no good, the girl thought, I've got to go down to the post office. If Harry sends the money I shall know it's all right. If he doesn't send it I know I'm done. Whatever happens, I've got to go down to the Post Office and see. I've got to be logical. I haven't a job. I've got to to be logical. During the war we used to eat locust beans. You never see them now. They said they had food value. We used to make them last a long time. That's what I want, something to last a long time.

" So I think there's nothing for it," Mrs. Victor said, " but to try simple starvation. I shall just starve and starve." She laughed a little. " After all, it must be the oldest form of losing weight in the world."

The children had come very near, the gulls shrieking and wheeling above the flurry of ducks, white bread and yellow bun-scraps flashing up in arcs against the bright sunshine.

" You see, it wears me out. Just sitting here now, I'm so hot I don't know what to do with myself. I'm all perspiration. I shall have to change everything when I get home."

A small child holding a round sugar-shining bun threw it into the water in one piece.

" It's so humiliating. You see, don't you ? Your friends, people staring at you. When you've been thin, when you've had a nice figure. You see, don't you ? "

" I see," the girl said.

"I envy you," Mrs. Victor said.

Again the girl thought, if I get up I shall fall down. She stirred slightly, feeling the emptiness of her stomach send out fainting waves of weakness. Her mind slipped into silliness. If A has two shillings between her and the workhouse and there's no letter at the post office, how many bananas must A eat before A is dead?

On the edge of the lake a nurse stood on tip-toe and tried to regain the lost bun with the ferrule of a sunshade, regained it, and gave it back to the child. "Of course it's all right. Of course they'll eat it. They'll eat anything."

"I know my husband won't like it," Mrs. Victor said. "But I can't help it. He'll say—think of my position and so on. But it's no use. I've got my own pride—I can't look at myself in the glass."

Now the small child had himself begun to eat the water-soaked bun, liking it. The nurse, grey-capped, swooped down on him like a gull herself, snatching it away, startling him to tears.

"Why does she make that child cry? I can't stand children crying," Mrs. Victor said. "It gets on my nerves. People think because you're fat and easygoing you've got no nerves. My nerves are all on edge."

The crying of the small child against the crying of the gulls made wire-shrill discords. Nerves, the girl thought. Nerves. Somebody had said that to her. Nerve. She remembered, saw herself mooning slowly along the street, intentionless, her mind dead. You've got a nerve, a voice said. Beginners on the other side of the street. When you went to the cinema this was what happened. This, as you knew, was the thing that the heroine had to face, and yet it was never mentioned. It was the most terrible thing, and in the end, by some awful irony, it was the director who saved her both from it and from herself.

"That child," Mrs. Victor said. "I can't stand it. Why does she make it cry like that?"

The child, holding his breath, had gone from crimson to faint purple in the face, in the fury of his frustration. The waves of torturing sound beat against the great cushion of Mrs. Victor's body and shook her nerves. She got up.

" It's no use, I shall have to go."

At that moment the nurse snatched up the child, put him into a large white perambulator, snatched the bun from his hands and threw it into the lake again. In a moment, as the perambulator moved off, the screams of the child began to die away.

" Well, that's better," Mrs. Victor said. " Even so, I think I must go."

I must go too, the girl thought. But if I get up I shall faint.

" Good-bye," Mrs. Victor held out her hand. " Think of me starving." She held in her large moist hand the girl's thin one. " Perhaps we shall meet again."

" Good-bye," the girl said.

Mrs. Victor walked away along the edge of the lake. The girl sat staring at the water. Ducks and birds and light and bread revolved like a lucky wheel against the sun.

ELECTRICITY: CONTROL AND CURRENT.

By David Barrend.

PUBLIC interest in the electricity supply industry has been stimulated by the announcement that the Government is about to introduce a Bill for the reorganization of electricity distribution. There is a widespread impression that this industry needs improvements in methods of operation; from time to time the Press has published stories about the high price of electricity in general—or somewhere in particular; occasionally a journalist-critic descants upon the super-abundance and cheapness of electricity in Sweden, Canada, U.S.A. or New Zealand compared with conditions in Great Britain. What are the facts?

It is untrue that electricity is, on the whole, expensive in Great Britain. In so far as international cost comparisons—the statistician's bugbear—are reliable, it appears to be cheaper than in the U.S.A., and more widely distributed among the poorer classes of town-dweller and in rural zones. American observers have been astonished to find this country so much in advance of their country in the provision of electrical amenities; the highly electrified slum-clearance estates in all parts of Great Britain, such as York, Hull, Norwich, Preston, Brighton, Wimbledon, Woolwich, etc., have no counterpart in the U.S.A.

The extension of supply into remote rural areas has been rapid during the last five years, many districts jumping the steps of change—from candles direct to electric light, from wood and coal ranges to electric cookers, and from oil to electric power as a motive force. Less than 3% of the country is now outside the zones of supply undertakings; some 40,000 farms are connected to supply; new consumers increase by 1 million a year; nearly $7\frac{1}{2}$ million houses are wired; electricity output increases at a regular 12% per annum; the average revenue received per unit from the domestic consumer has steadily decreased to

1.75d. In addition, there has been a rapid growth of special commercial facilities such as promotional tariffs, hiring schemes for apparatus and assistance in the wiring of houses.

These are good achievements. What is wrong with the industry?

The chief defects that bother the public as consumer are the varieties; varieties of methods of charging for electricity, of conditions under which it may be bought and used, of prices (some of which are too high) and of voltages and frequency of supply. The last point, however, is being rapidly put right.

These are the main reasons for increased measures of regulation. There are 620 undertakings in Great Britain, of which number about 60% are owned and operated by local authorities. Of the remaining 40%, about two-thirds are owned and operated by holding companies, the concentration of financial interests being marked. The Edmundson and the Balfour Beatty-groups control more than seventy-five different operating electricity companies between them.

Some of these 620 undertakings are large and wealthy in area; some are small and poor. Further, the various undertakers work under different local restrictions, some charged with excessive local rates and others being hindered by the refusal of local landowners to grant permission for the erection of overhead lines on their land.

It should be made clear that one half of the supply industry has already been organized on a planned basis. The generation and main transmission of electricity is controlled by the Central Electricity Board, a national body established under the Act of 1926. The Board was charged with the duties of co-ordination of generating stations through the construction of the interlinking network known as the "Grid," and of selecting the stations which should produce the entire power supply of the public system. This involved the construction of super-stations of the highest efficiency and capacity and the closing down of small and inefficient plants. The Board is the producer, the undertakings it supplies are the retailers.

Since one half of the industry has been successfully organized on a national basis, why not, it is said, apply the same principle and method to the other half?

The case for Nationalization was considered and rejected by the McGowan Committee, set up by the Government to inquire into the distribution, or retail, half of the industry. What is this Committee's alternative scheme ?

The broad lines of the McGowan proposals are :—amalgamations to form large-scale undertakings ; changing the boundaries of certain areas ; removal of duplicate powers of supply where they occur ; uniformity in methods of charging the consumer ; increased powers of control to the Electricity Commissioners who are the administrative and judicial body, associated with the Ministry of Transport, and regulating the supply industry. Other proposals aim at more rigid control of private undertakings, particularly holding company groups and their owners ; a standard rate of ordinary share dividend is suggested, with the application of sliding-scale limitation of profits. The Commissioners would have control over capital issues and extension of facilities ; they would have powers to insist on certain minimum services and forms of domestic tariff.

The system of amalgamations proposed, although compulsory, has a certain flexibility in that it allows for several types of undertaking. It allows for the absorption of various undertakings, both private company and local authority, by another undertaking which may be either private company or local authority itself. The second type of combine envisaged is the grouping of a number of undertakings, of both types, into a new body which will form a Distribution Authority. The exact structure of this new unit remains to be seen, but its control is to rest in not less than seven or more than twelve members appointed by the Minister of Transport. The third type of unit is to be a Joint Board, consisting of a group of local authority undertakings.

The total number of these new and large-scale units is to be seventy-six, and it is stated that some existing large undertakings are to stay as they are, their areas being big and rich enough for each to be regarded as a proper large-scale unit. The regional or local schemes are to be made out by the Electricity Commissioners : before any of the amalgamation schemes can be put through inquiries will have to be held into the scheme

contemplated; and the final purchase prices will be determined by an arbitration tribunal.

This condensed outline of the McGowan proposals shews that a very high degree of regulation and control is in view. Evidently, too, these schemes are to be fought determinedly by all sides of the electricity supply industry. To understand the great volume of hostility which has been aroused by them, one needs to know the peculiar history of the industry, particularly the ancient strife between local authorities and private companies For example, many municipal men regard with genuine horror the suggestion that a local authority undertaking should be absorbed by a private company undertaking: in their eyes it would be an "anti-social" act. Again, many company. men regard the suggestion of being absorbed by a local authority as equally indecent: in their eyes it would mean the sacrifice of their efficient and flexible operating unit to the cumbersome, committee-ridden bureaucracy of local officials!

This internecine tension of misunderstanding and obstinacy is an unhappy source of over-all inefficiency in what is supposed to be a single industry, carrying out a public service. But, in the face of a common danger, the foes hold an armistice of sorts to gather up their brickbats for the greater battle with the forces of amalgamation. Nevertheless, the McGowan proposal that the small undertakings (of less than 10 million units sales per annum) should be forcibly absorbed without right of appeal, split the municipal ranks with a crack. For the small and vociferous local authorities accused the fat and complacent ones of neglecting their cause and, behind closed doors at the great Brighton Convention, the vocal bombardment from South Wales shook the foundations of Birmingham Town Hall and rattled heavily on the roofs of Liverpool and Manchester.

In this confusion of interest, what of the consumer? Like the "Ladye Faire" at the tournament, for whose favours the knights did battle, he is temporarily forgotten during the heat and excitement of the *mêlèe*! Let us turn to the more rarefied air of the academy and examine the exact nature of this public utility industry which is being regulated.

What is a public utility? What distinguishes electricity from milk, or telephones from whisky, or gas from beer? If

there is no valid economic distinction, there is no special group which constitutes public utilities. In that case, the legal and political arguments for the special regulation or the national ownership of electricity supply are of no greater value than similar arguments applied to, say, the iron and steel industry or the flour-milling industry.

The chief distinguishing characteristic of the public utility is its tendency to charge discriminating prices for its services or products. This arises from two main causes :—(1) high overhead costs, derived from a very large capital investment in plant, equipment and service connections; (2) supplying markets with definite boundaries. In electricity supply these conditions are marked, and, in addition there exists the ability to divide the consumer market into classes and quasi-monopolistic conditions of supply. Direct competition does not exist; there is only competition from substitutes such as gas, coal, coke, oil, etc. Thus monopolistic conditions are present, for price fixing is unregulated and supply can be withheld unless payments are guaranteed. The tendency to overload the non-competitive consumer market and hand out price bargains to the competitive business section is marked in electricity supply.

There is then a definite economic class which can be termed " public utility " to which particular methods of control in the interest of the general public as consumer may be justifiably applied. From the political viewpoint, this class has potential dangers of abuse; moreover this view is concerned with the extent to which private property is applied to a public interest; the national importance of the service, and its potentialities for broad economic reconstruction and social betterment. In these respects electricity is a conspicuous case, so that there is a great deal for the regulation or planning of the industry.

Why should one raise this issue now? It is, first of all, because the unexpected chorus of hostility to the McGowan proposals, embodied in the Government's " White Paper," has shewn a certain temper in the supply industry, causing many observers to take " second thoughts." The opposition has come from almost every quarter; it has shewn that partisan interests outweigh the consumer's needs; it has made clearer than possible in any other manner the fact that any scheme of further regula-

tion of the industry which includes—as it must do—plans for amalgamations of existing units into larger ones, will meet the same type of strong and united hostility.

The traditional British way of dealing with the industry has been followed. A Committee was appointed to take evidence from representative people, sift it and issue a compromise Report which proposes gradual measures of change. The advantages of this system are those of " safety first " ; but the disadvantages too.

In such a method one seems to ' get the worst of both worlds.' Increased regulation is to be given to the " bureaucracy," but their function is essentially administrative. It is not dynamic. The various units making up the future industry will, for the most part, set their own pace, with prods from the administrators. All the complexities and management problems of large-scale organizations—some being new hybrids—will have to be solved, employing mixed personnel from local authority and private company undertakings, mutually suspicious. A long and difficult period of legal battling over the amalgamations and compensations will be followed by a long and difficult period of adjustment inside the new operating units. The public should not be misled, by the way, about the potential economies of the proposed scheme. Savings possible from changes in the distribution system are not as great as those made in the co-ordination of generation. Cost reduction per unit depends upon such factors as active commercial policies which obtain more consumers per mile of line or per square mile of area served, and which secure a higher consumption per consumer. Rural zones cannot, in many instances, yield a satisfactory return compared with urban districts : in distribution it is not the cost of current that matters so much as the costs of consumer service and the capital charges. There has been, and there must be, increases in selling, advertising and development costs : new types of " load " and of apparatus require the services of specially trained commercial-engineering personnel. This is, by the way, one of the important arguments for the large-scale unit ; the small undertaking cannot afford to employ these men.

One must distinguish between Regulation and Planning.

The McGowan Committee proposals are no more than increased measures of regulation. Such regulation may be beneficial; it may achieve a greater degree of uniformity all round. It may for instance, create uniformity in the *form* of the domestic tariff, a matter about which complaints have been made to the supply industry.

But regulation is powerless to create uniformity in the *actual price* of the tariff, because the entire market is split-up into numerous, oddly-shaped markets of different size and purchasing power. The telephone system, run by 620 or 76 undertakings would present an uncomfortable situation with strangely assorted prices for service: the sole reason for the uniform price of the telephone tariff—and that tariff, by the way, differentiates between urban and rural charges!—is that the telephone system is controlled, owned and operated by one body. Thus it can balance against losses, say, on remote rural exchanges, profits on crowded urban exchanges. Is it not a fact that the profits on the telephone system cover the losses on the telegraph service?

This illustration shows the fundamental difference between Regulation and Planning. In regulated control you may—and do—have local authority electricity supply undertakings which refuse to go outside their city walls to give supply to the neighbouring rural population. This undertaking is "ratepayer-conscious;" why should it subsidize those rural dwellers who do not contribute to the town's upkeep? In this way the alleged superiority of the local authority over its private company rival undertaking to provide a public service is undermined in practice by a short-sighted although quite understandable point of view.

Under a Planning system, however, it may be the major policy of the Government, expressed through its national administrative and executive bodies, to provide a full service to all dwellers in rural areas. Then the State is prepared to accept losses on certain rural distribution systems and to offset these losses by profits in the big urban centres.

So one would advocate subsidies in policy. Why not? Examine the tariff structure of any supply undertaking which serves a mixed group of consumers, industrial power, domestic, traction, public lighting, etc. In how many instances would the

domestic consumer be found to be subsidizing the power consumer if a true cost analysis were to be made? After all, the power consumer buys in his thousands where the domestic consumer buys in his tens—and is there not a famous principle in public utility service of "charging what the traffic will bear?"

Incidentally, the correct costing of a service by consumer groups is one of the most difficult tasks, it involves the allocation of joint costs and the proportion of joint costs to total costs in electricity supply is so high and its spread so wide that numerous theories for cost allocation abound to befog the engineer and the economist. So one may as well admit that subsidizing of some kind or another does—and must—exist.

Observers comment to-day that the job of planning generation has been done, courageously and well; more difficult as the planning of Distribution undoubtedly is, may it not be worth while, in the long run, being equally courageous?

There are certain factors which give support to this view. For electricity is unique. As the mobile power it is the natural partner of transport in the stimulation of Regional Planning and the re-location of Industry; in the revival of industries in rural zones; the re-designing of towns and buildings; the reduction of air-pollution by smoke; the improvement of amenities.

The State is facing very difficult problems. Public realization of the changes in conditions is evident in its willing concessions to extending the limits of State action in many fields. The creation of the Special Areas Commissioners represents a new type of governmental, regional body to deal with new problems. The Trading Estate policy shews a new and accepted State action in the industrial field. There are in these bodies and in others, such as the creation of Marketing Boards in agriculture, signs of the emergence of a planning policy. Electricity can partake of it—reinforce it.

Significantly enough, in his latest Report, Sir George Gillett writes:—

> "It has at last been conceded that matters which concern the welfare of many thousands of our fellow citizens are properly to be considered in relation to their social and broad economic consequences, as well as in relation to the profit and loss account of the individual concern . . . . . I hope that similar recognition of the need for considering major industrial changes from a social and national angle will be extended to other large industries in the near future."

This statement is something of a justification for a reconsideration of the Planning policy for electricity distribution as distinguished from the Regulation policy proposed. And there is one urgent work to be done in the industry before any big scheme is operating. It is the step to release the industry from the blunders and complications of early legislation. This can be done by setting up a group or committee immediately to bring all the Electric Lighting and Electricity Supply Acts under one General Act.

Under a national policy, the second step would seem to be the welding of electricity supply and transport into a regional policy of industrial location, based on the Report of the Committee now taking evidence on the problem of the location of industry. But, perhaps the second step would be to make clear to the industry its own significance, its potential social function. This is important from a psychological point of view. There are 60% of the undertakings in the country under local authority control., i.e., public service. The unpopularity of a scheme which proposed to transfer a municipal enterprise to a private company is understandably fierce ; the objections to the transfer of the same enterprise to the State are far less strong. The principle of preserving a public service in the control of the public is maintained.

Go down to Wattsborough and talk to the Council, to the Electricity Committee, to the commissionnaire at the brand-new electricity showrooms, the pride of the town. Go down and tell them all that the neighbouring company, Morjuice Dividends Inc., is to take them into its " capitalistic " fold—and see the sparks crackle round the chief engineer's ears! What is the better alternative—if any ?

Let us give imagination a chance, even if it is only to dwell for a moment in Utopia. Imagine that the Minister has announced in the " House " " that the Government views the responsibility of the electricity supply industry as unique in its potentialities for wise direction of economic effort and social betterment. The good work done by Electricity, largely through supply undertakings, local authority and private company alike is to be broadened. It is proposed to capitalize the goodwill and energies of the 620 supply undertakings in the

creation of a national undertaking, the Central Distribution Board, to supervise and control the entire distribution of electricity. It will operate with the maximum degree of decentralization practicable through Regional Centres. These centres will be located at Bristol, Birmingham, Leeds, Manchester Glasgow and London, corresponding to the Central Electricity Board's regional centres, with the addition of Norwich, capital of East Anglia.

> " The entire staffs of all local undertakings will be guaranteed continuous employment (or full compensation) in the plans to be developed. Local managers will be retained as far as possible, but efficiency must be the criterion. A Council of Investigation will be set up to study Regional conditions through seven Regional Committees who will examine the regional development needs and assess the efficiencies of local undertakings.
>
> " The Government's first step in its new National Reconstruction Policy is to use electricity to the fullest degree."

Suppose this remarkable announcement is followed by a visit to meet the Council and Electricity Committee of Wattsborough. They are informed that the State, and not the neighbouring company, Morjuice Dividends Inc. is to take control of their undertaking ; that the process will be gradual ; that the local manager and his staff will be retained ; that the formation of a Regional Division of the new Board is contemplated, using the best brains of all the local authority and private company managers and engineers inside the Region ; that a District Branch is to be set up at Wattsborough ; that the local showrooms will remain associated intimately with the town.

This is altogether a different proposal from the first one. There will be opposition, of course, but not of the same kind and depth as that which greeted the former announcement. There is a possible pride in contributing a municipal achievement to a national work, especially if local interests are to be preserved as much as practicable. But there can be no joy in handing over a municipal achievement to a private company, however distinguished its Board of Directors. One has to make allowances for the psychological factor in re-organization plans ; there should be some incentive or satisfaction in return for co-operation with 'the powers that be.' Further, it has always been true that people will respond to a bold policy that fires their imagination, but they will not respond to compromise policies.

These are points to consider in studying the proposals for the reorganization of electricity distribution. They attempt to put the viewpoint of Planning as compared with Regulation. They are not a criticism of the policy adopted, but a commentary on the choice before the industry and those who have to decide the difficult task of reorganization.

There are many Wattsboroughs, with genuine public spirit. The problem before us is to plan and co-ordinate without destroying that spirit : even to use it in a fresh way. Take an organization, " X " whether large-scale hybrid, Regional Distribution Authority or Central Distribution Board : put the best men in charge ; get keen devotion to the task from local officers ; willing co-operation from all supply undertakings ; sinking of internal feuds in the face of a herculean but inspiring job ; active development and economic research policy ; application of administration principles and organization technique ; a clear vision of the social purpose of electricity in a major plan of reconstruction—given all these things and the new body would be a success! And the future commentators would be able to say that the " right answer " had been found. Of course, these conditions are Utopian, but it does seem as if that plan will have the maximum chance of success which can capture the imagination of the industry, fuse its differences and create new loyalties to a practical ideal.

BERLIN : VIENNA : PRAGUE.

By Paul Anderson.

A FEW weeks ago Lord Halifax returned from his " mission " to Germany. As is well known, Lord Halifax's journey had been planned and promoted by those who hope to pave the way for a bilateral Anglo-German " understanding " by means of recognizing and, if possible, satisfying Germany's colonial demands. It is the irony of fate that, as the prime result of Lord Halifax's mission, the possible dangers arising out of Germany's revisionist policy in Central Europe have made much deeper impression that her colonial demands.

This effect was certainly not intended by Berlin, nor was it, I believe, foreseen by the British promoters of Lord Halifax's undertaking. However, the Nazis themselves have unintentionally, but most effectively, helped to create this effect by the singularly violent reactions of their own press to even the most carefully-worded suggestions of some British newspapers that the achievement of Germany's hegemony in Central Europe was in fact of greater importance for her than any strip of African land. The origin of these Nazi press attacks is worth noting. They first appeared in the *Nationalsozialistische Presse-Korrespondenz* and were subsequently copied by almost all important German newspapers. The editor of the *N.S. Presse Korrespondenz* is Dr. Otto Dietrich, Chief of the Nazi press and a permanent member of Herr Hitler's personal entourage. Within the Nazi Party Dr. Dietrich has always been famous as one of the strongest supporters of a " radical policy " in Central Europe. Only a few days after Lord Halifax had left Germany, Dr. Dietrich was appointed to be Press Chief for the German Government and State Secretary in the Ministry of Propaganda. (The appointment takes effect on January 15th, 1938.)

While the destruction of Austria's and Czechoslovakia's independence has always been (and still remains) the avowed

and often proclaimed aim of Herr Hitler and the Nazi Party, there have been many—and indeed many drastic—changes of Berlin's political and diplomatic methods. These repeated diplomatic somersaults were not always merely a reaction to changes in the general European situation, such as the Franco-Russian alliance or the British rearmament programme. They have often been the result of friction within the Nazi Party and the German Government themselves.

If, therefore, a chart were to be drawn of the development of relations between Berlin, Vienna, and Prague, it would reveal an amazing inconsistency on the part of German diplomacy as well as a most intimate interdependence between the several instruments of Berlin's policy *vis-à-vis* Vienna and Prague. A study of this imaginary chart may permit certain conclusions to be drawn regarding the present state of affairs in Central Europe.

At present, Germany's relations with Austria and with Czechoslovakia seem to have reached something like a deadlock. That is, at least, the outward appearance. Neither the *Anschluss* nor the submission of Czechoslovakia to domination by the Third *Reich* seem to-day to be any nearer their realization than they were, say, twelve or eighteen months ago. On the contrary, the determination to defend their independence (and incidentally the ability to do so) has grown noticeably in both countries. Therefore, the question which Berlin has to face now is not so much what it wants to do, but rather, how it can possibly break through the deadlock.

To the outer world both the Austrian and the Czech problems present themselves in a striking similarity, namely as the defence of the independence of the State against the expansionist designs of a much more powerful neighbour. Yet it must not be forgotten that the German approach to the Austrian problem is entirely different from that to Czechoslovakia. The Austrian people are Germans, and Austria is regarded as an integral part of the German *Reich*. In this respect the Austrian origin of Adolf Hitler himself is of no small consequence. The Nazi Party has never regarded the national independence of Austria as a problem of foreign policy, but as one of the many infamies of the Allied Powers and the Treaty of Versailles.

Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, is regarded as an enemy country, pure and simple. The German-Czech conflict arises from the strains and stresses of power-politics and is only due to Czechoslovakia's geographical position. It is not too much to say that there would be no German-Czech problem if the Czechs happened to be the inhabitants of Holland, and that there *would* be a German-Dutch problem if the Dutch were the inhabitants of Czechoslovakia.

The failure to achieve the *Anschluss* by the *putsch* in July, 1934 marks the beginning of the end of the insurrectionist tendencies which had inspired the Nazi policy towards Austria. Before long Herr Hitler himself was forced to disavow publicly his Austrian followers, and a number of Nazi leaders, notably General Goering, realized that their attitude had been dangerously delusive. But it took a very long time before the whole Nazi Party was brought into line. As a matter of fact, the radio warfare directed against the new Government of Herr von Schuschnigg from the broadcasting stations of Munich and Berlin, as well as countless acts of terrorism in Austria, were allowed to continue for almost two years and came to an end only very shortly before the conclusion of the Austro-German Political Truce of July 11, 1936.

By that Austro-German agreement the German Government recognized officially Austria's independence. Here was the first indication of a radical change of Berlin's policy towards Vienna. But it would be totally wrong to assume that the attitude of the Nazi Party has undergone an equally radical change. There is no evidence for such a belief, and indeed many elements of the old Nazi attitude towards Austria as a whole—and towards the *Anschluss* in particular—still prevail. It remains still true that all important decisions concerning German-Austrian relations are regarded as the personal privilege of Herr Hitler, and that neither the German Foreign Office nor the more radical elements of the Nazi Party are given a chance to interfere. In fact, the German Foreign Office takes little if any part in the actual shaping of German-Austrian relationship.

More will have to be said about the character and the significance of this change. But during the period between the summer of 1936 and the spring of 1937, the " Austrian question "

was allowed to drop into a rather obscure background, while German-Czechoslovak tension seemed to be rapidly approaching a crisis. Of the untold number of German accusations those of wilful ill-treatment of the Sudetic-German minority and the secret installation of Russian aerodromes on Czech soil near the Bavarian frontier are still well remembered. While the Czechs denied all the charges with great energy and invited impartial investigation, these denials seemed to stir up only more criticism and anger in Berlin.

Powerful sections of the Nazi Party and indeed of the German Government did at that time entertain the idea of a sudden crushing attack on Czechoslovakia, whose defences and fighting forces were not considered to be serious obstacles in such a "lightning-war." A rapid military defeat of Czechoslovakia—at any rate rapid enough to forestall foreign intervention—would have removed most of the obstacles which are in the way of Germany's domination of Central and South-Eastern Europe. Furthermore. the independent Power which to-day links Soviet Russia with France and Western Europe would have been "wiped off the map," and the diplomatic *bloc* of the Little Entente completely shattered.

Fantastic as the plan may sound—it did exist. More than that, it soon became the subject of the most passionate fight of factions within the leading circles of the Nazi Party and the German Government. The section of the Nazi movement and State bureaucracy supporting the plan, largely under the influence of Dr. Goebbels, Himmler (Chief of the S.S. and *Gestapo*), Rosenberg (Chief of the Nazi Party Bureau for Foreign Affairs), and Darré (Chief of the *Reichsnaehrstand*) found a good deal of support. If referred to in the press, this group is generally termed the "extremist group." I have the greatest hesitation in using these terms, simply because they tend to convey the idea of conflicting political aims as between "moderates" and "extremists," whereas in actual fact all the more important disputes within the Nazi Party have been on matters of tactics rather than of differences of policy.

The plan of open aggression against the Czechslovak Republic was most vigorously opposed by another section of responsible leaders of the German *Reich*, notably the Army leadership,

including General Goering. Apart from the obvious considerations of the dangers Germany might encounter in such an adventure, it has become known that the *Reichswehr* Chiefs brought forward two decisive arguments (1) that the German food supplies were at that time not nearly sufficient for such an enterprise and (2) that the military power of resistance of the Czech forces was being dangerously underrated by the "extremists." In regard to the former problem the *Reichswehr* took practical steps and set up a research committee consisting of three high army officers to make special enquiries into the potential German food supplies (Colonels Loeb, Thomas, and Beck).

It is, of course, impossible to state with a reasonable amount of certainty exactly how far things developed and exactly which circumstances finally prevented the catastrophe from taking place. Yet it does not seem over-speculative if one assumes that the international repercussions of the Spanish war and the announcement of Britain's rearmament programme very much facilitated the (at least temporary) victory of the " moderates " over the " extremists."

In the early summer of 1937 the direction of German diplomacy took yet another turn. On my imaginary chart the curve marking German-Czech relations would show a sharp downward trend—provided that a downward trend be taken to indicate a lessening of tension. The German Government had apparently realized the dangers and risks which unprovoked aggression would inevitably imply for Germany's own security and appreciated that the " elimination " of Czechoslovakia could not be achieved by a mere hussars' raid. In consequence, German diplomacy became once again active on the Vienna-Budapest line.

Both developments seemed to run parallel for some time, and only later it became evident that Austria was attracting the better part of the attention which, some months previously had been concentrated on the " Czechslovak problem."

But new ways were now sought to achieve the aim with less risks than those the " revolutionary act of the Austrian people" evidently implied. Both in the German Nazi Party and among Austrian Nazis, the new political formula has been

summarized as "*Anerkennung, Mitregierung, Alleinregierung,*" indicating the essentially gradualist programme of, first, legalization of the (now illegal) Austrian Nazi Party, subsequently its incorporation into the Austrian "Fatherland Front" and finally its admission to the Austrian Governmnt. This policy of gradualism which is now being carried out with great caution and, it should be added, with great skill does not render the existence of a strong Nazi movement in Austria superfluous. On the contrary, "mass pressure" will still be needed to ensure the successful attainment of each single phase. It has, however, paralysed the essentially insurrectionist character of the illegal Austrian Nazi movement which now finds itself reduced to a mere district section attached to the Party in the *Reich* and robbed of all its *élan vital.*

Ever since the first signs of this change became visible—and this must be dated back as far as 1935—there has been considerable opposition to it, both in the German and the Austrian Nazi Party. In both sections the opposition came from the so-called "extremists" who insisted that a continuation of a "radical policy" would have every chance of success in view of the weakness of Herr von Schuschnigg's Government and the "favourably changed European situation." (The latter was a remark made by one of the well-known leaders of the "extremist" wing and referred to Italy's pre-occupations in the Mediterranean as well as to Germany's successful *coup* in the Rhineland). As far as the German Nazi Party is concerned the real importance of these frictions is very difficult to establish. At any rate, the "radical opposition" has not proved sufficiently strong to alter the new course of Austro-German policy, great as its importance may be in other respects

In the Austrian Nazi movement, on the other hand, it was possible for the opposition to develop much more rapidly, and shortly after the conclusion of the Austro-German Truce (1936) as well as after the subsequent agreement of July 11, 1937, it reached such a pitch that it threatened to paralyse any further co-operation between the *Reich* Government and the Austrian Nazis. Although these repeated crises have been overcome thanks to the complete dependence of the Austrian Nazis on German support, the internal fight has not come to an end.

Under the leadership of the group of Captain Leopold, the Vienna Nazi leader, the Austrian Nazis are continuing their opposition against the "moderate" group of Herr von Papen, Herr Glaise-Horstenau, and Dr. Seyss-Inquart, thus attacking indirectly the official policy of the *Reich*. Although the extremists" in the *Reich* are known to regard the Austrian opposition with great sympathy, it would seem highly doubtful that they actually encourage it. To deal here with the countless political intrigues arising out of this conflict would lead me far beyond the scope of this article. But let me mention some recent incidents. I know of two separate cases when opposition Austrian Nazis actually informed the Police of the arrival of illegal couriers from Nazi headquarters in Munich. In both cases the couriers were arrested upon this information. This, I believe, characterizes the internal tension better than any description could do.

Outwardly, German-Austrian relations have developed according to the new programme of gradualism. Germany's efforts to achieve, as a first decisive stage, an effective domination of Austrian internal affairs and, even more so, of her foreign policy have visibly increased month by month. It is quite plain that the German Government now regard Austria, and not Czechoslovakia, as the key problem of their policy of revising the Central European *status quo*, and there are many indications that they are determined to increase their efforts even further.

This is a little surprising in view of the fact, that during the past eighteen months Germany has had to record more setbacks and failures than actual progress. Summarizing as briefly as possible the main events, one cannot fail to recognize that "poor little Austria" has shown a remarkable power of resistance. The political truce between Germany and Austria was in itself a heavy sacrifice—and only inspired by the hope that it would result in an immediate increase of Nazi influence in the Austrian Government. This hope remained unfulfilled, and relations between Berlin and Vienna were soon to become as strained as ever before. In fact, the Austrian Monarchist movement whose influence was to have been at least neutralized by the "Truce" made great strides and seemed to develop quite successfully into a counterpoise to the pan-German tendencies.

Another German move followed in the autumn of 1936. When the Italian Foreign Minister, Count Ciano, visited Berlin in October, the German Government asked for the Italian consent to the attendance of a German " observer " at the November meeting of the countries of the " Rome Protocols " (Italy, Austria, Hungary). Since Count Ciano could not commit himself, it was Baron von Neurath who tried to persuade M. von Kanya, the Hungarian Foreign Minister, that a German observer should be admitted to the Vienna meeting. In the end no German was allowed to attend owing to Mussolini's veto. Nevertheless, Germany scored one important success. It had been planned that the Vienna meeting should discuss the possibilities of a closer economic co-operation between the " Rome Protocol " countries and Czechoslovakia. Germany's influence in Rome, Vienna, and Budapest proved, after all, strong enough, and this subject was struck from the agenda.

At the Venice meeting of the " Rome Protocol " Powers (April, 1937) German influence was even more marked. If compared with previous *communiqués*, that issued after the Venice meeting is remarkable in more than one way. The habitual declaration of Austrian independence was omitted altogether. In another passage the *communiqué* hinted at a possibility of enlarging the " Rome Protocols " (by the admission of Rumania and Yugoslavia), a development which would be equivalent to the dissolution of the Little Entente. Finally, it contained a much emphasized sentence to the effect that Italy and Austria were convinced that no Danubian re-organization could be effective without Germany's active participation.

When, after the meeting in Venice, Herr von Schuschnigg returned to Vienna, Signor Gayda published his sensational statement announcing that the Austrian Nazi movement would henceforth take an active part in the Austrian Government. The Gayda announcement created something like a minor political crisis in Vienna, until Herr von Schuschnigg published a strong *démenti*. The really interesting fact about this incident is, however, that Austrian Nazi circles had been informed before the Venice meeting that the Nazis would very soon be able to join the Austrian Government. There can be no doubt as to the origin of this information. . . . All the same, Berlin's

efforts rather failed to produce the hoped-for result, i.e., Austria's readiness to co-operate unconditionally on an "All-German" line of policy. In fact episodes like Signor Gayda's post-Venice sensation did not help at all to promote in Vienna feelings of friendliness towards Berlin. A very sharp tone in the German press made things even more uncomfortable. It was hardly surprising that in this atmosphere the Austro-German talks, which followed in July, 1937, had only a narrow escape from breakdown.

By the agreement which was concluded on this occasion Germany scored some minor successes such as the legalized distribution of Herr Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, the admission into Austria of a much increased number of German Nazi newspapers, and finally, a special "truce of the press." But Berlin took little trouble to conceal the disappointment of the *Reich* Government regarding the rather poor net result of the Vienna talks.

Since then, Germany's efforts to strengthen her influence in Vienna—and incidentally to gain a better position for a future assault on Czechoslovakia—have been steadily increasing. The main feature of the present development is the German energy in attempting to counteract the growing strength of the "legitimist" movement in Austria by a heavily intensified pan-German propaganda. There are, as yet, no indications that Berlin is contemplating a return to the earlier and more violent political methods. The present pan-German propaganda is carried out not so much by the clandestine Nazi organizations as by mass-organizations like the *Deutsche Turner-Buende*.

Nevertheless, and despite the amazing power of resistance which the Schuschnigg Government has shown ever since 1934, it would seem very doubtful whether the defenders of Austrian independence will be able to resist for very long a neighbour of such determination and power as the Third *Reich*, especially since the Government enjoys the support of only a small minority of the Austrian people. The future of Austria, however, more than ever to-day depends on the shifts and permutations of power among the principal countries of Europe.

LAURENTIAN PROSPECT:

An Aperçu of French Canada

By Brian Meredith

A HUNDRED years ago there began in Canada a rebellion that had a profound effect upon the history of French and English-speaking Canadians. Seventy years ago Confederation brought the two races and the several sections of the country together. To-day there is a recrudescence of ancient political unrest: the ghost of Louis Joseph Papineau is abroad in the land. Papineau was the counterpart in Quebec or Lower Canada of Mackenzie, the rebel leader of 1837-38 in Ontario or Upper Canada. And just as the latter was the ancestor of the present Prime Minister, William Lyon Mackenzie King, so the former is the spiritual progenitor of movements that perturb Canadian affairs to-day.

That was the time when Lord John Russell was declaring Responsible Government to be a condition that could only exist in one place, namely at the seat of Empire; and in Toronto, in York, and in Montreal, were groups that thought otherwise. Of course they were right, of course there were many just causes for complaint, and of course half-measures towards reform failed to stem the tide. The rebellion broke out and was eventually crushed; the situation was at length investigated and remedied. But for the first time the French Canadians had stood together and fought as a people.

The rebellious, the patriotic spirit of Papineau lived on. Another leader, Sir Wilfred Laurier, came later to carry urbanely, ingeniously and charmingly the name of French Canada into national, imperial and world politics. And then for a time there was a lull. For thirty-nine years a provincial party remained in power, and no rival could disturb it. But Taschereau, the patrician in command, seemed at last to have lost his sense of

direction, and his followers their honesty; and the old régime was defeated. There were political scandals revealed, going back two generations; it was a period of the bitterest disillusionment and disappointment. The people felt they had been sold by their own leaders for personal gain; anything, in the midst of economic depression, would be better.

And so, born largely of internal troubles but blamed where possible on the doings of English-speaking Canadians, came a year ago another crisis.

They began to talk in Quebec of economic independence, this being largely a jealous reaction against the English character of Montreal's St. James Street, which is the City or the Wall Street of Canada: to complain of the contaminating effect of contact with "strangers," meaning their English-speaking compatriots, displaying as narrow an attitude as anything ever propounded by Ontario Orangemen.

The result was insecurity, akin to the nervousness of capital in Alberta. For the newcomers to power are experimenting with a new form of government. At the end of the session of the provincial legislature this summer it appeared that a formidable and carefully planned campaign was afoot to transform Quebec province into a clerical fascist community. (This was, incidentally, the considered opinion of *The Times* correspondent.) The new provincial premier, Duplessis, had earned the reputation of a politician of considerable energy and courage. Legislation initiated promised to benefit and regulate the basic needs of the province . . . but some of it has a radically reactionary twist, *e.g.*, measures to suppress subversive propaganda and to padlock offending premises, with the power to determine what was subversive in the hands of the Attorney General*. Moreover, new labour wage laws empowered the Government to determine whether any workers' organization was a fit body to participate in collective agreements and to ban radical groups.

"The enactment of these laws is the initial step," said the head of the Canadian Trades and Labour Congress, "towards totalitarianism, and they follow closely the decrees and laws

* On November 11th the provincial police, acting under orders from Mr. Duplessis' Government of National Union raided the private flat of the Montreal organizer of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation—despite the latter's moderate Socialist programme.

governing Fascist Italy, thereby establishing a political dictatorship which all employers and employees will be forced by law to obey." National and international trade unionism was threatened by powers given to municipal corporations to tax and license employers and employed and so bar workers from choosing their affiliations. And there was a familiar resonance to the periods of a leader in the *l'Action Corporative Nationale* who proclaimed that

> " our existing society is from the political point of view a mass of braggarts and from a national point of view a body without a soul. . . . Are we going to bow our heads before destiny? Are we going to continue to be gnawed by anæmia and rickets? . . . we must drown our Communists in the flood of our speeches, and that is the strongest solution of our difficulties." (All Socialists are considered communists in Canada, and in both English and French Canada there is an hysterical reaction against anything that smells of it).

The powerful St. Jean Baptiste Society has appointed a Committee on Economic Defence, basing its belief on the premise that, if French Canadians were to become masters of their own economic fate they must " group themselves by forming social corporations, and the people which, for a hundred years has built the number of churches which we possess, will certainly be able under a national direction to build factories to make the essentials of what we consume."

All of which seems to confirm that the French Canadian has long since emerged as something separate and distinct from the French, as the American evolved from the English; that political fever has jumped the Atlantic, and even that a " fascist" nation, *Laurentia*, is imminent on the shores of the St Lawrence.

The first thought is reasonable, for the *Quebecquois* is alien to the Frenchman despite the relations existing between the latter and the Quebec intelligentsia. The spring *Congrès de langue française* at Quebec presented the usual bouquets to the fatherland and declared its aim to be *préserver la race, la religion et la langue qui sont pour eux une indissoluble trilogie.* But the average French Canadian bridles towards the French for fear they will comment superciliously on his accent or, on the strength of a few ancient phrases, accuse him of speaking a *patois.* Also he remembers that the French banished the religious orders that are now so strong in Canada and suspects that the French must now lead rather irreligious lives.

Language and certain temperamental traits apart, the French Canadian is more Canadian than French, and, moreover, he is ultra-conservative.

The idea that a new fascist nation is developing in Quebec is reasonable up to a point; but not much will come of it unless English-speaking Canada forces the issue. It would be pleasant if the English population of Quebec were leaders in establishing the desired *entente*. It would be heartening to relate that they mingled with the French Canadians, welcomed them socially, talked their language. Unfortunately this is not so. Among classes who should know better there is a snobbish disregard of the people and of the tongue. The English minority in Quebec is conscious that it is the object of discrimination; but it makes no diplomatic effort to adjust itself to its peculiar environment.

By force of circumstance the French Canadian is the most coherently developed Canadian in the country: the danger is that he considers himself the only Canadian. He tacitly rates all English-speaking Canadians as *Anglais*, which puts Canadians of Irish and Scots extraction in a pother. He has little vision of Canada outside his own province, perhaps because his neighbours becloud it. He is unhappy with the French; he distrusts the Americans for their capacity to absorb other cultures; and, though he is Catholic, he dislikes the Irish Catholics. He bristles with sensitivities; he is rich with latent talent artistically and temperamentally; he has revealed lamentable weakness in the face of political temptation; and he is personally one of the most charming people in the world. But he is the prey to an almost hysterical fear of encroachment through the radio, the movies and the magazines.

And his behaviour moves the editor of Toronto *Saturday Night* to complain that demands for tolerance proceed from racial groups . . ." which have no intention whatever of exercising tolerance towards anybody else when they are in a position to indulge in a little intolerance themselves."

Actually, the English-speaking Canadians and the Americans would be the last people to wish to see him lose his French Canadian characteristics. They find the country people, *les habitants*, and the small villages, where a charming domestic

architecture has been preserved for two and three centuries, the most interesting on the continent; and Quebec province is thronged with tourists on that account. The public buildings and the big churches of recent origin, the new houses and flats, are usually ugly; but luckily they are not characteristic. Those who love Quebec remember simple slender spires against low horizons, rolling Laurentian landscapes of farmland and forest, and winding country roads with whitewashed farmhouses and weathered wayside shrines. If there was ever a land to love, it is old Quebec, and the shame of it often is that the urbanized French-Canadian is far more likely to "modernize" it and render it commonplace than any outsider.

The geographical, political and religious solidarity of the French-Canadian is a neat example of the beneficial effect of a little casual persecution. The French-Canadian for upwards of three centuries has had his little crosses to bear; he has grown great and powerful under them; and now he might lose direction if he were to have them removed.

He began by being badly administered and exploited by France. If England made a hash of her relations with her American colonies, France was outdoing her in Canada; and when the conquest revealed a new governing power disposed to preserve for them all their racial and religious rights, and to give them a degree of representative government which they had not enjoyed before, the change was welcomed. The early English military governors were strengthened in their liberality by the prejudiced attitude of incoming English settlers from the south, who expected to become the authoritative minority and to subvert the language and religion of the conquered. The United Empire Loyalists, many of whom had, in the opinion of Mrs. Moodie writing in 1834, left their country for their country's good, were outspoken in their demands for priority over the native French: and the bogey of an English bedfellow first took shape to give the French Canadian something to unite about.

But, though they resented English and Protestant infiltration and intimidation, they accepted British institutions enthusiastically. It was as British subjects that they rebelled against maladministration in 1837; and, as W. K. Hancock puts it in

his *Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs*, the French Canadians ultimately asserted that they desired a federated Canada to remain British in order that they should remain French. Though not imperialistically British, they have always valued the British connection and the right of appeal to the Privy Council, much as a smaller nation would value a connection with the League of Nations and the International Court, presuming those two institutions were all they should be. And let it not be forgotten that the threat of religious persecution at the hands of the Americans, judging from inept speeches by leaders during the Revolution, made the French Canadians passively resistant to invasion in 1776 and actively so in 1812-14.

So, from far and near, bit by bit through history up to the present day was built up a racial-religious-persecution-inferiority-complex, which has its counterpart in the aloofness and narrow-vision of the English-speaking inhabitants. A few months ago Gladstone Murray aroused a great tempest when he declared himself in favour of using the French language on the radio. Ontario Orangemen are still working, remember, against the teaching of French in provincial schools because it smells of Popery. ' Well enough ' is never left alone.

English-speaking Canadians prejudiced against or unacquainted with their French-speaking compatriots realize that the latter now comprise about 30 per cent. of the population and at the present rate of increase may by 1970 become 40 per cent. By the time the infants of today have matured the English and French populations should be about equal, and a third group of mixed origin will have grown further in importance, as its birth-rate is the greatest of all. If French Canadians gain control outside Quebec province, a control they already enjoy in a sense by the assurance of a balancing *bloc* in the federal house, it will be by sheer force of biology. From about 65,000 at the time of the British conquest they have grown to over three million in a nations of over ten millions. They grow on a compound interest basis of roughly an extra, 500,000 every ten years ; they have large families ; and sometimes there is a *coup d'état* like the Dionne quintuplets.

Much of the present recrudescent racial nationalism may be party politics. To achieve greater independence within the

Dominion, further to discourage outside enterprise from settling in the province, is to gain a Pyrrhic victory. More would be lost than gained. The French Canadian is as much threatened by obliteration by other Canadians as is the Scotsman by the English. 'Laurentia' is fundamentally a reaction against external capital and internal communism; or perhaps it is an exasperated attempt to save democracy from itself. Its extremists need not be taken too seriously, and, fundamentally the new gang is likely to prove to be much like the old.

The great danger is that current struggles to unite an already united French Canada against imaginary enemies may disunite Canada. It might resurrect racial and religious antipathies that are best left dormant. It might establish inter-provincial barriers and restrictions calculated to hamper mutual trade and appreciation—and give needless priority to provincial or state rights over national government.

EBB AND FLOW.

By Stephen Gwynn.

MODERN science has brought the quarters of the world so close together that all nations can damage each other as never before. There is, however, one exception. Long-range operations are much less possible overseas than when ships were propelled by winds equally available everywhere and equally at the disposal of all. Now, a fleet with bases of supply in easy reach is a match for two or three comparable armadas not so provided. As a result of these facts, Germany and Italy have been able without increasing risk or additional outlay to present Japan with supremacy in the Far East. For Japan has not merely undertaken far-reaching conquest in China: she has seized control of Shanghai, the privileged *entrepôt* of European trade. No doubt the combined forces of Europe and the United States could have resisted this audacious action and perhaps made it ruinous; it is possible that the two great English-speaking Powers by themselves could have done the same. But Germany and Italy made it clear enough that Japan's enterprise had their approval; Japanese diplomats and political strategists did not need to be told that, if England moved much of her standing power to the Far East, interests of grave import to her would be menaced in Europe; and they knew that the United States would certainly not act alone.

Japan unchecked

It is not quite clear what Germany and Italy have gained. They have certainly demonstrated that their force counts in world politics. They will have helped to inflict grave injury on the United States and on Great Britain, the nations whose trade with China is largest. They may have strengthened Japan against Russia, Yet a Japan deeply engaged in digesting large tracts of China will be less of an anxiety to the Soviet State than a still hungry Power, with eyes on the more fertile

parts of Siberia; and a China which begins to learn nationalism through resentment may regard Russia as an ally, not a menace. However, these aspects of a staggering phenomenon are less important to Great Britain.

It would be of extreme interest to England to know India's reaction. An Asiatic power, pushing a career of conquest which Europe condemns as immoral, runs up against a foothold in Asia allotted to European interests, and simply disregards those interests. Japan has treated European property, ships and lives with something close to contempt, and frankly tells Europe at large that, where Europe formerly dealt with China, terms must now be made with Japan.

The Impact upon India

The question is never publicly asked : what right had Europe to this foothold ? But is there an Asiatic to whose mind that question will not leap ? Every Indian knows that Great Britain has always justified her position in India by saying that British rule had brought unity, peace and economic development. Every Indian will be apt to say that China is comparable in extent and numbers to India and to India only; that Japan is as fit to give direction as ever England was, and China is just as much in need of direction as ever India was. Will Indians regard with sympathy British protests against this career of conquest ? If those opinions had prevailed in Great Britain which urged the case against giving India self-government, it seems to me that this triumph of Asia over Europe would inevitably have brought about revolt in that other Asia which concerns England more nearly. As it is, Liberal statesmanship has advanced so far that the influence of Mr. Gandhi—India's most potent and intimate representative—is used to give a chance for the introduction of reforms that point the way to full partnership. That way must now be left wide open. Even so, whatever statesmanship there is in Indian government will be needed to counteract the disturbing influence of what all India, and all Asia, will have watched with amazement and often with exultation.

To please America, we ended the alliance with Japan. An agreement by which the British fleet and the American were to be each two-fifths stronger than that of Japan, left the

English-speaking race apparently in a ratio of ten to three. But several things were forgotten—one being that, though Japan could not strike either of them in a vital place, they could scarcely, even if acting together, get in an effective blow at Japan. The other, more important, was the military value of the will to war, which both the English-speaking communities deliberately disowned, but which Japan fostered. Fifteen years of continuous sacrifice, and of risks forward tentatively taken as chance offered, have brought Japan to where she is—staggering for balance on the side of her boldest leap, taken when Europe made plain its own disorganization. It is a moving sight, and beside it Mussolini's raid on Abyssinia and Hitler's *coup* in the Rhineland sink into very small proportions—except indeed in so far as they prepared the conditions for this greater adventure.

Asia's Revenge.

The end is not yet. Napoleon achieved greater territorial conquests, and the burning of Nanking reminds us of what followed. Japan also may be drawn on too far, by her own impetus. But in Napoleon's case, the very prestige of conquest brought him allies among the conquered, and it is possible that parts of China may accept an Asiatic leadership which has been asserted against Europeans, who never in history have treated the Chinese as their equals. In any case, if Japan is driven out of her present triumphant position in Shanghai, it can only be by Chinese efforts; and the Chinese will hardly pull Japan down to set Europe up again. How much will be lost with the privileged status of the concessions, remains to be reckoned. It is said that American capital is not at all so deeply engaged, because it was not invested with such faith in long permanence as the British. Under whatever rule, China will continue to import what she needs; but if Japan is there, she will import very little, except from Japan, of anything that Japan can supply and the change will be tragically felt by British artisans.

But no one thinks it worth a war to keep the trade channels open, however unemployment may be increased. "Insults to the flag" are salved, after a fashion, by official apologies and a promise of compensation, which may conceivably be paid. The vital injury, however, is to civilization, to all comity between civilized nations. However, what should Europe say when Japan

has the applause of two super-civilized Great Powers. The doctrine of super-civilization is that the strong and efficient shall do as they choose; and Japan waits for the European world unwilling homage to her strength and effliciency. The race which the United States and Australia excluded from their territories, lest the racial standard should be lowered, is now assuredly taking the full irony of their revenge.

The Eclipse of Spiritual Standards

This does not mean that the peoples of the British Commonwealth accept Mr. Lansbury's view that nothing is worth fighting for. We are therefore under a necessity of deciding which are the objects that we must defend. On this important matter the British public lacks guidance. We know that we are to repel aggressive action against France and Belgium because, as Mr. Baldwin told us, our frontier is on the Rhine. They must be defended as if they were Dover. On this view, it matters nothing whether they are or are not members of the League. Does it make any difference to Mr. Chamberlain's policy that they are fellow-members? If so, are we only concerned for fellow-members whose territory is within bombing range of London or Portsmouth. Has the policy any spiritual aspect? The Germans and Italians make no bones about saying that for reasons which may be called "spiritual"—they regard it as vital to prevent the formation of a Bolshevist State in Spain, which has no common frontier with either of them. The British Government makes it plain that its representative will sit on any number of Committees to limit the chances of international war in Europe. But although, so far as unrevoked declarations can bind, British policy remains anchored to the principles of the League, there is no principle except that of self-protection which we can count on the present Government to defend, save by representation on committees.

We were told during the War that we were fighting for the freedom of small nationalities, and a lot of us believed it and meant it. Small nationalities were then lifted out of servitude and set on their feet. We are told now—not indeed by Mr. Chamberlain, but by powerful voices—that it is no concern of ours whether their larger neighbours reduce them again to subjection. We are told that it is of enormous importance to

conciliate Germany, and that the existence of Czechoslovakia is a small thing compared to the peace of Europe. Why, it is asked, should not Germany desire to consolidate under one beneficent united and well-equipped *Reich* all the German-speaking peoples? Well, one reason is that the arguments for transferring the *Sudeten* Germans to the *Reich* would be just as strong for restoring the Germans of Alsace-Lorraine—in some ways stronger, since these were taken away from the *Reich*. One must not forget, however, that these recalcitrant German folk after forty years of German rule preferred passionately to be citizens of France. It should be remembered also that the *Sudeten* Germans were accustomed to live in an Empire where the Czechs were treated as inferiors. They probably regard their fellow-citizens in Czechoslovakia as Ulster Protestants regard Catholics—that is to say, as persons by whom it is intolerable to be ruled. More than a generation will be needed to get rid of that mentality. But it does not follow that we should make up our minds to let Hitler undo the work of Masaryk. There are spiritual values at stake in Europe which need to be defended for the sake of civilization.

French Plot and Spanish War

M. Chautemps and M. Delbos, having made contact with Mr. Chamberlain, assure their countrymen that they are satisfied with the result. M. Delbos has gone on to impart his his confidence (and his confidences) to the States of Central Europe. Meanwhile France has swung into line behind its Government; a rather absurd organization of revolt has been unmasked; arsenals of oddly-assorted firearms came to light. It is widely believed that a counter-organization of Communists has similar *depôts*, which are known to the police. If so, the French Government will strengthen itself greatly by dealing with the second after the first.

For the moment Spain has ceased to be the focus of attention. One may infer that General Franco is now in a position from which the Italians think that he can advance without needing—and perhaps without desiring—further foreign aid. A recently published book, *In Franco's Spain* by Francis McCullagh, carried conviction to my mind on many points. The writer is a

well-known war correspondent, who would be a great deal better known if he had not chosen to be combatant rather than commentator during the European war. He is a Catholic, but a Catholic from Ulster, and there is no more democratic type of citizen in any country than Ulster Catholics. In so far as General Franco's *entourage* is aristocratic and feudal, he dislikes and despises it. What impresses him is the spectacle of an army whose regiments assemble at dawn in cold weather to hear mass in the open, not a man missing the parade; whose soldiers believe that if captured with a religious emblem on them they will certainly be put to death, and consequently pin their shirts all over with blessed medals. This has the double effect of increasing the hope of supernatural protection and of emphasizing the defiance of death. Mr. McCullagh thinks, from a wide experience of war, that troops so inspired are already far on the way to victory. He notes also their perfect sobriety and their patience under short rations and failure of supplies. This testimony is all the more valuable because, although he came to Spain having written passionately to the Irish press on Franco's side, he found no disposition to make his work as a correspondent easy. A French journalist of my acquaintance who had belauded Franco's work in Morocco was much disappointed to find himself treated without consideration in Spain. Both men hold that the insurgents are ill-served by their censorship. But Mr. McCullagh's narrative is the more enlightening because, whatever he got, he had to get for himself; making shift with discomfort, he acquired contacts right down into the mass of the people which a correspondent well provided with authorizations and introductions does not acquire—or, to put it more truly, does not incur. Mr. McCullagh is quite clear that General Franco is going to win; quite clear that he does not propose to give away anything that is Spanish; quite clear, finally, that Christian rule will be better for Spain than anti-Christian anarchism. But he doesn't tell us what must surely have puzzled him as a Catholic—why there was in Catholic Spain this furious assault on priests and nuns and churches.

Writing in Ireland this month, I notice various crackings in the ice of stiff political formations. Lord Craigavon's long rule

in Belfast—it has lasted since 1920—is threatened with a split among the Unionists—or to speak more truly, among the Protestant majority. There are dissensions, too, among the Catholics. A majority of them belong to Devlin's old following and are strictly constitutionalist; but there is a strong republican section, having in it elements of the I.R.A. Naturally, organized Labour sees a hope of holding the balance. That would not be a bad thing, because, in the north-east, trade unionists represent a more coherent force than in the rest of Ireland, and they are less hide-bound by the *odium theologicum* than any other part of the Ulster community. On the other hand, in what we are no longer to call the Free State (its official designation being "Eire" or "Ireland," at the speaker's discretion) Labour has almost attained to this control of the balance; and nobody likes that position. Some advocate a coalition ministry, which I would gladly see, but do not expect it, for Mr. de Valera has too much of the Spaniard in him to accept of compromises. There is, of course, one possibility—Mr. de Valera might choose to stand out of, and above, party disputes, becoming a candidate for the new office of President. If he did, no other Irishman would have a chance of being preferred—though in Dublin, the Lord Mayor, Mr. "Alfie" Byrne would beat him. But I do not see Mr. de Valera abandoning a post of power for one of dignity; and the offer of a spacious residence in the old Chief Secretary's Lodge, which has been the United States Legation, would be no temptation to his austere temper; though he and the Dáil at large have agreed that the head of the State shall be handsomely provided with fifteen thousand a year to maintain the position. There is departure from the original ostentatious frugality, and the *Taoiseach* (that is, the Prime Minister) under the new proposals will receive £3,000 a year, and the Vice-President £2,500, with a pension of £1,200 for each on their leaving office. Social obligations have made themselves recognized, and Ireland is now beginning to organize a new social order corresponding to the facts of our time. If Mr. de Valera should choose to go to what will be our White House, those of us who have seldom agreed with anything that he said or did will gladly recognize that our country is represented with

Irish Eddies

high courtesy and honour; and, failing Mr. de Valera, we can only hope that choice may fall on some one who is his equal in personal distinction.

These speculations bring me to a book in which the old pre-war social life of Dublin and of Ireland is vividly recalled. "Seventy Years Young" is the title for memoirs which Lady Fingall has written, with the skilled help of Miss Pamela Hinkson. Lady Fingall added beauty and gaiety to the times when Viceroys came over and spent, it might be twice, it might be four times, their allotted twenty-thousand a year in keeping up a court at the Castle and the Viceregal Lodge. Moreover, she knew the life, she *was* the life, of one of the few great Irish houses which survived unbroken through the centuries, almost from the first Norman conquest; and indeed the best thing in her book is the presentation of her husband, Lord Fingall, the quietest, most unassuming gentleman that ever was a passionate Master of Foxhounds. He was the kind of Master who spent hours planning his campaign of meets so as to make things easy for the men who had only one horse to hunt. I knew him only in another relation, when the Sixteenth Irish Division was being formed, but we saw there the same unselfishness and modesty and devotion to his job. It is not easy to make such a character stand out, yet this book has done it. He and she both worked like galley-slaves for his famous kinsman, Horace Plunkett, who, like many philanthropists, was an amiable slave-driver; and there is much told here about Horace Plunkett and all his works. But the most significant thing in it is Lord Fingall's comment: "You should never give the Irish people what they do not ask for."

Social Amenities

Mr. de Valera has needed this admonition as much as Horace Plunkett did; I have never been able to accept his view that when he wanted to know the wish of Ireland, he had "only to look into his own heart." Yet one can perceive now that Mr. de Valera is beginning to recognize a craving that has always existed in Ireland for something of stateliness, a touch of pageantry—a craving that since the troubled beginnings of our new order has been severely starved. We shall not get back to the days when A.D.C.s in brilliant uniforms routed out

an old sedan chair to carry a pretty *débutante* on a rainy night across the Castle yard to the ballroom, and made her swear to give them dances before they would set her down; it will not be as splendid as the "toy court" was, say, under Lord Dudley; but at least there will be recognized centre for the social life of Ireland's capital, which of late has been constrained to group itself as best it could about the foreign Legations.

The Spoken Word

A Londoner, Mr. Ashley Dukes, having come to lecture before the Royal Dublin Society, has been assuring us that Dublin is still the home of poetic drama. We heard him with conscious pride, being well aware of what Dublin has contributed in our own lifetime to the art of acting; but there was also a twinge of conscious failure, because the successes of the Abbey Theatre (and the Gate Theatre which now rivals it) have certainly not been made with plays in verse. Yeats is a great poet but only in one instance he achieved remarkable dramatic effect and that was in "Cathleen ni Houlihan," when his medium was prose. But to set against "Murder in the Cathedral," by which, under the management of Mr. Ashley Dukes, a poet's work in verse drew great audiences, we have really nothing; and we do not see anything coming along.

Still, one never knows the future. In Dublin, as everywhere else, the cinema has a vogue immensely beyond that of the theatre; and Mr. Ashley Dukes, unlike most other men of the theatre, does not think this a bad thing. He holds that the actual drama has much to learn from the screen-play. But there are two things in question; one, the handling of a subject in a manner remote from the mood of prose; the other, the use of an artificial rhythm—verse, in some shape. Can the art of speaking verse acceptably be revived? And who is to teach it? In some discussion which Mr. Ashley Dukes inspired at Dublin, there was pretty general agreement that poets themselves could seldom give example of the way to speak verse. Yet when the Dublin theatre started, Yeats supervised the teaching given by two admirable actors, the brothers Fay, and if his plays in verse did not succeed, it was not through any fault of the actual utterance, which was a delight to hear. The real trouble is that so few people nowadays care to hear verse spoken. Most

lovers of poetry prefer to read it in a book and listen, if they listen at all, with the inward ear.

That most seductive writer, M. Duhamel has unburdened his mind of grave apprehensions in a *Défense des Lettres*. He sees a lean time coming when no books will be published, and it is not the threatened shortage of paper that alarms him; since only a very small proportion of what is so lavishly used goes into book form: newspapers, advertisements, propagandas, these are the devourers. What M. Duhamel dreads is a coming time when nobody will want to read, because it is so much less trouble to switch on the wireless. And then, according to him, no matter what comes across the sound waves, all profit of literature is gone. The author will be as badly off as the old *trouvères* and as ill-remunerated. Leaving aside the question of profit, is it true to say that literary work can only be appreciated through script? One should always be able, M. Duhamel says, to turn back and read a passage over again. But no one thinks this necessary for the enjoyment of music. When Aeschylus and Sophocles produced their very complex literary effects at Athens, nobody suspended judgment till the text could be read. Even in the Elizabethan day, the highest poetry was presented to the world through the ear. Those who were specially interested could get the text afterwards (often long afterwards); but the art of poetry stood clear of the necessity for print; We have lost much, I think, both as writers and as readers, by divorcing this enjoyment from the physical sensation of sound.

Now, conceivably, if we begin to take our literary pleasures through the ear; if the best poetry and the best prose, instead of lying packed in dumb volumes, can be made audible to us through skilled interpreters, the results may be far from bad for literature (however the economics work out for the author's pocket). There may grow up a new profession, not less reputed than that of the executant with strings or keys, who will bring back into alliance with the written word what has become almost wholly separated from it—the music and the supple rhythms of the human voice.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

THE ABYSSINIAN CAMPAIGN

By Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn.

THE WAR IN ABYSSINIA, by Pietro Badoglio. *Methuen.* 30*s.*

Professional opinion, viewing the Abyssinian War in its purely military aspects, credits Marshal Badoglio with quite exceptional strategic and administrative capacity. He displayed foresight in laying his plans, daring and caution at appropriate moments in their execution. Opportunities he had worked to create or those offered to him by the mistakes of his enemy were never neglected.

His book fully confirms these views, and it should be studied by all serious students of military affairs. Essentially it is a concise report on the campaign from the standpoint of the Commander-in-Chief, describing the problems confronting him in each phase, his solutions and his methods of giving effect to them. Tactical encounters are dealt with in their broader aspects only and no attempt is made to present sensational pictures of the actual fighting. We receive in consequence a clear impression of the campaign as a whole and of the working of the Commander's mind, but miss detailed descriptions of the use made of, and the potentialities of, modern weapons. In particular the Marshal makes no mention of gas. He does, however, emphasize in his conclusions that neither aircraft, tanks nor artillery, can by themselves win wars, but that success depends on the close co-operation of all arms brought about by meticulous planning. Similarly he insists that, though offensive action conducted with a view to the destruction of his enemy's main armies was his ultimate aim, yet security at all stages was his first consideration. No clearer demonstration could be given of the fact that defensive and offensive strategy and tactics are inseparable and that a commander must be prepared to assume either attitude at the right time and place. The battle of Enderta, strategically the decisive battle of the war, was an attack conducted on deliberate modern lines against Mulugheta's strong position, but defence was employed in it for the security of the flanks of the attack and to prevent any interruption of the orderly development of the plan of battle. On the other hand, the battle of Ashangi, where the *coup de grâce* was delivered, began as a defensive encounter from which, when the enemy had been repulsed exhausted, a prearranged counter-attack developed.

It has been argued that the long delays at the outset of the campaign were due to the employment of unnecessarily large forces, and it was at one time suggested that when Badoglio took charge he would use smaller and more mobile groups.

Nothing in his book confirms these theories. On the contrary, his first instruction provided for the formation of an additional army corps, while later on one finds him asking for two more divisions from Italy and gratefully accepting three. Both while standing on the defensive and when he initiated his main offensive he desired increased numbers. In the former case especially he complains that the premature occupation of Macalle forced him to

withdraw troops for its defence that should have been employed to close the gap between Axum and the Setit R., which, giving access to Eritrea, constituted a danger.

The delays and confusion in the early period were in fact due to Mussolini's insistence, for political reasons, on an advance a month before de Bono's preparations were complete ; his further insistence on the occupation of Macalle made matters much worse and definitely created a dangerous situation. It was only the excellent organization which de Bono had built up, coupled with the simple requirements of Italian troops and their readiness to do all kinds of work, that enabled Badoglio to disentangle the congestion of traffic, perfect the condition of the main artery of communication, and build up reserves of munitions necessary for offensive operations.

During the long period of re-organization and preparation, Italian troops were employed in holding and consolidating the 150 miles of defensive front. On Eritrean troops fell contact and outpost duties, clearing the Tembien region and checking Abyssinian attempts to work round the exposed flanks. The impression formed during this period that Badoglio was relying on Eritreans to do the fighting was certainly correct, and they were obviously most suitable for the task in hand. When, however, the main offensive was at length launched, casualty returns and the dispositions described make it clear that the bulk of the fighting fell on Italians, though the Eritreans continued to take their full share.

At the outset Badoglio admits he felt uncertain whether the Abyssinians would employ their traditional tactics and display their national characteristics, or whether the process of westernization would have brought about changes making them more formidable and their intentions more difficult to anticipate.

In practice, he soon discovered that though the Abyssinian fighting men retained their gallantry and flair for seizing local opportunities their leaders were quite incapable of adapting themselves to new conditions. Quarrelling among themselves, insubordinate and without initiative or power of decision, they were unable to carry through the elaborate plans suggested to them and relapsed into fatal strategic immobility. The first battle of Tembien fought as a precursor to the attack on Mulugheta may be described as a draw tactically but was strategically disastrous to the Abyssinians, if only because it revealed Ras Kassa's incapacity to Badoglio.

One cannot help wondering if Haile Selassie had followed tradition and from the first taken command in the field instead of relying on indifferent wireless communications, generally intercepted by the Italians, whether the result of the war might have been different.

Scarcely any mention of the southern theatre of war is made by Badoglio, but he makes it clear that the two theatres were so widely separated that there was no question of co-ordination to produce pincer effect. Graziani, in the south, was ordered to maintain an active defensive and not until the *débâcle* took place did he launch a major offensive to exploit success and secure possession of the Jibuti railway.

In general, Badoglio's account, so far as it goes, rings true, but it loses some of its value by the omission of reference to gas. A frank statement of its effect on operations might have removed some of the gilding but would hardly have damaged the structure of his achievements, which have certainly caused us to revise our estimate of Italian military efficiency, especially in administrative matters.

THE HAND-MIRROR OF HISTORY

By H. Pearl Adam.

ENGLISH WOMEN'S CLOTHING In the Nineteenth Century, by C. Willett Cunnington. With ten coloured plates, and hundreds of Collotype illustrations and black and white sketches. *Faber and Faber.* £3 3*s.*

TASTE AND FASHION, from the French Revolution until To-day, by James Laver. *Harrap.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

Dr. Cunnington has offered his collection of English women's clothing in the last hundred and fifty years to any museum which shall devote itself to this branch of knowledge. It will have to be an extensive institution. The bibliography of books about dress would in itself fill a volume of vast dimensions. Even this would only cover the description and explanation of the vagaries of costume; if invective against the vanity of fashion were to be included, the Museum would have to found another Colindale.

It is a notable fact that the great majority of writers on the question of dress are men. They are not only men of leisure, with a whimsical interest in a whimsical topic; they are scholars, ethnologists or prelates of many degrees of learning and of seriousness. Most of them refer to the weaknesses and frivolities of the female sex; but not one of them considers it weak or frivolous in himself to bend a strong masculine mind towards the frail (or hygienic) clothing of the frail (or matronly) sex.

The reason for this does not lie entirely, nor even mainly, in the industrial revolution which repressed in men the dress-instinct that they had previously shared with the other sex, and which they have since had to satisfy by becoming theatrical designers, dress-designers, or dressmakers. Many of the writers on women's costume date before that revolution. Probably the eternal attraction of the theme resides in the fact that the human form changes so slowly. Geological formations are slow, it is true; but it suffices for one volcanic eruption to change the outline of a range of mountains, to remove or form islands, to alter, to enrich, or impoverish, all the trees and flowers of a district, to change climate, habits, and colouring within the range of its energy. As for the sea and the desert, they are equally fluid of contour, under the influence of the merest and most momentary breeze.

As for trees and cereals and flowers, the attention of chemists skilled in these cultures can alter them from year to year. This applies to all the domestic animals, whether of pleasure or of use. Plough-horses and toy-dogs are equally liable to these eugenic fluctuations.

It is the proud distinction of the human form to remain one with wild animals, in refusing to change. True, human beings are sometimes taller, sometimes smaller, according to the lives imposed on them by social conditions, the nutriment provided for them by their prosperity or their poverty,

and the contemporary conditions of transport. We have in some museums suits of armour into which hardly even an undersized Cockney of to-day could insert himself, but bearing brands like those of Astur, "which none but he might wield."

Dr. Cunnington's remarkable work is at once a study of, and a guide to, the arabesques and grotesques woven around this central human figure. Both he and Mr. Laver have their own methods of interpreting these ever-changing outlines. On many points the two experts agree; on many points they have divergent opinions to offer. One can but listen with respect to Wellington and Napoleon, or Wellington and Blücher, on points of military history. As far as Mr. Laver and Dr. Cunnington speak for themselves, one has the enjoyment of hearing two keen observers discussing why women ever wore bustles, what they looked like, and why they ceased to wear them, together with many other matters of interest and amusement, of varying importance, but of unbroken interest. To this extent the two books, which cover roughly the same period, and present many similar, and some few dissimilar conclusions, run on parallel lines. The historian, the dilettante, and the ordinary reader will alike find them full of entertaining and interesting matter.

Dr. Cunnington's book is secondarily concerned with these matters. It is in addition a sartorial encyclopædia to which the appropriate inflection of the word Britannica might well be added. From her topmost curl to her shoe-lace, from the fact that she eschewed curls or shoes, from her skin outward to the coat-tail which she sometimes trailed and sometimes wore almost between her shoulders, the details of costume of the women who saw the end of the monarchy in France, to those who saw the end of the Victorian era in England, are here tabulated, dated, and kept in accessible form for all those who have the need or the wish to follow a subject which is the hand-mirror of history.

THE AYES HAVE IT, by A. P. Herbert. *Methuen.* 6*s*.

It was characteristic of Mr. Herbert to turn his legislative triumph to literary account, and it was evident that a very entertaining story could be put together from the vicissitudes of the Matrimonial Causes Act. His business is not only to amuse, but to surprise his public; and in many ways this book is the most surprising thing that he has done. He has boldly undertaken to divert his readers with the details of parliamentary procedure, and to adorn his tale with the intricacies of Standing Orders. A writer who can, so to speak, set Erskine May to music deserves the respect of all of us.

Mr. Herbert, as the prime mover towards the greatest and most humane reform that has been wrought in many years, has given cause for thousands of unfortunate people to bless his name and reverence his memory. The main purpose of this book, or so it seems, is to distribute a little of the credit where it may belong. There were some, like Mr. Haynes, whose lives had been devoted to the struggle. There was Mr. Claud Mullins, an old if difficult ally. There were many private members who quietly helped; there were the Law Officers; most amazing of all to the readers of *Holy Deadlock*, there was the King's Proctor himself. But more than to any human agency, the bill owed its passage to the small anomalies of politics; it squeezed its way through the little gaps and leaks that time has made in the parliamentary machine.

The law that Mr. Herbert sought to amend had stood substantially unshaken for eighty years: the twin bogies of nonconformity and catholicism had scared successive governments from interference: private efforts seemed always doomed to failure. Here was a prime example of the inflexibility of the law, and the impotence of individual initiative. But because it caused hardship in this instance, it did not follow that the system was as bad as it appeared. We do not want our statute

books stuffed with brainwaves like those of the American Congress : the private member's bill is a menace, and usually to private liberty. It is to be discouraged in every way : yet, as it is an essential feature of democracy, it is not to be eradicated. The Matrimonial Causes Act illustrates how nicely the odds are balanced against the private reform ; yet how neatly they swing round in its favour when the voice of public opinion has endorsed it.

Mr. Herbert's constituency was an anachronism ; his candidature was an absurdity ; his election was a freak. Without all three, we should still have our savage old law. Once elected, he had to ballot for his opening. That was the first hurdle. After that it was a continual race against time. What saved it was the personal factor, that imponderable element that makes Parliament so much more efficient than it seems. The nonconformist opposition did not materialize : but the Catholics could have killed the bill by several quite legitimate forms of strangulation. If it had been the unsupported effort of a crank, they would have done so. But when they saw that the voice of democracy, of the Protestant and irreligious public, had spoken in its favour, they refrained, and fought it instead upon equal ground. Then again, there was the official attitude. When it appeared from the second reading that the bill had a chance of getting through, the law officers thought it their duty to help make it a workable measure. That in itself was a great service : and as the bill progressed, their technical assistance developed into strong moral support, until finally the great gesture of giving Government time set the crown of success upon Mr. Herbert's efforts.

"It is very easy to stand off and throw loose stones at Parliamentary procedure : it is not so easy to pick a good hole." That is the moral of this book : and it comes from one who has been well jolted and mangled in the parliamentary machine, only to find himself safe at the end of it, and clutching a much improved baby. The Lords and Commons will read with a glow of pardonable pride the many kind, grateful, and penitent observations that Mr. Herbert has to make about the manner in which they discharge their duties. The ordinary voter will learn more about the inner working of the two Houses from these pages than from a mile of newspapers.

CHRISTOPHER HOBHOUSE

A MEMOIR OF Æ (George William Russell), by John Eglinton. *Macmillan.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

THE LIVING TORCH, by Æ. Edited by Monk Gibbon. *Macmillan.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

It was a happy thought that suggested simultaneous publication of these two books. For John Eglinton, a close companion in early manhood, was later estranged from Æ. as he confesses, by one of those wretched quarrels which so often occurred between men of goodwill in the dreadful years following the Rising of 1916, though kind fate, or rather—as Æ. himself would have insisted—the law of spiritual attraction brought them together again before the end. Monk Gibbon, much younger than either, while thus obliged to rely on others for the story of Æ's boyhood, his eager studies in the sacred books of the East and even his labours as an agricultural organizer, writes with intimate knowledge of the later Æ.—the wise counsellor in public and private affairs, one ever less eager to teach than to evoke the good in others. But indeed the two things are inseparable. Æ. taught by example rather than precept. "He was a tribunal," said one who had long known and loved him, before which the ignoble dwindled."

Moreover, it is not merely in point of time that each of these books is a complement of the other. In one we have a detailed account of Æ's life, in the astonishingly varied activities of poet, prose-writer, painter, economist and publicist, together with a cool and somewhat detached criticism of his work and his philosophy ; in the other, the voice of a disciple, grateful for

having "known one great soul" and eager that others should share, so far as they may through the cold medium of print, in that experience. One needs but to dip here and there among the selections made by Monk Gibbon from those writings which have not hitherto appeared in book-form, to realize how generously Æ. gave of his best in the hurried task of journalism, careless whether credit came to him or not, so only that under the appearance of passing events he could point to the divine spark in common things. No doubt, as in all anthologies, one misses something one would wish to find; but in all that is given one can rejoice.

And I suppose that if every friend of Æ.—and who was not his friend that ever knew him—were to write of him, it would still not be too much. Never was there, surely, so full a man. As Simone Téry says, "*Le chef-d'oeuvre d' Æ., qui est un grand artiste, c'est encore lui-même.*" That, I think, sums up wittily and completely, what all of us know to be true. Even George Moore —"the rogue" as John Eglinton calls him—though wont to speak contemptuously of "the Donegal dauber," once at least bore the same witness. "You know," he said to a mutual friend, "I think that Æ. is too great a man to be a great artist." Moore was thinking of course, of that savage and often selfish concentration upon a single aim which is perhaps essential to excellence in any art. For myself, I am sure Æ. chose the better part, recalling Ruskin's aphorism that it is better to irrigate than to excel.

Both volumes are admirably produced and illustrated; and at the end of John Eglinton's will be found a list—almost but not, I think, quite complete —of Æ.'s books and pamphlets. These, with the two memoirs themselves, and with the extracts from the *Irish Statesman* and other journals now printed in the *Living Torch*, form a noble memorial of a noble life.

HUGH A. LAW.

HALDANE, 1856-1915, by Major-General Sir Frederick Maurice. *Faber and Faber.* 18*s.*

LAW AND OTHER THINGS, by Lord Macmillan. *Cambridge University Press.* 8*s.* 6*d.*

NOT WITHOUT PREJUDICE, by Lord Hewart. *Hutchinson.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

The common interest which runs throughout these three books is the Law. The authors of two of them are lawyers of great eminence, while Haldane, though not a lawyer first and foremost, was engaged, either as advocate or judge, in the practice of the law throughout the whole of his active career, except those years when he was Secretary of State for War. It is no lack of respect for the other eminent authors which is responsible for Sir Frederick Maurice's book heading the list. The appearance of the authorized biography of such a man as Haldane is necessarily an event of outstanding importance.

It is not so much his achievements, great though these were, as the innate quality and strength of the man which make him a unique figure in British public life. In a sense he was the most outstanding example of the pure intellectual to be found in our history, but yet, as Sir Frederick Maurice so skilfully shows, it was the combination of balance in character with balance in brain which, more than anything else, made the man who was Haldane. His courage in adversity, instanced when his engagement was broken off, and when he was the victim of the dastardly campaign of calumny in 1914-15; his ruthless self-criticism and his delight in overcoming difficulties; his pleasure in society and the "pawky humour," as Asquith called it, with which, together with his beloved food, wine and cigars, he entertained it: all these emerge, each in its due proportion, from Sir Frederick Maurice's careful and competent biography. The book bears every mark of a labour of love, and, indeed, the question sometimes suggests itself whether its interest might not have been enhanced, if the author had

not put on his subject's spectacles so whole-heartedly. Haldane's dismissal of Lloyd George as "really an illiterate with an unbalanced mind" points to limitations on both sides. The temptation for a chivalrous author to be uncritical of a man who was so unjustly criticized in his life, is strong; but it is clear that England could not be governed by a Cabinet composed of Haldanes alone. His versatility makes a biography of Haldane a difficult book to write. It is a pity, perhaps, that a philosopher was not enlisted to write about Haldane's metaphysical studies, and a lawyer to deal with his career at the Bar and on the Bench. Sir Frederick Maurice's account of him as a philosopher does not seem entirely satisfying, and his treatment of his legal career does not profess to be adequate. The accounts of his educational activities and of his great skill as an amateur diplomatist are, on the other hand, everything that they should be; and Haldane's work at the War Office receives the memorial which it deserves. Sir Frederick Maurice proves that the vendetta of 1915 was a national as well as a personal tragedy.

One of the addresses collected in Lord Macmillan's book is entitled "Two Ways of Thinking." Its theme is the difference between the deductive mind (like the Scotsman's) which works from a general principle to its application in a particular case, and the inductive mind (like the Englishman's), which draws general conclusions from concrete cases; and Lord Macmillan draws the conclusion that "each has its contribution to make to the attainment of the goal of all right ways of thinking—the Truth." It was partly this difference in approach which prevented Haldane and the English public from understanding each other. Lord Macmillan, another Scot, has confined his activities to spheres where his particular qualities are more readily appreciated than in national politics. His book is composed of essays and articles discussing the relation of law to other forms of social activity. One question must be asked: what does Lord Macmillan mean by saying that the Separation of Powers has long been the boast of our Constitution? It may have been its boast; it certainly has not been its practice.

Lord Hewart is an Englishman the inductiveness of whose mind is above reproach; his miscellany of articles and speeches ranges further than Lord Macmillan's in the variety of its topics, which include patriotism, personalities and capital punishment. While the contents of this interesting and entertaining book do full justice to Lord Hewart's powers as an after-dinner speaker, it is when discussing topics related to the law that he is at his best: in particular, "The Young Offender" should be read by every citizen, lawyer or layman.

W. T. Wells

THE HOUSE THAT HITLER BUILT, by Stephen H. Roberts. *Methuen.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

GERMANY AND WORLD PEACE, by Sven Hedin. *Hutchinson.* 15*s.*

DOVER-NÜRNBERG RETURN, by John Baker White. *Burrup Mathieson.* 5*s.*

Here are three more books on Nazi Germany, each claiming to be impartial and authoritative and to have something to add to the great body of literature that already exists on this controversial subject.

Of the three, Professor Roberts' book is by far the most valuable. As he says in the preface, it is essentially a book for the plain man. Lightly, at times almost conversationally written, it gives a comprehensive account of the origins, philosophy, organization and ultimate triumph of the Nazi movement. It begins by examining the psychology of Hitler and his associates. It then deals with the movement and its philosophy. The second part (there are five parts altogether) describes the Revolution and the four years of power, 1933-1937. Part III. deals readably and effectively with economics. Part IV. is entitled "The Balance-Sheet of Hitlerism," and

is divided into two sections "What the Onlooker sees," and "What the Onlooker does not see." This part discusses first those features of the *régime* that must strike any visitor to Germany in the first few days of his visit—Labour camps, the Hitler Youth, Workmen's Organizations, etc., then those less obvious and less creditable features—the "drive for a common mentality," cult of the closed mind, persecution of the Jews, the struggle against Christianity—and finally the abuse of the law as a political instrument. The fifth Part deals with the repercussions of Hitlerism in the outside world, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe.

Professor Roberts has handled with skill an immense mass of information and a complicated tangle of issues. Writing as a "democratic individualist" he has not been sparing in his criticism, and the picture that emerges is not altogether flattering to the Third Reich. But he has not set out to write up the anti-Nazi case. On the contrary, as he himself acknowledges, he was everywhere generously aided by the Nazi authorities and he cannot be accused of neglecting their point of view, or of seeking out the bad and ignoring the good. There is all the difference between this book, which, though critical, is clearly by an open-minded man, and those which set out to black-wash the Nazi regime from the first page. For this reason Professor Roberts' criticisms, which are implied rather than expressed—since the book is more descriptive than analytical—are all the more telling. They will not convince those whose mind is already made up, but they are worth the consideration of all who wish to form a fair picture of Nazi Germany. In the last four years Germany has recovered her strength and self-respect, and she now presents to the world a façade of co-ordinated uniformity. But it should not be forgotten that for these material gains she has paid a tremendous spiritual price. Those who are interested to draw up a balance-sheet of advantages and disadvantages will find Professor Roberts' book stimulating and informative, even if they do not accept all his conclusions.

In reading Sven Hedin's book I could not help asking myself why this book had ever been translated into English. It contains little information that was not already available; it faces none of the questions which the average Englishman has to ask of the Nazi régime; it teems with inaccuracies. On page 75 there is, for example, a remarkable sentence, beginning "Alsace-Lorraine, Eupen, Malmédy, Eastern Upper Silesia (which were handed over to Czechoslovakia in 1919) . . ." I have sought in vain for an emendation that would make sense of that. Three pages later there is a reference to "two million Slovakians in Maehren" (*sic*). The translation is not everywhere felicitous—even of classical quotations. Sophocles' great chorus in the Antigone, πολλὰ τὰ δεινά . . . which stands with doubtful relevance at the head of a chapter on the Rhoen plan, is reproduced in woeful paraphrase. That is a detail. But it is symptomatic of the whole. If Nazi propaganda is to be served up to the English public, it can be done better and more convincingly than this. Altogether I cannot agree with the publishers that this is a "clear and sane account, untinged by bias and propagandist notions." One chapter, it is true, expresses half-hearted disapproval of the persecution of the Jews, but it appears to have been slipped in like the pips in synthetic lemonade to give an impression of a quality which the whole does not possess.

"Dover-Nürnberg Return" is a chattily written account of a motor-tour, which had as its principal object a visit to the Nazi Party Rally. It presents the commonplace reflections of an average Englishman, and is somewhat slight both in form and matter. The two chapters on France seem rather more valuable than the fifteen on Germany.

DAVID STEPHENS

THE CHURCHES SURVEY THEIR TASK : The Report of the Oxford Conference on "Church, Community, and State." *Allen and Unwin.* 5*s*.

THE HUMAN SITUATION : The Gifford Lectures of 1935-1937, by Professor W. Macneile Dixon. *Edward Arnold.* 18*s*.

What a pair of books to bracket in a review! It is not merely that they lack so much as a single point of contact : they reveal points of view so completely opposed that they might have come from different universes. Yet each is symptomatic of its own force, and the profound, dynamic conflict of these forces has brought the modern world into the gloomy valley through which it labours. Shall Man continue in the present, as in the past, to build his social life upon a meed of Faith, and if so, faith in what ? or must we say with so many, and Professor Dixon, that the universe is so profoundly puzzling and contradictory that the fundamental task of the modern world is to make an arid agnosticism emotionally powerful to cure selfishness and to "let righteousness roll down like a stream ?" This is a quest beside which the perennial task of making Christianity work is mere child's play.

Thus the authors of the first book have the easier task. It is, as its sub-title suggests, a report of the great Oecumenical Conference held in Oxford last summer. Representatives of almost every Christian Church were present, and their ground was most carefully prepared by various committees meeting together to discuss such matters as Race, War, The Totalitarian State, etc.—all burning and urgent topics. Conference reports are always apt to read a little dully : it is inevitable. But the patient and the imaginative will find much that is moving if only they will read this report with the innate sympathy which every reader should be prepared to greet every book. A body of people from all over the world, all of them immersed in the actual concrete situations which the supreme challenge to Christendom has created : all of them moved and impelled in the heart of their being by a vital faith in God, and a haunting sense of the deliverance and release which could be brought to a world if only it was prepared to salute Him in penitence, faith, and hope—is not this a moving spectacle ? There is a good deal of "Resolution English" in the Reports, but there is passion too, and plain speaking. On Patriotism, for instance : "Any form of national egotism, whereby the love of one's own people leads to the suppression of other nationalities or national minorities, or to the failure to respect and appreciate the gifts of other people, is sin and rebellion against God." Nothing could be clearer or less compromising. So it is with the rest of the Reports. They shirk nothing ; and if anyone wants to know what world-wide Christianity is thinking and saying, he will find it here.

One of the universal consequences of faith is a sense of sin ; and, contrariwise, ethical neutrality is a necessary result of faithlessness. Professor Dixon starts off with a statement of ethical neutrality : "For ethical idealists I confess I have small regard and with them I feel little sympathy . . . In what century did Nature change her ways and in what year was human nature born again ? In all ages the prophets and moralists have upbraided and denounced their fellow creatures. I desire to be excused their honourable society." The references to Nature and human nature are illuminating. To lead off with the recognition that the one is inscrutable and the other unchangeable is to be limited at once to maintaining the proposition that the world's very complex, quite impossible to reduce to any rational terms, and really there is nothing to be done about it. It is to deliver oneself a prey to the tyranny of mere bulk—the weight of contradictory fact. The Professor gilds this distinctly bitter pile in 430 pages of really charming

prose, and at last, realizing that he must come to *some* conclusion, says, "How simple, then, is our duty—loyalty to life, to the ship's company and to ourselves." But as, on his own terms, life is essentially undefineable that does not really help very much. It is sad that so much charm—for this writing is charming—should have in the end nothing to say, that it should come empty-handed to a generation so desperately in need of help. But only faith can help it—and to Professor Dixon, faith seems to be the ultimate irrationality.

ROGER LLOYD.

THE COUNTRY YEAR, by Eric Parker. *Seeley Service.* 10*s.* 6*d. net.*

WILD LIFE IN A SOUTHERN COUNTY, by Richard Jefferies. *Nelson* 8*s.* 6*d. net.*

JEFFERIES' ENGLAND NATURE ESSAYS, by Richard Jefferies. *Constable.* 8*s.* 6*d. net.*

Mr. Parker's book is divided into twelve sections, one for each month of the year; and in each section there are some ten or twelve sketches upon some aspect of country life, be it country sport in some form or nature in general. For example under March 2nd we find an interesting account of the penning of pheasants, which takes place after the shooting season is ended; while under October 2nd, Mr. Parker has a few words to say on partridge driving. The author is well-known as a distinguished naturalist, and a large section of his sketches of the country are devoted to bird life. We are also ntroduced to country sport of every variety; hunting, shooting, fishing, cubbing—even village cricket—Mr. Parker has something interesting to say upon them all. It is the kind of book in which those who fancy that they know everything that there is to be known about the country and its inhabitants—human or otherwise—will find how mistaken they really are and will realize how much there is for them to learn. How many, for example, have ever seen a mole of which the author writes; "Mostly it is cream-colour, but the throat and belly are brilliant orange, the nose is olive, and there is a grey band round the tail"? It is indeed a fascinating book, and a book, moreover, by one who is in every way qualified to write it.

As for Richard Jefferies, it is only fitting that tribute should be paid to him this year, the fiftieth anniversary of his death. Wild Life in a Southern County was first published in 1879, and was one of the first books that he wrote about the country, although before that time he had already published several novels and pamphlets, for throughout his short life he was a most prolific and versatile writer. Though it is sometimes claimed that some of Jefferies' earlier work is, if not of an immature, at least of a somewhat mediocre, nature, such a claim certainly cannot be allowed in the case of the present book, where the magnificent powers of language and description that belonged to Jefferies are to be seen at their best. This book has been illustrated with some sixty exquisite pen-drawings, done by G. E. Collins, who has also contributed a note on the setting of Jefferies' scene, while Sir William Beach Thomas has written the introduction.

Jefferies' England, also admirably illustrated by a series of excellent photographs, contains a selection of his later essays, mostly written after 1880. These essays are very carefully chosen, and it is true to say that they form a representative portion of Jefferies' work at its best. There is a lengthy and critical introduction by Mr. Samuel J. Looker, who has also supplied any notes that may be necessary for the complete understanding of these essays. Finally, there is a very comprehensive bibliography, called "Check Lists," of the works of Jefferies, published during his life-time and after his death, as well as of books and articles on and about him.

PHILIP SCHAPIRO.

WITH THE CORNERS OFF, by Commander A. B. Campbell. *Harrap.* 8*s.* 6*d.*

ALL CHANGE HERE, by Albert Jarosy. *Longmans, Green.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

LEX, by Frank Whitbourn. *Longmans Green.* 10*s.* 6*d.*

Both biography and autobiography are flourishing trees to-day, and for the most part well justified in their fruits. The wealth of adventure often to be discovered in the most "ordinary" lives must have come as a surprise to many. These three books are none of them likely to become classics, but each has its own particular interest and should not fail to find its public.

As simple entertainment Commander Campbell's account of his "adventurous life on land and sea" easily takes first place. Those who have heard him broadcast some of the material appearing in his present pages will know that he has an attractive way of telling a tale and also no lack of tales to tell. He can be as amusing in recalling a "pranky" boyhood in Portsmouth as in narrating the trials of a tenderfoot in North-West Canada, where he proved his adaptability and his power of getting on with all kinds and conditions of men, faculties serving him well when he later became purser on liners travelling to the East and Australia. Then, before his pen-pictures of odd passengers and card-sharpers can become wearisome, he turns to his War experiences, notably those aboard the armed merchant cruiser *Otranto,* which spent the best part of three years patrolling the South American coasts. Here, particularly, one has some good examples of the variety of interesting stuff a book of this kind can turn up. On one page one reads how Admiral Craddock gave away his position to the German fleet by an uncoded order for a basket of fruit, thus in all probability leading to the action off Coronel and the "loss of two ships and over twelve hundred seamen." On another the Commander has to tell of encountering along the Patagonian coast, when landing in search of information of German raiders, what seemed to him clearly "relics of the Darwin survey" of more than eighty years earlier—"a picket-rod still standing, with a cross-piece let into its slot, perhaps a mark for the great scientist himself as he noted angles and distances." Later he gives a very vivid and dreadful picture of the sinking of the *Otranto* with great loss of life. Every aspect of his experience is told so well that one regrets when he crams his post-War publishing years into a single chapter; one suspects a wealth of good stories suppressed, and hopes he will get around to telling them later.

Albert Jarosy's "eccentric autobiography" also breaks off some years in the past, about the end of the War. But it opens the door on a totally different kind of life—that of a rising young violinist on the spendthrift fringes of aristocratic society in pre-War Prague and Leipzig. That existence ended with his father's death, and he had to deflate his rather large idea of himself to become music-master in Russian Courland, only to fly from danger of imprisonment when he challenged a fellow-pianist to a duel. There followed a renewed youth in Paris, with love and marriage, then presently a return to Russia, to experience first war-detention and then danger and hardship, with eventual escape, in the midst of Bolshevik Revolution. He tells his story with the air less of one looking back to than one reliving the past years, lending to parts of it not only the vividness of a novel but also some of the confusion of the contemporary event. Kubelik, the last Russian Tsar, and one or two other famous figures make momentary appearance, but mostly it is the author himself who holds the centre of the stage, romantic, vivid, and dramatic against a background of bright lights and dark shadows.

Lex provides a contrast to either Campbell or Jarosy. "No one who knew Alex Devine," begins Mr. Whitbourn's foreword, "will deny that he was a remarkable man. But he was remarkable to some as a great head-

master and educationalist and to others as an eccentric adventurer." The conjunction of estimates is unusual, and it is that conjunction and the eccentricity which largely sustains the interest of this biography. Mr. Whitbourn draws well Devine's family and Manchester background, the obscure young man's itch to make his mark in the world, the self-confidence (some will prefer to say the arrogance) which both launched and wrecked his first Working Boys' Institute, the conceit which made him live well and dress well and at the same time refuse to render accounts of his spending to suspicious committees, and the power as well as the faith which enabled him to bring Clayesmore School into being and to keep it there through frequent hard times as an educational experiment of acknowledged value for thirty years. A man difficult to like, or even to admire, but attractive to read about as another specimen of humanity's infinite variety.

GEOFFREY WEST.

THE CASE FOR SOCIALISM, by Douglas Jay. *Faber and Faber.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

THE FALSE STATE, by Hilda D. Oakley. *Williams and Norgate.* 6*s.*

A dual challenge faces the economics of socialism at the present time. On the one flank are the forces of liberal ethical neutrality, and on the other the determinism of neo-Marxist economics. It is out of an elaborate intellectual contest with these twin forces that Mr. Jay's constructive socialism emerges. For if the liberals, Professors Mises, Robbins and Hayek, are correct In regarding the aims of socialism, namely, the redistribution of wealth, the progressive abolition of inheritance and the control of the price mechanism, as not lending themselves either to the approval or disapproval of the economist as such, then the economics of socialism must make clear the ethical boundaries of the subject. Mr. Jay not only does this, but he contrives, perhaps successfully, to argue that the neutrality of the liberals, who deny the comparability of the welfare of different individuals or classes, rests upon a basis of solipsism which is itself in no sense neutral between social ends. If, again, Mr. John Strachey is correct in his discovery of an inevitable breakdown in the system of capitalism, then the aims of reformist socialism must be intrinsically futile, and any close analysis of "capitalist economics" a waste of time.

Mr. Jay devotes the greater part of this admirably constructed book to an examination and criticism of existing economic theory, both in its static and its dynamic, or trade cycle aspects, and concludes that there is actually no logical unworkability in the capitalist system, considered as an abstract pattern of relationships. This being taken as proven, the way is then open for the author to describe the policies of a reformist socialism. Apart from a tentative acceptance of some of the theories of Mr. Keynes and Mr. E. F. M. Durbin, the economic policy of Mr. Jay's socialist government would follow strictly orthodox lines. He would preserve a large part of the price mechanism, introduce a large element of control, especially over basic industries and the stock of capital, and effect an elaborate redistribution of wealth on the lines of taxation and subsidy.

There is no doubt whatever that this is the most careful and dispassionate book on socialist economics that has appeared for a very long time.

Miss Oakley has written a totally different kind of book. She presents a philosophy of the State which is at once devastatingly negative and profoundly sincere. The ideological conflicts of the age, she argues, resolve themselves into various forms of acceptance of the False State. In metaphysics the State inevitably erects itself into a supra-social entity which cannot, when developed in the actual processes of history, either embrace a universal community, society at large, nor extend the limits of true

freedom. Reality, she seems to say, will defeat, by fraud, force or war, every attempt either to embody in pure law the metaphysical forms of the State, as in contemporary fascism (which seems to derive from Hegel), or to destroy itself (wither away) according to the equally futile metaphysics of Marxism. Miss Oakley describes, perhaps not always successfully, the pretensions and failures of fascism and communism respectively, and regards the "Mass-Man" of modern society as the inevitable implication, in actuality, of the false metaphysics of State ideology in general. True liberty, in such an age, can only emerge from the martyrdom of suffering of those who love, and have loved freedom.

This is a curious, insensibly febrile book, but Miss Oakley's sincerity goes a long way.

RICHARD TERRELL.

CIVITAS DEI. Vol. III., by Lionel Curtis. *Macmillan*, 1937. 5*s*.

THE WAR AGAINST GOD, by Sydney Dark and R. S. Essex. *Hodder & Stoughton*, 1937. 5*s*.

These two books may be said to have one thing in common, and one only: they both view politics from a non-political angle. In nearly everything else, they are a great contrast.

In his third volume, Mr. Curtis is endeavouring to apply the principles of the first and second to contemporary politics, and the most important thing about it is not the detail of his application, but the fact that he does deal with politics in the light of a conscious philosophy or faith. Mr. Curtis contends that mere empiricism and hand-to-mouth procedure can to-day only deepen the confusions in the existing situation. What is the ultimate end in view? First of all settle that question, and that will decide immediate policy.

The writer defines his own faith in God as final reality, "a spirit personal in an infinitely higher degree than my own personality, and therefore supremely creative; and that God having endowed his creatures with reason, conscience . . . set them to discover, little by little, what the universe is, and called them to join in the task of making it better and greater." (p. 38). This faith issues into the practical consideration of "the organization of human society as one commonwealth" (p. 68). The immediate way to the realization of that end is "the establishment throughout the world of local self-government and of national commonwealths." (p. 68-9).

Thus, to Mr. Curtis, national sovereignty is the great obstacle to the further development of human society. How is this obstacle to be overcome? Mr. Curtis has no faith in the League of Nations for this purpose. On pp. 82-92, he advocates withdrawal from the League on the ground of the proved futility of Articles X. and XVI. His argument here lacks the grasp and power of his usual writing. Has he considered what the effect of British withdrawal would be *in the present situation*? Does he not think rather that the peril in which the democratic States find themselves is a stimulus to a development of the League in the direction of super-national sovereignty? Mr. Curtis pins his faith to the Empire, especially its outlying Dominions, as constituting a nucleus for the next step in World Commonwealth (*vide* Chapters 10 and 11). A serious, weighty and stimulating study which deserves the attention of every good citizen.

"The War Against God" is a most unequal book. Dr. Martineau once told a too ambitious student that it was impossible to preach the whole duty of man in twenty minutes. Mr. Dark and his co-author have attempted something equally ambitious in trying to summarize the history of theology and philosophy from Job down to Bertrand Russell in about ninety pages. And it can't be done. This part of the book is a succession of slap-dash generalizations, whose effect can only be to accentuate the intellectual laziness and superficiality which are

only too common in the Churches already. On p. 84, for example, is repeated the half-truth that Marxism teaches the supremacy of economic causes. If Mr. Dark will read the Preface to the "Critique of Political Economy," he will discover what Marx really said about "powers of production." One has no space to quote, but the Introduction is peppered with inaccuracies and half-truths.

The authors nowhere clearly define what war against God means. Is it denial of God's existence? or of a particular idea of God? Or opposition to Christian ideals and values? We are not told. Sometimes we are left to infer one or other. After all, from the ethical point of view, the Church has been as hostile to God as secular institutions.

In the second part of the book, which is a survey of anti-religious activities in various countries, particularly Russia, Spain and Germany, there is really useful information. The account of the struggle between Hitler and the Churches is especially good. The authors show some appreciation of the corruption of the Hierarchy in Russia and Spain, so that opposition to the Church, in such circumstances, is not necessarily war against God.

Readers of this book should keep a supply of salt handy.

D. R. Davies.

NOW READY

My Winter Lists of

RECENT SECOND-HAND

PURCHASES

are now ready.

Many bargains in all subjects await you.

Send a card today.

THOMAS J. GASTON,
76 STRAND, W.C.2
Phone: TEM. 3048

KISSING THE ROD, by Viola Meynell. *Cape.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

A PURSE OF COPPERS, by Sean O'Faolain. *Cape.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

THE SHORT STORIES OF LIAM O'FLAHERTY. *Cape.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

WELSH SHORT STORIES. *Faber & Faber.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

What a large number of the most striking stories in English are written by the Irish and the Welsh! Striking, because the English reader, ruminant moralist and romantic, is startled by these tales of the tribes. His own tribal days were over long ago. He has lost that kind of smallness and that kind of largeness. He is no longer a neighbour and no longer a hero. The people of Liam O'Flaherty, Sean O'Faolain, the Welsh contortionists in the tales of Caradoc Evans, Rhys Davies, Margiad Evans, are people and a place at once. They stand out largely in their mountain farms, their forgotten towns, their civil war lorries. They are figures which a countryside talks

about. And you can see how deeply-rooted this feeling is when Mr. O'Flaherty triumphantly assumes that the death of a blackbird or the escape of a conger eel has the same transcendent quality. Beside these writers, an English one, like Miss Viola Meynell, seems to belong to no place, but to live without local fame (and without local littleness, be t said), within the levelled limits of herself. If her people are to have importance it must *all* come from her. She has got to build up brick by brick from dead level.

There are two long stories in her book *Kissing the Rod* which stand out above the rest and the first is excellent. It is a study of a young *roué* who, going out to Australia on business, flirts with an inexperienced young girl, amusedly digs out her story and discovers, when she has run away from him in miserable disillusion, that he can't do without her. Both man and girl are admirably built up. Every word and every sentence counts. There is a stolidity in Miss Meynell which keeps her mind to the earth while her sensibility moves unerringly into the journeys and climates of human feeling. Straightforward with her facts yet aware of every obliquity—that is the kind of balance she strikes. Her best stories give one, at the end, the true feeling that, in completing the cycles of their experience, human beings have made a bargain about which, although there can be two opinions, there is only one they wish to know :

> "Harold had arrived at that stage when happiness becomes mere acute suspense—reaching an intensity when it had gone neutral."

It is a dangerous game, the exploration of neutrality, but Miss Meynell is an artist in its subtle surprises ; and if her range is not wide, a story like *The Time, the Place, and The Loved One* is masterly in execution and impressive in content.

Of all the Irish writers, Mr. O'Faolain seems to me the most authoritative and diverse. He is a writer of the first class. His opening sentences take one at once into a world which reverberates with the sound of real voices reflecting upon their own experience. He is the first to catch the Irish priesthood, the Catholic atmosphere and the stifled life of the provincial towns with something more than a camera. A fighting priest talks in a train, a French sailor lands in the West and wants a woman, a girl is driven to lying in the confessional, a commercial traveller makes a farce of the economics of self sufficiency, a singer fails—these are some of the tales, and he moves through them into the dim rooms of provincial life where people sit cramped but not mean, forgetting their bruises in curious, twisted talk. Garrulous solitaries, all of them are, frustrated in life but eloquent in dogma or private fantasy, their wit turned against themselves and the world. Mr. O'Faolain is an unequal writer, occasionally cumbersome in plot, better in the oblique suggestion than direct narrative.

Mr. O'Flaherty's stories illustrate the Irish skill with the athletic animal in life, the muscular, instinctive and sensational. Ten years ago they seemed to have a miraculous freshness like grass in the spring, and they have worn as well as the almost purely physical can. Violence loses its force in retrospect, and how these people do hate, howl, lust and roar! But this heroic stuff has its genuine side and is not all melodrama. Some of it belongs to Nature and not to the parish.

The Welsh collection has the same tribal force but it is distributed into the equivocations of Welsh character. These are small but mysterious and give the kind of pleasure one has at a local race meetings when the thrill of the gallop is given a twist by the knowledge that all the jockeys are pulling. Margiad Evans' *Country Dance*, easily dominates the book, but among the lesser known writer a story translated from the Welsh of Richard Hughes Williams was impressive. There is a really native stamp and ring in this anthology and a higher standard than one commonly finds.

V. S. Pritchett.

THE BIBLE : Designed to be read as Literature. *Heinemann.* 10*s.* 6*d.*
THE DIARY OF A COUNTRY PRIEST, by Georges Bernanos. *Boriswood.* 10*s.* 6*d.*
WRESTLING JACOB, by Marjorie Bowen. *Heinemann.* 15*s.*
THE VILLAGE CARPENTER, by Walter Rose. *Cambridge.* 8*s.* 6*d.*

Praise may be lavishly bestowed on Ernest Sutherland Bates for the arranging and editing of *The Bible*, designed to be read as literature. The Bible has always been a best-seller but in this new form, with the eye pleasantly attracted by a clear type set in ordinary paragraph book form, it has again become a book to be read in the home. There are omissions but they are omissions to good purpose, planned to avoid redundancy and repetition, and will displease nobody except those who seek a favourite passage—and they will be few—without finding it and those who do not believe that the Bible is capable of being edited by twentieth-century man. In particular the printing of the verse as poetry and not as prose divided arbitrarily, is a great advance.

Another generation may find less to admire than our own in *The Diary of a Country Priest*, brilliantly and sympathetically translated from the French by Pamela Morris. The story is a simple one, compelling in its candour, of the hopes, doubts and fears of a young priest, battling against the enormous odds of a parish, accepting God yet incapable of reflecting his enthusiasms or responding to his teaching. Weak in body but not in physical courage, fearless yet fearful of his relations with other men, constantly misunderstood yet half respected even while being laughed at or reviled, the country priest is presented as a highly sensitive type, and it is in his mind that the fiercest struggle is waged. He finds peace at last, and with him others may do the same in a fine book, which has more power for good in a page than a pulpit full of sermons.

A strange contrast is the John Wesley seen in Marjorie Bowen's study, *Wrestling Jacob*. The facts of Wesley's life are largely indisputable, but Miss Bowen has welded them into a fine narrative, which even if it reveals Wesley in harsh perspective, is no doubt just and true. Too much may be made of the Lincolnshire scene but life controlled by Susanna Wesley, John's mother, with the inconsequential behaviour of the Rev. Samuel, must have been as hard an upbringing as any children have ever been asked to endure in a Christian home. Mrs. Wesley, whose one absorbing task was to save the souls of herself and her children, allowed no spark of humour to invade her circle, and the misery of poverty was increased for the children by the grim rule of method controlling all their actions. Small wonder that John and the other children were hardly normal, but at least the boys were well educated, and John, during his Oxford days, had opportunity to live a less spartan life. Had he married Sophie Hopkey in Georgia, the world might well have heard less of John Wesley, but, jaded and disappointed, he returned to England to rediscover his faith and his great preaching power. The religious fervour, which he inspired in a country long overdue for a revival of humanitarian ideals, was akin to madness, yet it achieved much and perhaps, somewhere in John Wesley's character there was a gentler streak, discernible in his brother Charles, which has escaped his biographer and the world.

Walter Rose is still a carpenter and still a great believer in the need for more craftsmen to-day. His book, *The Village Carpenter*, is chiefly concerned with his memories of his grandfather's and then his father's business—in its early days, for later it became amalgamated with the kindred trades of bricklaying and decorating. The love for wood in all its forms pervades the book with a sweet atmosphere, but the varied information it imparts is wide and interesting. Illustrated with excellent photographs the book also contains chapters on every form of jobbing from work on the farm to undertaking. A book for everyone who has admired a good gate or listened to the music of the saw.

JOHN ARMITAGE.

OUR CONTRIBUTORS

For the benefit of our many overseas readers we provide here each month a brief sketch by way of introduction of our contributors to THE FORTNIGHTLY *public.*

1938 is here, and, as individuals, most of us will be indulging in the salutary habit of taking stock. THE FORTNIGHTLY, too, may perhaps stand back from its advanced observation-post on the quickly changing scene of current affairs and scan the wider horizon.

Appropriately, scrutiny begins at home. THE FORTNIGHTLY has always kept out of the rut of party politics. To-day such detachment is vindicated more than ever. For in no period within living memory was there ever such a blurring of party frontiers.

Lord Elton, who contributes the leading article on "The Decay of Opposition," may claim to have been among the first of those actively engaged in the party dog-fight to get his bearings in the post-war world. A contributor to the review on many occasions during the past few years, Lord Elton won his spurs, politically, as the chief lieutenant of the late Mr. Ramsay Macdonald when England's first Labour Prime Minister put country before party in 1931. But before that he enjoyed an enviable reputation as historian, teacher and author. A Fellow and Tutor of The Queen's College, Oxford, and one of the first of the dons openly to espouse the cause of socialism—he was an unsuccessful Labour candidate at the 1924 and 1929 elections—Godfrey Elton, as he was then, wrote poetry and novels as well as history and had considerable success with his fascinating record of the evolution of the British Labour Party, *England Arise*! His intimate knowledge of that party gives special point to the statement, which few would challenge, that to-day it has "lost its political *differentia*." Lord Elton is one of the principal members of the National Labour Organization and Chairman of the Board of the fortnightly *News-Letter*, which he has edited since its inception. Recently he has made a host of friends as a broadcaster of the series of informal talks "It occurs to me . . ."

Philip Mairet, in the second article, provides a conspectus of the far-flung British realm from an unusual—but exceedingly important — angle. He shows the effect on the Dominions overseas of their financial dependence upon "the City," and its relation with the plight of agriculture in the home country. Philip Mairet is a man of many parts, known chiefly as editor of *The New English Weekly*. As successor of the incomparable A. R. Orage, he has had a formidable task and has acquitted himself most creditably. His special field is psychology, but he has a remarkable grasp of all matters relating to public affairs.

An issue which touches us all directly —and immediately—is Empire defence, on which **Captain Liddell Hart,** military correspondent of *The Times* contributes an authoritative paper. His theme acquires special interest from the recent overnight changes in the highest posts of Great Britain's military organization: while the unsolved problems in foreign affairs are a grim commentary on his remark that "the British Empire is on

the rack, suffering a two-way stretch." Before joining the staff of *The Times* the author was for ten years military correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*. His books on war history and strategy are standard works, and the latest, *Europe in Arms*, is indispensable to the student of current politics. He is also Military Editor of the Encyclopædia Britannica.

The foreign scene shows little or no improvement. In the Far East, indeed, the gravest issues portend. **Felix Morley,** who contributes a valuable analysis of America's attitude, is Editor of *The Washington Post*. He formerly worked for many years in Geneva, on the *Geneva Research Center*, and was a witness of that depressing chapter in the history of the League of Nations when Japan was allowed to begin her lawless action of China. During that time he wrote an admirable study of the League of Nations which ranks high in the voluminous literature on that subject.

O. M. Green tells the story of Shanghai, a unique international phenomenon, and suggests that its fate might have been a happier one if original national concessions of the Great Powers had never been replaced by an "international" régime. The author returned to England some years ago after ten years in China as Editor of the *North China Daily News*.

Paul Anderson turns the searchlight on that Berlin-Vienna-Prague sector which is the focus of the ambitions of an expansionist Germany. The author of this well-informed article was a former student under the late Dr. Mendelsohn-Bartholdy at the *Institut fur Auswärtige Politik* in Hamburg, and also studied in Berlin and Vienna. He has travelled widely in Central Europe and is at work now on a study of the foreign policy of Nazi Germany.

Lord Derwent, writing of *The Arts To-day*, takes us away from politics—though, as he laments, even in art and literature politics will keep "creeping in." The author is President of the Yorkshire Liberal Federation. His active experience of politics is limited, however, to the period 1923-1928 when he served as attaché to the British Legations at Warsaw, Brussels and Madrid. His sojourn in the Spanish capital was productive of an admirable and impressionist study of Goya published in 1930. He has also written books on Prosper Mérimée and Rossini, and a certain amount of verse.

H. E. Bates, the distinguished short story-writer, needs no introduction, and the writer who signs himself **David Barrend** is an authority on the electrical supply industry.

Alfred Fellows provides a valuable commentary on the new Divorce Act, is well-known as an authority on these problems, and has written a masterly popular exposition of the new Act, published by Mesrs. Watts (2/-). He is Vice-President of the Divorce Law Reform Union.

THE FORTNIGHTLY BAZAAR

Politically 1937 closed on a dismal note, and few people will find much consolation from the fact that we have so far managed to avoid a world war. Curiously enough the sales of the FORTNIGHTLY—and no doubt kindred reviews follow the same tendency—serve as a foul weather barometer of surprising accuracy. When times are bad the sales go up. Not very excitingly, we must admit, for the sales of the FORTNIGHTLY are not easily affected by a free gift scheme or even signed portraits of the Führer or Duce. But a hint of hostility, and the curve of the graph begins to plot its way upwards : and history relates than in its more than seventy years of life, the peak circulation of the FORTNIGHTLY was reached during the Great War. All things considered it is just what one might expect, for when the world is anxious the reviews, more than ever to-day remain a fearless commentary on public affairs. That this is appreciated by others besides ourselves can be observed in the advertisement of *The Times*. They, too, find that as confidence dwindles so do the people turn to more solid fare for their daily mental food.

* * * * *

Ashridge, that famous forcing-ground for young Conservatives, has just published its programme of courses for 1938. A wonderful institution in a beautiful setting. Conservatism is not always a marked characteristic of those attending the courses, but the purpose of Ashridge, endowed by its founder, the late Urban Broughton in memory of his friend Bonar Law is to offer adult citizens of both sexes and all classes education in democratic citizenship on traditional and constitutional lines. Subjects for courses during 1938 include Conservatism and the Nation, Foreign Affairs, Imperial Defence, Agriculture, National Health and Fitness, Local Government and Literature and Politics. Major General Sir Reginald Hoskins is Principal, and the Earl Baldwin is Chairman of the Governing Body.

* * * * *

The Royal Academy has arranged a series of official lectures in connection with the forthcoming Exhibition of XVIIth century Art in Europe which opens on January 3rd. The lectures will be delivered on successive Fridays, in the Meeting Room of the Royal Society, Burlington House. The list of lecturers includes Sacheverell Sitwell, who will open the series on Friday, January 7, A. M. Hind, C. C. Oman, Anthony Blunt, E. K. Waterhouse, Lord Gerald Wellesley, Professor Emile Cammaerts, Professor Tancred Borenius, Mrs. Esdaile, and Professor Geoffrey Webb. In addition, the Royal Academy has prepared a panel of distinguished lecturers who will speak on the various aspects of the exhibition at societies, clubs and educational establishments. Application for a copy of the panel should be sent to the Secretary of the Royal Academy.

* * * * *

Pictures from private collections all over Great Britain will be on view at the Exhibition of XVIIth Century Art in Europe, which will be open from January to March. Their Majesties the King and Queen have consented to lend a number of Rembrandt, Rubens, Van Dyck, Vermeer, Hals, Velazquez,

Murillo, Claude, Poussin and other masters will be shown. A feature of the Exhibition will be a number of important works by artists so far little known to the British public.

* * * * *

Community, the Journal of Social Service, published from the Midland Office of the National Council of Social Service at Birmingham is a first-rate affair. With simple yet effective make-up the magazine achieves its purpose in a thoroughly workmanlike and attractive way. In text and in photographs it shows the value of a corporate existence, the need to look after one's physical and mental well-being by means of keep-fit classes, athletics, using the public library for reading, amateur dramatics, music, cooking and gardening. The illustrations are all good, but the one entitled " The Book Lover " which shows a young working man sitting on his heels in the corner of the public library, and opening the book which he has just taken from the bottom shelf, is delightful.

* * * * *

The new and completely revised 1938 Burke's Peerage, Baronetage and Knightage, exceeds, 3,120 pages. It is the only volume in existence which gives an alphabetical Guide to the Relative ranks of nearly 50,000 distinguished people.

* * * * *

" War and Peace " is to be the subject of the Tuesday evening public lectures at Morley College, 61, Westminster Bridge Road during the spring term. The first three lectures on *Danger-Spots in Europe* ; Fighting Forces and Modern Methods of Warfare will be given by Major General A. C. Temperley, who will be followed by Lt.-Col. Sir Arnold Wilson on Isolation, Bertrand Russell on Pacifism and Miss Eleanor Rathbone on Collective Security. The first lecture is on January 18th, and a course ticket at half-a-crown covers the series of six lectures. In addition to the usual College classes, several short courses have been arranged on the Ballet, the Cinema, Problems of Contemporary Art, Clear Thinking, Life and Labour in London and Social Ethics

THE ARYAN PATH ——— *Commencement of New Volume.*

Vol. IX. PRINCIPAL JANUARY CONTENTS. No. 1.

MESSAGES FROM THE BORDERLAND - - - - *J. Middleton Murry*
LOVE AND LIFE AS ETERNAL ENEMIES - - - - *Clifford Bax*
CRITICISM AND CREATIVE ART - - - - *K. S. Venkataramani*
GENIUS AND CHARACTER ACCORDING TO GEORGE DUHAMEL - - - -
and other interesting articles and reviews.

Subscription 12/-. *Single Copies 1/6.*

THEOSOPHY COMPANY (INDIA) LTD., 17, Gt. Cumberland Place, LONDON, W.1.